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I.	Abstract	
The background for the thesis is to look into if a broadband levy may be the answer to the 
increasing challenges of monetizing unlicensed cultural content on the internet, and if such a 
levy can work in an age where traditional elements, covered by previous levies, moves over 
to media that is not covered, such as streaming and cloud storage.  
 
To do so, I have used the methodological approach of exploratory research, combined with 
qualitative interviews of four respondents who has great insight of the music industry from 
different view points.  The first two chapters involves an insight into existing challenges and 
previously introduced levies on broadband, in order to form a foundation for comparison 
and analysis. Chapter three presents methodology. The fourth chapter is dedicated to 
responses from informants on key questions, in order to form a solid basis for discussion in 
chapter five, and a conclusion in chapter six. 
 
The findings are that it is possible to, in a simple way, introduce a levy on broadband in a 
widely digitalized market like Norway. This can be done somewhat in accordance with 
existing copyright structures. The question is whether or not it is necessary. In terms of this, 
the thesis leans towards a negative response in terms of necessity. One of the major issues of 
monetising cultural content on the internet today is related to platform services such as 
Facebook, Youtube and Google, and their lack of remuneration of this content with basis in 
the recently dismissed Safe Harbour agreement.  Despite the fact that it may be possible to 
introduce a levy on broadband fairly simply, this could lead to so many changes in the 
structure, that it may be of more value to focus the energy on a topic that may lead to a 
similar result in terms of monetizing cultural content; regulating the internet and focusing on 
monetizing platform services.  
 
The conclusion presents a number of ways of introducing a broadband levy, but asks 
whether or not it is necessary to focus on it, based on the fact that there may be more 
prominent challenges in terms of monetizing cultural content,
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III.	Introduction	
In the fall of 2014 the Association of Norwegian Film Producers called out for a broadband 
levy of 1 NOK/month per subscriber paid by the Internet service providers (ISPs) to the 
industry (Nilsen, 2014). This yet again made the issue of a broadband levy a fairly hot topic.  
 A levy on broadband has been discussed since the mid-noughties in different shapes and 
sizes, but mainly based on the fact that illegal downloading has been a major challenge. This 
is, at least in some countries and with some cultural content, not the case anymore. Streaming 
is growing, and legal ways of acquiring cultural content is increasing, but unlicensed content 
still stands for a major part of the cultural content consumed online, regardless if it is bootlegs 
on Soundcloud, home-made concert videos on YouTube, or professionally copied films on 
services such as Popcorn Time. The amount of cultural content available that rights holders 
are not gaining remuneration for is vast. 
 Where private copying levies were a good way of gaining remuneration for the rights 
holders, through levies on physical storage media, more and more files move from physical 
personal storage m(Gluth 2010)edia to cloud-based services, which are not under the same 
obligation to include such levies in their pricing. The incomes of private copying levies are 
decreasing, but the amount of unlicensed content available is still massive.  
 
Based on these issues, and inspired by the proposed levy by the film producers:  
 
How and why is one to introduce a levy on broadband to address the challenges of 
unlicensed cultural content being spread widely online? 
 
There are five main issues that need to be discussed in this context, and that has come up as a 
consequence of gathering theoretical material: 
• What justifies a broadband levy for cultural content? 
• Which factors determine the size of the levy for internet users? Is it fair to put a levy 
on the internet, when it may be regarded as a utility?  
• How does one introduce a levy on broadband that does not breach the foundations of 
copyright, and does in a technical way permit illegal downloading? 
• How does one distribute the money from a broadband levy, and how does one avoid 
manipulation of the numbers that the money is distributed upon? 
	 IV	
• Can a broadband levy work as a supplement to the existing structure of the music 
industry? 
This topic raises issues, which this paper seeks to answer, mainly from a music industry 
perspective, and mainly based on developments in Norway. The paper seeks to provide some 
insight and suggestions for possible solutions in an ongoing and ever-returning debate. 
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1.	Issues	of	the	internet	
Even though a levy on broadband might be feasible, one needs to gain some insight of the vast 
array of topics that covers the world of the internet, and how user trends are shifting as more 
and more move over to what is commonly referred to as «the cloud» and streaming. In 
essence, more and more is moving over to the internet and away from the physical, which 
gives new challenges to the technology industry as a whole, and in this instance the producers 
of cultural content. One can argue that some of the structures in place today, are in fact not 
structures for tomorrow. This development is mainly down to the main topic that has occurred 
over the last two decades: Digitalization of content.  
 This chapter seeks to provide some insight to what is going on on the internet and in 
technology in terms of digitalization, technological advances, and problem areas for the 
cultural content industry. In part one it looks into how digitalization has affected the music 
industry, in order to lay some groundwork for an understanding of the issues. Part two looks 
into how we use technologies differently than in the age of illegal downloading, and what 
streaming has done to the music market. Part three seeks to provide a basis for a discussion of 
unlicensed cultural content, looking at issues that could need to be resolved if one were to 
solve such an issue. Part four seeks to gain some insight into the potential earnings that could 
be created by a broadband levy, with only a very conservative estimate.  
1.1.	Digitalization	of	music	
To put a broadband levy into a context, one needs to understand the reality of which the 
cultural content providers roam. There is no doubt that many of the challenges that a 
broadband levy may be able to address exist due to digitalization. The story of digitalization is 
long, and fairly complicated, surrounded by major labels and declining revenues battling 
technological advances and new industry acts. This part of the chapter seeks to give a brief 
overview of the consequences digitalization have had on the music industry. 
 The main driver for digitalization has, in its simplest form, been the internet. The internet 
can be described as many things, and has a different shape and use today, than what it did in 
the sixties as a tool for the military and computer scientists at universities. The perhaps most 
precise description of the internet is in fact a series of tubes, as a governor from Alaska 
described it in 2006 (Blum, 2012, p. 4). Although we like to think of the internet as a cosmic 
cloud, it is a very physical infrastructure, where wires and data centers connects your 
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computer or mobile phone to the rest of the world. The cloud is in fact not a cloud, but most 
likely a data center somewhere in Oregon or northern Sweden (Blum, 2012, p. 227). Yet, this 
physical structure has changed the game for so many, has changed the way we see the world, 
and has changed everything it has come in contact with (Hardy, 2012; E-book, Beginnings, 
paragraph 6)  
 The internet and digitalization has been the major driver of change in the music industry in 
the last two decades (Wikström, 2013, p. 8). Music has perhaps been the cultural content that 
has been hit the most severely by digitalization (Hardy 2012; E-book, Beginnings, paragraph 
7), due to the challenges connected to the accuracy and ease of which digital recordings may 
be copied. Digitalization has made copying of music easier, hence threatening the artificial 
scarcity of which is a corner stone of the music and recording industry, and other cultural 
content industries, as well (Hesmondhalgh, 2013, p. 341). This development had the 
consequence that in the noughties, revenues from sales of recorded music saw a substantial 
drop. Where the CD had caused a major impact on physical sales, it became less and less 
relevant, leading to decreased revenues in the recorded music industry as a whole (Hardy 
2012; E-book, Beginnings, paragraph 20). David Hesmondhalgh addresses four reasons for 
why digitalization became a pressing issue for the music industry, before any other creators of 
cultural content: 
• The development of the MP3 compression standard, allowing massive amounts of audio information 
to be compressed into small files of relatively high quality. 
• The spread of high bandwidth connections, making it easier to acquire copies 
• The introduction of computers with improved storage capacity, soundcards, CD players and 
speakers.  
• The development of accessible software that could copy («rip») CDs into MP3 files, and also 
discover and download these types of files from others.  
(Hesmondhalgh, 2013, p. 342)	
 
This development did not only lead to structural changes in the music industry itself, such as 
mergers and bankruptcy of record companies (Hardy 2012; E-book, Beginnings, paragraph 
8), but also meant that the recording industry was faced with two major issues as a 
consequence of technological development: File sharing and P2P-networks, and how to 
distribute recordings digitally rather than physically and make money out of doing so. The 
answer to these issues were: 1) prosecute and sue those who granted access to illegal file-
sharing, such as Napster, and 2) implementing copy protection standards such as digital rights 
management (DRM), in addition to making digital files accessible for purchase. The issue 
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here is, of course, that these actions caused parts of the digital community to try to break 
DRM-coding and to find alternatives to the file-sharing services being closed down due to 
legal battles.  
 Even though digitalization in the noughties has been an ongoing battle of wits between 
those trying to gain compensation and those creating free and illegal access to this material, it 
has caused a major shift in the recording industry. On the downside, it has caused record label 
portfolios to be reduced, and decreasing their willingness - or ability - to take financial risk. 
On the upside, it has also caused positive developments; Consumers today are able to, more 
than ever before, gain access to massive repertoires via streaming services; to purchase music 
quickly and conveniently through digital download services and; purchase physical material 
easier than before via online retailers.  
 The ongoing battle of wits in terms of DRM and prosecution of illegal file-sharing services 
may have been, by some, seen as a losing battle, but it is quite clear that it may have helped 
the music industry to discover and develop alternative solutions, for instance when it comes to 
streaming. Streaming services have helped to make legal music more accessible, whilst 
protecting the rights of the ones who own the content. Services, such as iTunes, offering 
digital downloads have also helped, but have seen a decline in sales after streaming became 
the preferred way of acquiring music for many (Thompson, 2015). 
 Digitalization has caused the old recording industry to become what Patrick Wikström 
describes as the new music industry, tackling one major challenge that is characterized as: 
«(...) high connectivity and little control; music provided as a service; and increased 
amateur creativity» 
(Wikström, 2013, p. 8) 
 
This aspect causes major challenges for the new music industry. In relation to a broadband 
levy, the question that arises is whether or not such a levy can help tackle some of these 
challenges. Can a broadband levy help to gain remuneration for the works, despite the limited 
control the music industry has in the realm of digitalization? And can it perhaps take 
advantage of the high level of connectivity? These aspects are something that will be taken 
into consideration when moving forward on this topic. 
1.2.	Technologies	develop	and	progress	
There is no doubt that technologies have always developed and progressed, and that they are 
likely to continue to do so. Technology has always had a potential to change the way we go 
about things, sometimes for the worse, sometimes for the better. When one looks into how 
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technologies have changed the way we consume music and other cultural content, there are 
many elements that has made an impact in terms of both income and the creation of potential 
income through different systems and models. This part of the chapter seeks to give some 
insight into - arguably - two of the most prominent ones. One is hailed as a potential solution 
to the troubles that the cultural content industry has seen in the aftermath of illegal 
downloading; the other may create a problem for existing structures.  
1.2.1.	Streaming	services	
Some deem streaming of music, and also film, as the saviour of the online cultural content 
industry. Streaming has caused illegal file sharing, especially of music, to be reduced. Norway 
- a country where new technology gains foothold fairly quickly - has seen a reduction in 
illegal file sharing of music, which today is close to nothing (Ingham, 2015a). In 2014 
Norwaco estimated that around 2 million Norwegians used music streaming services1 (Ipsos 
MMI, 2015, p. 29). This is more than half of what is described as the «digital» Norwegian 
population; those who have access to and uses the internet frequently2. Out of the total 
number of music streaming service users, a little over 70 per cent pays for a subscription 
(Ipsos MMI, 2015, p. 30), or around 1,4 million people.  
 The Norwegian numbers are quite large from a more international point of view. Estimates 
show that only around 25 per cent of the total Spotify users have a subscription. The rest 
chooses to go for a freemium option. (Atkinson, 2015) New numbers concerning 2015 
confirms that streaming is on the rise, and Spotify at the beginning of 2016 had 100 million 
users, with around 25 per cent using the premium option (Resnikoff, 2016). Although the 
amount of users of music streaming services are increasing, there is still a major gap in 
income coming from different types of users. Estimations show that the 25 per cent that have 
the premium option stands for close to 90 per cent of the income of Spotify. The 75 per cent 
that have chosen to go for a freemium ad-based option only caters for roughly 10 per cent of 
the income (Ingham, 2015b). The fact that the gap is so huge, represents a major issue when it 
comes to streaming services: the income. Many artists and rights holders have complained that 
they get very little in return from Spotify. British artist Zöe Keating estimated in 2013 that she 
got around USD 0.0044 per stream on Spotify (Dredge, 2013). This means that Keating would 
require around 225 streams in order to earn USD 1 from streaming. Although Keating may 
not - arguably - be what one regards as a popular music artist, similar data confirms the fact 																																																								1	55 per cent	2	Around 90 per cent of Norwegians fall under this category.	
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that rights holders gains very little income per stream. Of course, there is the question of how 
a lot of plays adds up to major sums, but estimates show that 1 per cent of artists stands for 77 
per cent of the income of Spotify (Nordgård, 2016, p. 186). Based on this 99 per cent of artists 
- if they are even streamed and listened to - are left with sharing 23 per cent of the money 
between them. This of course may be fair from a basic market economics point of view, but it 
shows that streaming income for most artists is minimal, and perhaps not sustainable in the 
long run. The fact that the income potential from the largest music streaming service is not 
fully utilized, and that the distribution of this income is very uneven can be regarded as a 
major issue when it comes to streaming. Even though it might be the best answer, music 
streaming services are in no way perfect. This may provide basis for something like a 
broadband levy to even things out.  
 Another issue with streaming is the fact that so many things are regarded as a streaming 
service; in many cases this content is unlicensed. The topic of unlicensed content will return 
later in this chapter. What is interesting at this stage, however, is to look at what one regards 
as a streaming service, and what one counts in when reporting increasing usage of streaming 
services. There are of course plenty of streaming services that are used for the purpose of 
streaming specific content, such as Spotify, Apple Music, Netflix and other similar services. 
The issue here is that online content intermediaries are also sometimes counted in as a 
streaming service, most notably platform service YouTube. There is of course nothing wrong 
with counting in the world’s largest content intermediary as a streaming service, but up until 
very recently3, YouTube has not been a service where you pay to gain access, and where very 
little advertising income comes back to rights holders. Therefore, one may question whether 
or not it is a streaming service in the strict interpretation of the word. For instance, when 
Polaris Nordic - a cooperation between three nordic collective management organisations 
(CMOs)4 - states that 78 per cent of internet users in the nordic countries have used a digital 
music service in 2014, and then counts in YouTube in these statistics (Polaris Nordic, 2015), 
it may not be as impressive as it sounds. If one is led to believe that this means that 78 per 
cent pays, which may be likely, then that is a misunderstanding that needs to be clarified. This 
example is not used to criticise Polaris Nordic, but to show that streaming is a very wide term, 
and although streaming is increasing and replacing illegal filesharing in many instances, it 
does not have to mean that as many as 78 per cent pays for streaming content through 
subscriptions or advertising income. In fact, the same report shows that only 20 per cent paid 																																																								3	YouTube	Red	4	Danish Koda, Norwegian TONO, Finnish Teosto	
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for digital music in 2014, meaning that most users either go for a freemium option, or streams 
from YouTube5. This is in no way only negative, but it raises a major question: what is 
streaming? Is it what creates income through services, or is it the use of the technology? 
Streaming has a bigger potential for bringing in money than what it is doing at the moment, 
and if solved correctly it may be able to maximize this potential. In short: although streaming 
is the answer to many issues, there are still issues that need to be covered if streaming is to 
actually become the saviour of the music and cultural content industry. Today it is a great 
solution, but it may not be a complete one. The question is whether a broadband levy may be a 
decent supplement to limited streaming income, although with a bigger potential than it 
manages to extrude.  
1.2.2.	Cloud	storage	
Where companies would compete selling personal hard drives with the most storage capacity 
possible a few years ago, external hard drives have seen a drop in sales over the last few years 
(Arthur, 2013). Today it almost seems as if computer companies are competing to sell SSD-
drives that have less capacity but better processing speed, at a higher price. One reason why 
hard drive sales are dropping - there are many other factors, such as floods and natural 
disasters in production areas increasing prices of production - is the fact that consumers have 
started to move from personal computers to personal tablets and bigger and better mobile 
phones, increasing the need for storage in the cloud (Arthur, 2013). Of course, storage in the 
cloud requires physical storage media too, but these are mainly put in data centers in different 
parts of the world, and the consumer has no need to purchase an external hard drive to be able 
to store in the cloud. This development creates a challenge for the cultural content industries. 
 Many countries have levys on physical storage media, for instance Sweden and 
Privatkopieringsärsettningen. As we will see, the income from this system has decreased. 
There may be several reasons why the income has decreased. One may assume that less 
people download, which in some countries is the case, for instance in Norway, but one may 
also consider the fact that more and more gigabytes are moved over to the cloud and other 
alternative storage media, not under the levy regulations. This is not highly unlikely, as cloud 
storage seems to gain foothold.  
 Regardless if this is the case or not, if one is to develop a new levy, one probably needs to 																																																								5	It should be noted that in the 2015 report, Polaris Nordic excluded YouTube from the statistics. In this report, 
the number of Nordic internet users who had used a music streaming service was reduced with 20 per cent, 
coming out at a still impressive 58 per cent. People who paid for music in digital format had gone up to 23 per 
cent.	
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take into consideration that more and more files are stored in other ways than on physical 
storage media.  
1.3.	Unlicensed	cultural	content	
The rise of new ways to consume cultural content over the internet has lead to new challenges 
for the cultural content industries. One of the major challenges connects to unlicensed content 
being spread widely online. In the age of illegal downloading, this content was illegal due to 
the fact that it was not licensed or uploaded by the creators and distributors, hence creating no 
money. The fact that one could acquire it without paying, and the content not being licensed to 
be used for such a purpose, made it illegal. As we have seen, illegal downloading of music is 
not the problem it used to be - in Norway being close to zero – and in addition more and more 
legal services, such as Spotify, have made it possible to acquire music legally, through 
licensing deals with major labels and their counterparts. The problem of unlicensed content 
has shifted from P2P to streaming sites such as Youtube, Soundcloud and so on. As users can 
upload most content, often at a higher speed than what one has the resources to take down, 
there is a lot of content out there where one uses parts of, or all of, works that have been 
copyrighted by others than the uploader. The problem also becomes evident when one 
considers that some copyright-algorithms used by the biggest player Youtube, favours the 
ones who have signed what some call unfavourable license agreements (Coplan, 2014). This 
means that the ones who have not signed such agreements, whatever the reason, are not 
protected by the algorithms Youtube use to take down unlicensed content, hence having to do 
this themselves. This is done by the owner of the works noticing the content provider to take it 
down, creating a tiresome and complex process where the owner has to roam the internet for 
unlicensed content in order to have a better chance of gaining compensation for their works, 
improving the chances for legal and licensed acquisition by the consumer. The process of 
noticing the content provider - in this case Youtube being the most relevant - to take it down, 
is - perhaps naturally - referred to as «notice and take down» (Wikipedia, n.d.). 
 One can always argue whether or not notice and take down is the way forward, or if 
Youtube should treat all works equally, regardless of if some choose to stand on the outside. 
One can also argue whether or not today’s copyright system is outdated, and should not cater 
for people using unlicensed content to enhance and showcase their own creativity, as often is 
the case. One of the most prominent critics of the existing copyright structure is Lawrence 
Lessig, who considers the existing copyright structure to limit and prohibit the rise of new 
creativity, and to only cater for an old-fashioned way of expressing creativity; not taking 
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technological advances into account. This is some of the essence in Lessig’s book “Remix” 
(Lessig, 2008). Lessig advocates the need for a reform of copyright law, in order to enhance 
new ways of expressing creativity.  
 Regardless if one agrees with this view or not, the amount of unlicensed content on the 
internet creates a major challenge for the cultural content industry, as creators and their 
supporters are not substantially remunerated from the use of this content on the internet. 
Higher amounts of unlicensed content means less likelihood for creators gaining 
compensation for the use of their works. The fact that some internet intermediaries can be 
seen as undermining the validity of legal services, gaining a substantial income through users 
sharing unlicensed content, is also an issue. This is evident when it comes to the use of 
platform services and social media.  
1.3.1.	Cultural	content	on	platform	services			
A platform service can be defined as a service that is based on user uploaded content, or the 
aggregation of existing content (GESAC, 2016). Youtube is perhaps the most prominent 
example in this regard, but Facebook may also be counted in as it is also based on user-
generated content. A counter argument for counting in Facebook is the fact that a lot of the 
content shared on this platform is acquired and generated from other sources, such as 
Youtube.  
 Despite the fact that more and more cultural content is available through licensed paid-for 
services, creating a solid income for many copyright holders, there are still issues. The main 
issue is - arguably - the fact that YouTube still is the biggest streaming service in any genre on 
the internet. YouTube itself creates very limited income for the amount of content that is 
licensed. Danish CMO Koda signed a license agreement with YouTube in 2013, and their 
calculations show that half a million streams creates less than DKK 1000 for the rights 
holders. In six months, only seventeen Koda members generated a higher payout than DKK 
1000 from YouTube. (Hjortshøj, 2016) According to the International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry (IFPI), a paid for service such as Spotify last year created around € 1.2 
billion, while as services that are based on user-uploads such as YouTube and SoundCloud 
generated around € 400 million6, despite the fact that they have six times as many users as the 
paid for services (Hjortshøj, 2016). The question here is: why isn’t the income from these 
platform services based on user-uploads six times as high as the income from the paid for 
streaming services? There are of course many different reasons for this. One is - as we have 																																																								6	Based on exchange rate from DKK to EUR, 31.03.2016	
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seen in the earlier segment on streaming - that ad-based income is substantially lower than 
income from user payment. Most of YouTube’s income still comes from this source, even 
though measures have been made to shift the balance, such as YouTube Red. This is still only 
a minor part of the solution.  
 What is perhaps the biggest issue when it comes to income from platform services, is what 
is referred to as safe harbor. Safe harbor, explained simply, was a law introduced in 2001 with 
the purpose of simplifying the creation of new web-based companies, not holding these 
companies responsible for the actions of users at both ends of the service. In essence: 
regardless of what the users of a service did, the service could only be counted as a non-
responsible intermediary. The reason why this is an issue today, according to many acts in the 
music industry, is that services such as YouTube today may be considered to be anything but 
a neutral, technological intermediary, as long as they rank and prioritize content, and guide 
their users to similar and related content. Due to this, they should be obliged to pay for the 
content they make available (Hjortshøj, 2016).  
 In the fall of 2015, the opponents of the safe harbor agreement gained more ammunition in 
the battle to change the law. Austrian law student Max Schrems challenged the safe harbor 
treaty, based on the fact that it could compromise privacy as it allowed authorities, such as US 
NSA, to access content of electronic communications - for instance on Facebook - hence 
surveilling European users. Schrems ran the case in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), 
based on the revelations made by Edward Snowden, that the US National Security Agency 
collected and accessed huge amounts of data from global tech companies, under the 
provisions of the safe harbor agreement. As a consequence of this, the ECJ ruled safe harbor 
to be invalid (Griffin, Merrill, 2015). 
 As the safe harbor agreement needs to be re-negotiated due to the ECJ verdict, many 
cultural content producers hope that this may also change the flow and distribution of the 
money generated, and that more money comes back to the industry. 23 per cent of the value of 
different platform services is estimated to be directly related to the use of cultural content. 
One estimates that the total market value of platform services in Europe is € 22 billion, hence 
23 per cent of this would be around € 5 billion (GESAC, 2016). One estimates that as much as 
around 62 per cent of the value generated by the platform services is indirectly linked to 
cultural content, so the potential pay out could in fact be argued to be higher. (Hofseth 2016) 
YouTube does pay out money, while as other acts such as Facebook and Google - although 
they own YouTube - pay nothing.  
 One estimates that around 62 per cent of what is on a Facebook news feed is related to 
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copyrighted material, and that 52 per cent of Facebook’s advertising income directly relates to 
cultural content. (Hofseth, 2016) Facebook had a profit of around € 3.25 billion in 2015. 
(Newton, 2016) 65 per cent of Google searches is also directly or indirectly related to cultural 
content (Roland Berger, 2015). Much - if not most - of Google’s income comes from 
advertising in their search engine. Their activities lead them to a surplus of around € 20 
billion7 in 2015. (Hofseth, 2016) When one knows that a lot of the income of the platform 
services is related to cultural content and copyrighted material, one can question why the 
cultural content industry does not see more of the money. 
 Regardless of whether or not one believes that platform services should pay out to rights 
holders, this issue proves problematic. The issue shifts the competitive balance and those 
services that may be preferred by the rights holders stands at a competitive disadvantage when 
competing with free services, who in turn pay out very limited amounts of money. Safe 
harbour has so far given the platform services the opportunity to do so, and one can argue 
whether or not it is right that services who stand in the same market as their competitors 
should play by such different rules. One can hope that future negotiations related to the safe 
harbor verdict may change the payouts to the cultural content industry. The question that 
arises in relation to the main topic of this paper, is whether or not a broadband levy can help to 
compensate for some of the problem areas related to safe harbour and platform services.  
1.4.	Economics	
A question that arises when discussing a broadband levy is whether or not it has potential to 
create a significant income to be distributed to the cultural content industries. It is not 
necessarily easy to conclude upon whether or not it may have such a potential, but there are 
some pointers if one pulls in data on amount of subscriptions and puts this into a monetary 
context. The monetary effect of a broadband levy can be very simply introduced, and such a 
system can show to be fairly profitable in terms of the income gained for further distribution. 
If one is to follow the Association of Norwegian Film Producers suggestion, NOK 1/mth can 
give a significant amount to distribute. A brief look at the numbers show that there are around 
6,8 million subscriptions on wired and mobile broadband8 in Norway in the first half of 20159 
(Nasjonal Kommunikasjonsmyndighet, 2015). If such a levy were to be introduced it could 																																																								7	Based on exchange rate from USD to EUR, 31.03.2016	8	Mobile phone subscriptions with active use of mobile broadband: 4,26 million, mobile broadband 
subscriptions:  511 000 , Wired broadband subscriptions: 1,87 million (private), 129 000 (business)	9	Including mobile phone subscriptions with access to mobile broadband, mobile broadband and wired 
broadband used privately and by businesses.	
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create a potential income of a little under NOK 82 million a year10. If one were to put a levy 
on NOK 5/mth, the number would - naturally - be 5 times as high, close to half a billion 
Norwegian kroner.  Compared to the income of both the Swedish and Norwegian model of 
today – as we will see in chapter 2 - this is a significant sum. On the surface a broadband levy 
can have a high potential for good income and good money to distribute. If one deducts ten 
per cent in administration costs, which is quite a decent standard, one turns out to have around 
NOK 73,5 million to distribute. Still a high number, and comparable to the total of money 
transferred by the Norwegian Ministry of Culture and distributed by Fond for Lyd og Bilde 
and Norwaco. It is worth noting that this calculation only includes mobile phone subscriptions 
that actively uses mobile broadband. If one includes all mobile phone subscriptions, under the 
presumption that all have access but not all chooses to use it, the number rises to 8,35 million 
subscriptions in total that uses or could potentially use broadband in different forms, raising 
the potential income to a little over NOK 100 million, before deducting potential 
administrational costs.  
 It is difficult to conclude upon the amount of money a different model may have the 
potential to generate. If one were to, for instance, add a levy of one per cent per subscription - 
meaning that a subscription costing NOK 299/month would bring in NOK 2,99 - this could of 
course generate a significant amount as well. The advantage with this model is that it takes 
into account the speed, access and download amount of the holder of the subscription, as 
better terms tend to cost more. I may be conceived as more fair, as it differentiates use. There 
is no guarantee, however, that someone with a 100-megabit line uses more cultural content 
than someone with a 5-megabit line. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find the potential income 
from such a model, as the average amount one pays for a broadband or mobile broadband 
subscription is difficult to retrieve. There are some pointers, however. A quick glance at the 
NKOM-report referred to earlier (Nasjonal Kommunikasjonsmyndighet, 2015), implies that 
the revenue created in the first half of 2015 by mobile broadband, broadband over mobile 
phone subscriptions and wired broadband used both privately and by businesses is around 
NOK 10,5 billion. If one assumes that the number for the last half of 2015 is fairly similar, the 
revenue from different types of broadband comes up to NOK 21 billion. If one were to 
introduce a levy of 1 per cent per subscription, the total revenue from subscriptions implies 
that the income generated could be around NOK 200 million. A significant amount, but very 
uncertain as the numbers at not broken down, and does not say anything about the distribution 																																																								10	NOK 1 x 6,8m subscriptions x 12 months	
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of costs, taxes, and so on. In this instance it may be worth to look at the amount that 
households spend on telecommunication services. In 2011 there were around 2.2 million 
households in Norway (Statistisk Sentralbyrå, 2012). The numbers closest in year11 of how 
much each household spends on telecommunication services per year is from 2012, where the 
average household spent around NOK 8200 (Statistisk Sentralbyrå, 2013). Based on these 
numbers, the total spending on telecommunication services in 2012 would be around NOK 18 
billion. This would lead to a levy of 1 per cent bringing in around NOK 180 million. As with 
previous numbers, there are many uncertain factors, but it is perhaps safe to assume that a 
broadband levy based on percentage could have the potential to bring in money in the area of 
NOK 150-200 million. 
 It is also possible to include such a levy into the line rental, a sum baked into most wired 
broadband subscriptions in order to use and maintain the infrastructure. The Norwegian line 
rental is set to NOK 89. If one raises it to 90, bringing in NOK 1 per subscription, it would 
still only bring in around 24 million a year, as it would only include the wired subscriptions - 
some of these are even exempt from line rental, due to the technology it uses to transmit 
signals - and not mobile subscriptions. This has some flaws, as many use mobile broadband to 
access cultural content, for instance on YouTube from a mobile phone.  
 This economic breakdown shows us one thing: determining the best way to collect a 
broadband levy is difficult. On the bright side, however, it turns out that the simplest way may 
also be quite profitable, especially if one is to include everyone who could have access, and 
not only those who chooses to use it. The question is not necessarily if the system has a 
potential for income, but turns more onto how one is to distribute that income.  
 
																																																								11	There are no statistics on numbers of households from 2012; the most recent year of household spending 
numbers are from 2012. 
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2.	Levies	on	the	internet	
To better understand the basis for why a broadband levy is discussed, and indeed has been for 
some years, one needs to look at earlier levies both before and after the age of the internet. 
Levies have primarily been put on equipment that makes it possible to copy works easily, 
such as cassette recorders, blank disks and, as mentioned earlier, hard disk drives. There has 
also been put forward numerous suggestions as to how to compensate authors for illegal 
downloading. These suggestions are yet to gain a foothold, even though they have been 
around for years.  
 This chapter presents the history of levies, in order to better understand the foundations for 
the levies of today and the future. It covers existing types of private copying levies from 
Norway and Sweden, two countries close in proximity who have chosen very different 
solutions. It also presents in detail the suggested levy on broadband that has gained the most 
momentum, mainly referred to as the cultural flat-rate. This is done in order to gain some 
insight and inspiration as to why and how one is to introduce a broadband levy today, if it ever 
comes to it. Some other models have been suggested, but they all have similarities to the 
cultural flat-rate, thus spending time on the vast amounts of research and official reports 
related to the cultural flat-rate model is highly relevant. The final part of the chapter gives a 
brief overview of criticisms and problem areas, and what topics need to be discussed further. 
These topics form the foundation for some of the questions asked to the interviewees in 
chapter 3.  
 
2.1.	A	brief	history	of	levies	
As the first chapter briefly mentions, the idea of levies has been tried and tested for many, 
many years. The system of copyright levies were first introduced in Germany in the 1960s, 
and became a model for other levies in Europe, and a levy on the sale of sound and video 
recording equipment was introduced in 1965, as a result of two court decisions (Hugenholtz, 
et al., 2003, p. 11). The basis of the court decisions were lawsuits brought by German CMO 
GEMA to producers of such equipment, most notably Grundig, where they wanted the 
producers to inform consumers of their obligations under copyright law. The reason for 
introducing the levy was the that the courts «(...) considered individual claims against private 
home taping not to be enforceable» and an understanding that «(...) producers of recording 
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equipment would pass the charge on to the consumers by means of the price of the tape 
recorders» (Hugenholtz, et al., 2003, p. 11). In essence, a levy was introduced to claim 
compensation for illegal copying via this type of equipment, while acknowledging the 
difficulty of controlling and gathering information on an individual basis. A levy that would 
affect everyone was easier to administer, rather than a method were GEMA - or some other 
organisation for that matter - had to collect money based on an individual basis. The courts 
decided to put a levy on the recording equipment itself, rather than on blank tapes or other 
consumables related to this type of equipment, which were not subject to a levy until 20 years 
later, when the German Copyright act was modified to include blank tapes. The main 
argument for a levy on blank tapes was «(...) that the remuneration collected on the sale of 
recording equipment no longer equalled the dimensions assumed» when the first levy was 
introduced (Hugenholtz, et al., 2003, p. 12). Many countries in the EU have followed this type 
of levy in their own local legislation. Countries in Africa and the Americas has also 
introduced similar models, in addition to more limited models in Canada, USA and Japan, 
where some have focused more on digital recording equipment rather than analogue12. 
Countries in the EU have followed this trend bit by bit (Hugenholtz, et al., 2003, p. 13). In the 
late 90s, the EU Copyright Directive was amended to include new equipment used for 
copying, including blank CDs, minidiscs, and other similar products. Later this legislation has 
been amended to include storage media such as hard disk drives, and equipment built upon 
this technology such as memory sticks. These technologies are subject to levies in some 
countries, while as other countries are yet to introduce this levies in this material - most 
notably, perhaps, the UK. 
 In the Scandinavian countries, Sweden has a levy on hard disk drives and USB storage 
media, while Denmark only has levies on USB storage media in addition to CDs and other 
blank media13 (Copydan, 2016). Norway did not introduce levies on similar material after the 
abolishment of the cassette levy in 1999, but has a compensation system funded by the 
government. This example shows how differently levies have been introduced in very similar 
countries. The next part presents two of these models.  
2.2.	Two	existing	types	of	compensation	
There are plenty of different levies around the world. Most existing levies chooses to focus on 
gaining money from sales of blank storage media, such as hard drives and memory sticks 																																																								12	Japan introduced a remuneration scheme for digital copying in 1992.	13	Lockable USB storage media where the content can not be removed does not come under this legislation.	
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(WIPO, 2013). Some countries have chosen to abandon such a system, and instead transfer 
money directly from the government. This part looks at Norway and Sweden, two countries 
close in proximity, which have chosen two different routes.  
2.2.1.	Norway:	Fond	for	Lyd	og	Bilde	and	Privatkopieringsvederlaget	
Unlike many other countries, Norway has chosen not to have a private copying levy. Instead, 
money is transferred from the government to Fond for Lyd og Bilde and to rights holder 
organisation Norwaco. Fond for Lyd og Bilde works as a fund where artists can apply to 
create new material, based on collective management of a private copying levy. Norwaco 
distributes money from the government individually to those affected by private copying, 
through CMOs and other organizations (Norwaco, 2016a). 
 In the 1980s and 90s, Norway used to have a levy on blank cassettes and videotapes, and 
distributed this money to rights holders who had a right or need for such a compensation. This 
saw the light of day through Norsk Kassettavgiftsfond - the forerunner of Fond for Lyd og 
BIlde - in 1983. The levy seized to be collected in 1999 (Møller, 2002, p. 7). Today the funds 
for Fond for Lyd og Bilde’s activities are directly granted through the national budget each 
year. The sum transferred to the fund today is considerably lower than the sum that was 
transferred when there was a levy in place. In the beginning of the 1990s the amount was 
around NOK 80m (Møller, 2002, p. 16), while as today the amount is around NOK 37m, 
based on the proposition for the national budget in 2016 (Kulturdepartementet, 2015). Around 
one third of this14 is distributed to applications for music (Kulturrådet, 2015). 
 In addition to the transfers to Fond for Lyd og Bilde, Norway also has a private copying 
levy that is funded by the government, established in 2005 (Norwaco, 2016b). Norwaco is the 
distributor of this sum, and has around NOK 46m to distribute (Kulturdepartementet 2015).  
Around 23% goes to music rights holders in different forms. Earlier Norwaco transferred 
more to music rights holders, but as copying of music goes down audiovisual material have 
gained a larger amount of the total money (Based on e-mail communication with Elin Urkedal 
in Norwaco, 11.03.16)15. Even though the income for Fond for Lyd og Bilde is lower than it 
was during the levy on cassettes, these two sums added together shows that a private copying 
levy today gives roughly the same amount to distribute.  
 The Norwegian private copying levy is based on government funding, while most other 
countries with a private copying levy gains the income through different types of consumer 																																																								14	NOK	13,5	million	15	See appendix for copy of e-mail communication	
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payment and payment from manufacturers. One of these countries is Norway’s closest 
neighbour.  
2.2.2.	Sweden:	Privatkopieringsärsettningen	
Although many other countries operate with a private copying levy, the Swedish example is 
perhaps one of the most developed and transparent, and covers most storage media. Many of 
these systems are very complex, and are hard to understand. They are also somehow 
inconsistent in what areas they cover (WIPO, 2013). 
 Sweden has chosen to continue with a levy on private copying, focusing mainly on 
rewritable and write-once media such as hard drives in all shapes and sizes - inside for 
instance phones, set top boxes and of course external hard drives - in addition to CDs and 
DVDs, known as Privatkopieringsärsettningen (Copyswede, 2011). The levy varies somewhat 
based on the medium it is put on, but the average number is 1 SEK per gigabyte up to 80 GB, 
and then 80 SEK for anything over that, and is paid by the producers, importers or retailers of 
such products (Copyswede, 2015a) - although it is probably paid by the customers at the end. 
More concretely, you pay a levy of 16 SEK for a 16 GB flash drive.  
 Around SEK 100m is brought in by the Swedish levy, divided onto several products where 
external harddrives and USB storage stands for around half of the amount, and set top boxes 
with harddrives stands for around one third of the total amount (Copyswede, 2015b). 
Copyswede gives around SEK 4 million each to Stim, IFPI and Sami, before compensating 
some rights owners on an individual basis. The above-mentioned organizations have their own 
distribution of this money. In total, the field of music receives around one third of the total 
distributed sum. The rest is received by the film and television industry, both domestic and 
abroad. It is worth noting that the amount of money that has come in through a levy in 
Sweden have gone down by more than one third in the last 7 years. In 2007, the amount was 
around SEK 160m (Copyswede, 2008) compared to todays SEK 100m. Some of this may be 
down to less copying, as streaming gains foothold, but it may also be down to other 
technological advances and changed consumer behavior. 
2.3.	The	cultural	flat-rate	
Even though many a move has been made to address the challenges of private copying 
facilitated by technological advances, the internet has been a fairly untouched realm in terms 
of levies. Many suggestions have been made in order to tackle the challenges of illegal 
copying and unlicensed distribution of copyrighted material on the internet, but this far they 
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have failed to gain a wide foothold. This part of the chapter looks into one of the previous 
suggestion for a levy on the internet; the cultural flat-rate, as it is known in Germany, the 
country in which the idea has gained the most momentum in terms of politicization and 
research. It is worth keeping in mind that the cultural flat-rate comes from a time when illegal 
downloading was a major issue for the creative industries, and the returns from the private 
copying levies on hardware was - arguably - insufficient to cope with this challenge, perhaps 
even too one-dimensional.  
 The principle of the cultural flat-rate requires a brief and simple explanation. Whether 
proposers have chosen to call it a broadband levy, a P2P-license, a content flat-rate or a 
cultural flat-rate, the idea, in its simplest form is the same. By paying an extra monthly fee 
collected by the ISPs16 the user gains access to non-commercial file-sharing, and can 
download as much cultural content as they would like. Some suggestions believes this levy 
should be mandatory, others believe in it being on a voluntary basis. Some of the main 
arguments put forth for such a levy has been that it would decriminalize an entire generation, 
and gain compensation to the rights holders affected by file-sharing (Øvrebø, 2009, p.65). 
2.3.1.	The	cultural	flat-rate	turns	into	politics	
The German idea of a cultural flat-rate has been the idea that has gained the most momentum, 
both on a political and governmental basis. Germany was one of the first countries in the 
world to formalise the discussion of a broadband levy in political terms. In April 2009, the 
German Green Party introduced a broadband levy in their manifesto for the European 
Parliament Elections (Øvrebø, 2009, p.65). The Green Party had been studying the 
opportunity of introducing such a flat-rate in order to allow non-commercial use of digital 
cultural content. Back in 2009 this was a relatively unexplored territory, and even though the 
idea never reached much further than a theoretical idea in a political manifesto, there have 
been some attempts on introduction in smaller territories, such as the Isle of Man (Kiss, 2009), 
where specific suggestions on introduction were made, but never reached as far as becoming 
legislatively feasible.  
 The idea of a broadband levy has also been explored to some extent in the Scandinavian 
countries, where Swedish STIM have been the most prominent taker of interest on this matter. 
STIM has done surveys regarding voluntary fees, and has found that 87 per cent of the 
respondents had an interest for a voluntary subscription which would give the right to conduct 
																																																								16	Some suggestions have delegated this job to CMOs or government agencies	
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file-sharing of music17 (STIM, 2009, p. 16). STIM also found that just over 42 per cent could 
have an interest in paying as much as SEK 100/month for such a service (Øvrebø, 2009, p. 
65). Norwegian political parties Venstre and Sosialistisk Venstreparti have looked into 
making a model similar to the cultural flat-rate part of their political manifestos, mainly by 
deciding to study the subject further (Øvrebø, 2009, p. 65). 
 At the press conference for the Green Party’s cultural flat-rate suggestion, the scientific 
director of The Institute of European Media Law (EML), Prof. Dr. Alexander Rossnagel, 
introduced the feasibility of changes in legal structures in order to implement such a system. 
Rossnagel introduced the minimum requirements for such a system:  
1. a legal licence permitting private individuals to exchange copyright works for non- commercial 
purposes.  
2. a levy, possibly collected by the ISPs, flat, possibly differentiated by access speed; 
3. a collective management, i.e. a mechanism for collecting the money and distributing it fairly.  
(Grassmuck, 2009, p. 3) 
 
Rossnagel also introduced some issues, amongst many, specifically relating to copyright. 
These issues will be brought up later in the chapter 
2.3.2.	The	cultural	flat-rate	and	the	European	Union	
The idea of a cultural flat-rate at some point gained so much momentum, that the European 
Union in released a study on it in 201118. The study set a minimum requirement for two types 
of questions any cultural flat-rate needed to answer: 
1. It should guarantee fair remuneration for the rights holders, with a fair procedure for distribution 
2. It should provide a safe haven for the individual user.  
(Directorate General For Internal Policies, 2011, p. 8) 	
In addition to this, the study also had some interesting considerations and recommendations:  
• any cultural flat-rate needed to take into account the diverse interests on the matter, 
from originators to aggregators, and all the intermediaries - both in the traditional 
value chain of the cultural content industries, but also in the value chain emerging 
as a consequence of the possibilities and challenges of digitalization. 
• a cultural flat-rate’s economic objective needed to bring a spill-over effect on the 
market, this to convince rights holders of the usefulness of such a system. The 
income flow should be somewhat similar to what private copying levies brought 																																																								17	52% had a high interest, 35% had some interest	18	In the study referred to as a «content flat-rate»	
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into the market, in order to enhance the credibility of new system, complementing 
premium offers.  
• the setting of a price needed to meet different challenges, such as supporting P2P 
file-sharing whilst reducing piracy; represent an extension of legal offerings, and; 
enjoy the cooperation of the ISPs. 
• the pricing structure needed to satisfy a number of criteria, such as: setting the right 
price; not losing sight of expected price, and; not cutting itself off from normal 
collection of revenues. 
 Even though the study had some interesting findings and recommendations, one could 
argue that it may have been too inconclusive and too bureaucratic, in some sense. The study, 
in addition to some interesting aspects as the ones mentioned above, introduced 42 key factors 
of success, in order for a cultural flat-rate to work. This number seems awfully high, but is 
understandable in an area that could have the potential to be controversial, and relatively 
unexplored in more official aspects. The study also concluded in it’s summary that: 
 
«This system as proposed will only cover cinema and audiovisual works. Given the specificities of the 
music sector, its different value chain, its different consumption habits and the volumes involved it falls 
out of the scope of what is proposed here. A similar system could work for music but an in depth and 
case study of the existing offers should be conducted in order to build up and refine a workable model 
that could be validated by both consumers and rights holders. However, this work would represent a 
much greater challenge than that involved in dealing with audiovisual works.» 
      (Directorate General For Internal Policies, 2011, p. 14) 
 
The study, in essence, concluded that the music sector needed an own study on the matter, due 
to a different value chain than other cultural content. Although a good point, one can begin to 
see why a cultural flat-rate has not become reality, but remained on paper.  
 The reasons for bringing up the intricacy of the EU studies, including both some interesting 
findings, but also where it fails to reach a conclusion or simply gives - arguably - too many 
recommendations, is not to label the study as a failure, nor to criticise the study, but to show 
the sheer complexity of the matter. A broadband levy is a multifaceted issue, with many 
aspects to take into consideration. One of the perhaps most complex aspects in the earlier 
introduction of a cultural flat-rate, is the issue of copyright.  
2.4.	Broadband	levies	and	copyright	
Copyright is the foundation of musical and other creative works. It makes it possible to 
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control some of the challenges created by the new music industry and digitalization. 
Copyright makes it possible to commodify a musical work, and to gain remuneration and 
compensation for its use (Wikström, 2013, p. 17). The foundations of copyrighted works as 
we know today, were laid at the Berne Convention in 1886 (WIPO, 2016), although one can 
trace copyright as a principle as far back as the Statute of Anne from 1709. The Berne 
Convention has later been revised and amended several times, to keep up with changes in the 
industry and new technology providing new ways of content consumption. Any new scheme 
that may affect copyright, or has anything to do with copyright should ultimately be put 
through the Berne three-step test, in order to gain validity. The three-step test derives from the 
Stockholm Conference in 1967, where the Convention was revised (Rietjens, 2006). The 
three-step test limits what type of exceptions member states of the Berne Convention can set 
in their own laws regarding copyright holders’ reproduction rights, and member states can 
only set exceptions in their national laws, if these exceptions fulfill the three-step test. The 
three-step test was «(...) considered to be a `catch-all´limitation for those exceptions not 
specifically mentioned in the Berne Convention» (Rietjens, 2006, p. 325). The cultural flat-
rate must be considered such an exception, and it is therefore interesting to run it through such 
a test.  
 The three-step test in its essence consists of, perhaps not surprisingly, three steps that are 
meant to be taken into account when creating copyright exceptions in national laws. It derives 
from the Berne Convention, later amended in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) TRIPs19 
 agreement, and requires that exceptions and limitations: 
1. are confined to “certain special cases”, and 
2. “do not conflict with a normal exploitation of a work” (performance or phonogram), and 
3. “do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author” (performer or phonogram 
producer) 
(Knights, 2001, p. 13) 
There has been some research of how a cultural flat-rate may stand the scrutiny of the three-
step test. Some research has also taken into account moral rights. Moral rights, as stated in 
article 6bis in the Berne Convention are defined as follows: 
«Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author 
shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to 
his honor or reputation.» 																																																								19	Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights	
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(WIPO, 2016) 
 
In order to better understand how a potential broadband levy - regardless of similarities or 
non-similarities to the cultural flat-rate - may stand the scrutiny of a three-step test, and 
perhaps also moral rights as well, it is worth having a look at findings from this research. 
2.4.1.	Institute	of	European	Media	Law	
As mentioned earlier, Prof. Dr. Rossnagel introduced a study with findings related to the 
three-step test at the Green Party press conference. He provided findings on why a cultural 
flat-rate was feasible when coming under scrutiny by the three-step test. Rossnagel found, in 
regards to the first step, that the cultural flat-rate  
«(...) shall benefit only private individuals and only for non-commercial personal purposes would 
constitute a `certain special case´ and thus pass the first step».  
(Grassmuck, 2009, p. 7)  
In regards to the first step, the case of a cultural flat-rate is a special case, and as the three-step 
test are confined to certain special cases, it would not conflict with the first step.  
 In terms of the second step, there was some debate over what normal exploitation would 
imply, and co-author of the study, Silke Jandt, pointed out that this was not purely a legal 
question, but that market research was needed, in order to complement the study and to draw a 
more concrete conclusion. On this matter, the study concluded that  
«From the fact that despite the existing prohibition of file-sharing industry laments a decline in 
revenues the study infers that legalizing P2P would not have an additional dramatic impact. Thus the 
normal exploitation would not be diminished.»  
(Grassmuck, 2009, p. 7-8)  
In essence, as file-sharing already leads to reduced revenues from copyrighted works, 
legalizing it would not compromise the normal exploitation that already exists of the works, 
and in that sense, normal exploitation would not be conflicted. As one may see, this topic is 
controversial, but perhaps also feasible as it is based more upon the reality of the industry in 
that day and age, more than on what one may see as an ideal reality.  
 On the topic of the third step, the study found that  
«The interests of authors and exploiters (...) have to be weighed against the interests of the general 
public and against possible alternatives. Assuming an appropriate remuneration the study concludes 
that the prejudice would not be unreasonable»   
(Grassmuck, 2009, p.8) 
Regarding the third step, the conclusion was, in essence, that if one were to create an 
appropriate remuneration to the author, it would unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
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interests of the author, hence passing the third step.  
 The EML study also introduced som findings in terms of moral rights. The study concluded 
that a cultural flat-rate would not violate the moral rights of the author, based on the fact that 
at this point in time most authors chose physical media as first publication. In this regard 
internet distribution would become a secondary use, and as the most important part of the 
moral rights is to determine the first publication of their work, such secondary would thus not 
violate moral rights due to the fact that the author 
«(...) has regularly already exercised her right by deciding in which way to publish her work» 
(Grassmuck, 2009, p. 8) 
The study concluded that the secondary use would then primarily affect the 
«(...)ancillary copyrights of producers of sound carriers, film and TV production companies and 
publishers» 
(Grassmuck, 2009, p. 8) 
The report added that any harm done by legalized file-sharing would be cured by a lump-sum 
compensation.  
 In short, the cultural flat-rate - arguably - seems to come out on top in the EML study, 
when put under the scrutiny by the three-step test and moral rights.  
2.4.2.	Bernault	and	Lebois	
French Carine Bernault and Audrey Lebois are two other researchers who have looked into 
the feasibility of a system of compensation for illegal file-sharing. This was done in 2006, and 
was at that point yet to be called a cultural flat-rate, hence the study mostly referred to it as 
private copy exception. The idea that acts as the basis for the study, however, is the same. 
Bernault and Lebois have studied such a system, with a strong basis in French legislation 
(Bernault, Lebois, 2006, p. 29).  
 The study underlines the fact that many believe that the three-step test is not relevant in 
terms of a private copy exception, but as for instance French courts already have the 
opportunity to refer to the three-step test when making a ruling on copyright matters, it is still 
a highly relevant test. The study also concludes that several French court verdicts have been 
very unclear on the matter of copyright relating to new technology, hence there is a need to 
have something to apply when considering compromises in copyright, thus the three-step test 
is relevant, also for a private copy exception. 
 When putting the private copy exception under the scrutiny of the three-step test, the study 
mainly uses the WTO application of the TRIPs article 13 in regards to exceptions in American 
law (WTO, 2000), due to the fact that it  
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«(...) provides guidance to confirm that the private copy exception applied to peer-to-peer 
downloading fulfills the three step test». 
(Bernault, Lebois, 2006, p. 32) 
The study concludes that a private copy exception passes the first step, based on 
«(...) the fact that making private copies has become a `standard practice´ does not cause the 
exception to no longer constitute a `special case ´ (...) 
(Bernault, Lebois, 2006, p. 34) 
On this topic, the study concludes, however, that: 
«(...) with numerous situations such as peer-to-peer downloading, the private copy will disturb the 
normal exploitation of the work and/or cause unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of 
rightful owners»  
(Bernault, Lebois, 2006, p. 34) 
This implies that even though one may not see private copies being a special case, there are 
still challenges connected to the other two steps.  
 On the topic of normal exploitation, forming the basis of step two, the study, similarly to 
the EML study, questions how normal exploitation should be defined. It asks an important 
question in this regard;  
«(...) whether downloaded works affect the sales of works and the legal system of downloading 
works, such as music and video.» 
(Bernault, Lebois, 2006, p. 35) 
 
The study ends up on a somewhat inconclusive conclusion; seeing as rights owners cannot 
prohibit the exploitation or obtain a remuneration in the world of illegal file-sharing, there is 
reason to believe that private copying in this instance does not comes under what one can 
define as normal exploitation, hence it could be argued that a private copy exception may 
fulfil the second step, seeing as this type of exploitation, at least in the time where this study 
was conducted, is in no way normal.  
 In terms of the third step, unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the rights 
owner, the study concludes that if a proper system for remuneration is in place, a private copy 
exception may not cause such unreasonable prejudice:  
«In the matter of peer-to-peer downloads, it is clear that there is a potential loss which prejudices 
the legitimate interests of the authors and the holders of neighbouring right holders. However it 
seems practically impossible for the right holders to assert and control their rights. The 
application of a system of remuneration for private copies is thus possible on the condition that it 
adequately compensates the potential loss of income. Otherwise the prejudice will remain 
unreasonable.» 
(Bernault, Lebois, 2006, p. 36) 
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 The french study concludes that a private copy exception may pass the three-step test, but 
only if a number of different conditions and issues are catered for. The study may not be as 
assertive as the EML-study, but it proves a likelihood of such a system being compatible with 
the laws of copyright. The fact that the study may be somewhat inconclusive, provides good 
insight into the fact that the issue of a system - regardless if one is to call it a broadband levy, 
a cultural flat-rate, or a private copy exception - is widely complex.  
2.4.3.	Bob	Rietjens	
Another researcher who has used the three-step test when assessing the feasibility of a 
broadband levy related to file-sharing, is Dutch copyright lawyer Bob Rietjens (Rietjens, 
2006). Rietjens uses the same WTO-source as Bernault and Lebois to conclude whether or not 
P2P licensing is possible using the three-step test, but comes to a very different conclusion. 
This study is also conducted in 2006.  
 When it comes to the first step, Rietjens uses two approaches; a qualitative test and a 
quantitative test. In terms of a qualitative test, it implies that an exception should be an 
exceptional or distinctive objective. Rietjens believes the test to be hollow, as the WTO-panel 
in question refused to examine the policy or purpose of what is an exceptional or distinctive 
objective. In terms of a quantitative test one has to determine whether or not only those who 
download are taken into consideration, or if everyone who has the possibility should apply. In 
essence, do you take into account all of those with access to the internet and has the potential 
to download, or only those who uses this access to download? With the growing access to 
broadband at this point in time, Rietjens concludes that a case of a broadband levy to be paid 
by those who download is not «special» enough, as most people have, or will have, the ability 
to download unlicensed material off the internet: 
«(...) P2P licenses are not compliant with the first step of the three-step test. A P2P license does 
not qualify as narrow in scope, both in regard to the number of potential and in regard to the types 
of work covered.»  
(Rietjens, 2006, p. 329) 
 
 In terms of step two, Rietjens believes that illegal filesharing does compete with other 
channels of sale, thus competing with normal exploitation. Put simply: file-sharing reduces 
the income of rights holders, as they potentially lose sales that are conducted in legal ways. 
Therefore, a license on illegal file-sharing does not survive the scrutiny of the second step:  
«The acts exempted by a P2P license (ie file sharing) compete with the normal exploitation of 
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works by the copyright industry.» 
(Rietjens, 2006, p. 332) 
When it comes to the third step, Rietjens concludes that: 
«The third step of the three-step test does not need to be reflected on. If the P2P license can pass 
the first two steps, then, provided that the right holders are properly funded, the P2P license would 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holders.»  
(Rietjens, 2006, p. 332) 
  
 Put simply: as a P2P license does not pass the first two steps, one does not need to reflect 
on the third step. If a P2P license did pass the two first steps, it would thus pass the third step, 
as a P2P license would in that case not unreasonably prejudice the rights holders’ legitimate 
interests if they were to be compensated. On this matter, Rietjens is in agreement with the 
EML, Bernault and Lebois, but as Rietjens concludes, unlike the two others, that a P2P license 
would not pass the first two steps, the third step, according to Rietjens, is irrelevant.  
 In addition, based on the findings of putting a P2P license under the scrutiny of the three-
step test, Rietjens concludes that: 
«P2P licensing is a clear breach of countries’ obligations under the TRIPS three-step test.»  
 (Rietjens, 2006, p. 332) 
  
2.5.	Criticisms	and	problem	areas	of	suggested	broadband	levies	
The topic of broadband levies have come under criticism, both by music industry officials, public 
officials and representatives of the technology industry. One of the first to criticise the 2014-
suggestion from the Norwegian film producers was Torgeir Waterhouse, Director of internet and 
new media in IKT-Norge20  (Nilsen, 2014). Waterhouse stated that such a levy in reality would 
be deemed as a special tax, and called it an unsustainable approach.  Waterhouse was also 
concerned on the topic of distribution, and who would have the rights to the money. He stated21: 
«If we take this further; whom on the Internet cannot then claim payment from the internet service 
providers? It's like the taxi industry should pay clubs and bars who are struggling.» 
(Nilsen, 2014) 
IKT-Norge later released a post with five more reasons not to introduce a broadband levy as 
suggested by the Norwegian film producers. These were, in short22: 
1. Film should be funded and supported by open and democratic means 																																																								20	Note that IKT-Norge is an interest group for the norwegian ICT industry, hence not a neutral organisation in 
terms of technological development.	21	Translated from Norwegian to English	22	Translated from Norwegian to English	
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2. Broadband providers should build broadband, not be responsible to claim taxes 
3. Funding for film should be given by ability, not by if you have broadband 
4. Infrastructure should be strong, wide and cheap for the consumer 
5. An own levy earmarked for the purpose is cutting in line 
(Schjerva, 2014) 
Based on these arguments, it becomes clear that the opinion of some parts of the technology 
industry is that broadband providers should focus on creating the best infrastructure possible, 
and that laying the bill on the consumer is contradictory to the way one tends to fund creation 
of new content in Norway. These arguments can most likely be transferred to a discussion 
where music forms the basis from a similar levy, and they are worth taking into the account 
when discussing the topic of a broadband levy further. The opinions of IKT-Norge as a whole 
also forms a fundamental question: why should the film industry - or the music industry, for 
that matter - have an exclusive right to introduce such a levy? What justifies a broadband levy 
on cultural content? 
 Director of the Norwegian Consumer Council’s digital group, Finn Myrstad, also criticised 
the proposal from the Norwegian film producers. He was of the opinion that as so many 
services in Norway today are done over the internet, it may be regarded as a utility along the 
same lines as electricity. As the proposed levy would increase the cost of internet access, and 
as the United Nations had defined internet access as a basic human right23, the proposed levy 
missed the mark completely (Nordseth, 2015). This criticism is also something to take into 
account when discussing the topic further.   
As well as the points surrounding the utility discussion, it is also worth looking into how the 
money should be collected, and which factors determine how the money from a broadband 
levy is to be collected.  
 In 2007 Norwegian NTNU-researcher Hendrik Storstein Spilker suggested a levy similar to 
the cultural flat-rate (Kristensen, 2007). This suggestion came under criticism by parts of the 
industry itself, more specifically from head of IFPI Norway, Marthe Thorsby. Thorsby 
concluded that such a levy could give the impressions that illegal downloading was legal, and, 
from a music industry standpoint, this was obviously not something they wanted to achieve. 
Thorsby brings up a valid argument, that is definitely a major dilemma when discussing a levy 
on broadband. Even though illegal downloading of music is no longer a major issue, the use 
of unlicensed content from other sources still is. Introducing a levy on broadband could give 
the impression that this type of activity is no longer considered to be illegal. This should 																																																								23	In 2011	
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obviously not be the case. A levy on broadband should not be considered as a system that 
could compromise the basic foundations of copyright, thus not a system that - whether 
allowing or being interpreted as such - should legalize the use of unlicensed content in any 
shape or form. This is definitely a major issue to consider further.  
 Criticism of broadband levies, like the cultural flat rate, has also come from the ones who 
are - perhaps more than most - interested in internet freedom and internet privacy. Rickard 
Falkvinge, founder of the Swedish Pirate Party has been one of the most prominent critics in 
this regard24. Falkvinge, in his article, discusses mainly distribution of fixed sums based on 
amount of downloads. He believes it to be a terrible idea and uses the exploitation of the 
forerunner of many of the services we see today, MP3.com who distributed money from a 
fixed pool in terms of popularity, as an example: 
«(...) several factors came about to stall the momentum of mp3.com. The pay-for-play experiment 
that rewarded artists monetarily for their downloads was sabotaged by the artists themselves. 
Honest acts were robbed of their intended share by enterprising gamers whoexploited the system 
with programmed play bots and download gangs (posses) who would play long songlists often with 
the volume turned down to run up artificial numbers that equated into big bucks. Mp3.com tried 
and threw numerous cheaters off the site but they could not control the gaming… 
This is the most predictable development ever. The second somebody gets paid from a common 
pool if a file is shared or downloaded, that file will get shared over and over again way beyond 
what would have happened otherwise, just to rack up artificial numbers that will translate into 
financial reward. 
This is a school textbook example of how you can’t measure something for money without 
changing the thing measured completely in the process. 
This is why cultural flatrate will never work.» 
(Falkvinge, 2012) 
One can of course argue whether or not this is the case, after streaming and digital downloads 
have become the solutions of the music industry, but it does raise a valid point; that of 
distribution.  
 There is also major problem area concerning broadband levies; the sheer complexity of it. 
As shown earlier, a government study from the European Union was in no way definite on the 
topic, and introduced many different aspects and possibilities to take into account. The fact 
that such a study proposes 42 key factors implies that the topic is a very complex one. Can 
one find a solution that will either ignore or cater for these complexities? Another dimension 
is the fact that three different studies have come up with three different conclusions regarding 																																																								24	One should note that Falkvinge and the Swedish Pirate Party is opposed to the way copyright is built up 
today, and wants a radical change in copyright law.	
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the three-step test and copyright. One can always argue that these types of reports will differ 
depending on the researcher, but the fact that one concludes in favour, one concludes 
somewhere in the middle, and one finds that a broadband levy - even though it is based on 
illegal downloading - does not meet the demands of the three-step test only confirms the 
complexity. This tells us that a broadband levy can not challenge the existing structure – if it 
is to still exist – it has to supplement the structure, or even complement it.  
 In summary, some of the criticisms and problem areas that have been raised towards a 
broadband levy, regardless of type, raises five major issues to take into consideration when 
discussing possible solutions for broadband levies further: 
• What justifies a broadband levy for cultural content? 
• Which factors determine the size of the levy for internet users? Is it fair to put a levy 
on the internet, when it may be regarded as a utility?  
• How does one introduce a levy on broadband that does not breach the foundations of 
copyright, and does in a technical way permit illegal downloading? 
• How does one distribute the money from a broadband levy, and how does one avoid 
manipulation of the numbers that the money is distributed upon? 
• Can a broadband levy work as a supplement to the existing structure of the music 
industry? 
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3.	Methodology	and	interviews	
To gain better insight as to if a levy on broadband could have the potential to be implemented, 
interviews have been done with four people in the music industry. This chapter seeks to 
provide some insight into the methodology and process leading up to these interviews, and 
how the interviews have been analyzed, as well as presenting the interviewees. This work will 
lay the foundations for the interview analysis, and later the discussion that needs to take place 
in order to conclude upon the research question.  
3.1.	Methodological	approach	and	gathering	of	information	
This part of the chapter seeks to explain the methodological approach when working on the 
thesis, as well as give some insight into the process of gathering data and relevant informants 
for the interviews.  
 A qualitative method has been chosen. The qualitative method gives the opportunity to 
gather material that is perhaps smaller in terms of amount of data, but ranges more widely in 
terms of the aspects they cover (Østbye et al., 2013, p. 22). Further, the research question 
should be answered through a systematic collection of different types of data. The findings, 
especially in an interview situation, also need to be interpreted through analysis. This is 
another factor that defines qualitative research (Ryen, 2002, p.18). Previous parts of the paper 
have laid out findings from secondary data, in order to lay the groundwork when presenting 
responses to the interviews conducted. This secondary data provides some insight into 
questions that need to be explored further, and functions as a basis when analysing responses 
from the informants. Extensive use of secondary data is also in accordance with the 
explorative approach, as the goal is to become acquainted with the field of study, and the 
issues it brings forward (Østbye et al., 2013, p. 267) 
 As I had limited knowledge of the topic when starting the process, it was clear at an early 
stage that a qualitative research method laid the foundation for a decent starting point. It was 
also clear that there was a need for gathering the information and data I needed through 
interviews, as well as using information from literature and previous research. When it came 
to using this secondary data, it also became that there was a relatively small amount of 
conclusive research that had been made on the matter, as we have seen in chapter two. This 
led me to go for an exploratory approach, where I could explore the subject further, not 
drawing a definitive conclusion. 
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 Qualitative data collection has been preferred to quantitative data collection due to one 
very simple reason: the complexity of the issue. This complexity presents a need to gather in-
depth data in the respondents’ own words, and the need to explore and discuss (Blackstone, 
2012, p. 230). In this thesis a quantitative collection of data would be too numeric, and would 
not provide the in-depth responses needed with exploratory approach. The dismissal of 
quantitative data collection does not mean that a qualitative data collection does not have its 
flaws, and one needs to take outmost care to create questions that are not leading or that cause 
short answers due to the way they are asked (Blackstone, 2012, p. 236). The method also 
depends on the respondents ability to accurately answer questions and present their opinions, 
as well as creating a more tedious analytical process, where one may have to listen more 
closely in order to grasp what is actually being said (Blackstone, 2012, p. 243-244). 
 The interviews have been conducted as a guided interview, meaning that all the interviews 
followed the same pattern. Most researchers agree that an interview guide should be used 
(Ryen, 2002, p. 96). In all interviews a framework of ten questions have been used. These 
questions have had some follow-up questions in order to gain more insight on the matter. In 
addition some informant-specific follow-up questions have been made in order to clarify 
certain responses. The same interview guide has been used in all of the interviews. All 
informants have been offered the interview guide in advance to prepare; only one informant 
has chosen to do so. To ensure validity and correct citation of responses, all interviews have 
been recorded with the consent of the informant, and later transcribed. The transcriptions have 
been made a little easier to read, reducing the amount of actual pauses and fill words, but only 
where this does not alter the actual opinions and meanings of the informants. The 
transcriptions of each interview and the full interview guide with follow up questions can be 
found in the appendix. 
 In some parts of the interview process, the need to clarify questions or issues to the 
respondents has been necessary. This need has also ruled out more impersonal quantitative 
interview, and favored a more personal qualitative interview. It may well be that a quantitative 
data collection could be relevant if one is to gather attitudes and opinions of more 
respondents, but as a broadband levy at this point in time is very unexplored territory - 
something that the amount of secondary data also shows - it is not deemed relevant at this 
point in time. This type of data, however, may be very relevant at a later point in time, when 
initial issues are sorted out better, and a more practical approach, rather than theoretical, is 
needed.  
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Gathering information in terms of literature and secondary data has been done since the fall of 
2015, with some being gathered as far back as January 2015. In terms of literature, as there is 
little research on the matter, a method of finding research on similar concepts have been used. 
This is reflected in, for instance, the cultural flat-rate, that shares many similarities with a 
broadband levy for today. It has been important to gather as much information on the cultural 
flat-rate and similar models as possible, to better understand the challenges and benefits of a 
similar model almost, in some cases, ten years later. This literature has been complemented by 
literature on digitalization, streaming, current cases, and so on.  
 Despite being little research on the matter, gathering literature has been relatively 
manageable. The main challenge has been to gather informants for interviews. The four 
informants that have been interviewed are all of great value in the thesis, and represent four 
different areas that are all important if it ever were to come to a broadband levy. Despite 
communication previous to the interview perhaps have moved a little slow at times, the 
process from acquiring interviews to performing them have been fairly simple.  
 The biggest challenge that has occurred when gathering information has been the ones who 
are not willing or able to talk. For this thesis, these all represent the record companies in some 
way or another. Some have answered no, some have not answered at all, and some have said 
they would bring it up in the system, without coming back with a response. Even though it is 
understandable that time, and perhaps interest or knowledge on the matter, may limit the 
willingness to be interviewed, this thesis could have benefitted from more input from the 
record labels. It has to be mentioned that some of the questions for the interview guide 
benefitted from a phone conversation with a representative for the major labels. Whilst trying 
to request an interview, this representative presented many counter-arguments that, after 
revision, became part of the interview guide in order to gather a better understanding, and 
perhaps solutions to as many things as possible. Even though the label representative was not 
willing to go on record, and presented personal, rather than official opinions on the matter, 
this opinions have been valuable in the process, as they help to confirm what many others also 
consider counter-arguments to a broadband levy.  
 The most valuable information has been that gathered from the four informants. These have 
all brought in highly valuable opinions and possible answers to questions, originating from 
their different positions in and views of the music industry. 
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3.2.	Informants	
The informants for this thesis have widely different backgrounds in the music industry, with 
different approaches to the topic. They are chosen because of their vast, but different, 
knowledge of relevant topics to introduce in a discussion on broadband levies.  
The informants are:  
• Knut Bøhn: Head of finance at Phonofile, a digital distribution partner for record 
labels. Phonofile is perhaps one of the companies that have had the most influence 
in the digitalization of the music industry in the Nordic countries.  
• Bendik Hofseth: Musician, composer, chairman of the board of TONO, professor at 
the University of Agder. Has worked in and with organizations such as World 
Intellectual Property Organization and CISAC. 
• Peter Jenner: Has managed acts such as Pink Floyd and Billy Bragg. Has been 
heavily involved in artist management organizations and questions of copyright. 
Lecturer at the University of Agder.  
• Cathrine Ruud: Secretary General of the Norwegian Music Publisher’s association, 
Musikkforleggerne. Musikkforleggerne represents publishers, and holds vast 
knowledge of different copyright issues that affect many of the acts in the industry.  
3.3.	Interview	guide	
As mentioned, an interview guide has been used for the interviews of the informants. The 
interview guide has been semi-structured. Most main questions have been asked in the order 
presented, but sometimes the structure has changed in order for the informant to quickly 
elaborate on points previously brought by them. Some follow up questions have been asked to 
each main question. Each main question is listed underneath with some of the most frequent 
follow up questions. The entire interview guide is attached in the appendix. The interview 
language for three of the informants has been Norwegian. For one informant, English has 
been used. The interviews are transcribed in the language that the interviews have been 
conducted. All questions have aimed to be as open as possible, in keeping with the 
exploratory approach, and have undergone reviewing several times by the interviewer and the 
supervisor, in addition to having been tested on fellow master’s students, to ensure that the 
questions are as open as non-leading as possible. Follow up questions have been used to gain 
more specific answers, or to lead the interview subject onto similar topics if they have not 
already touched upon this under the main question. These questions have aimed to lead onto 
topics and not specific, wanted, answers.  
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The questions asked were as follows:  
1. What do you think of when hearing the term broadband levy? 
2. Why do you think a levy on broadband has not become a reality, although it has been 
discussed for the last decade?  
3. How could a broadband levy work as a supplement to the already existing structure of the 
music industry? 
- Could/should a broadband levy replace the private copying levy on physical 
 storage? 
4. What are the benefits of introducing a broadband levy today? 
5. What disadvantages are connected to introducing a levy on broadband? 
 - How can you implement such a levy without compromising the foundations of 
 copyright? 
 - Is there a way to avoid the issue of technically legalizing illegal activities surrounding 
 copyrighted material when introducing a levy? 
6.	How	do	you	see	a	broadband	levy	working	if	it	were	to	be	introduced	today?	
 - How would you determine what to pay= 
7. How could one justify a broadband levy to the parties involved? 
 - (Consumers, Rights holders, Politicians, ISPs?)   
8. How can a levy be financially beneficial to the different acts in the industry? 
9. If a levy could have the potential to bring in money to the music industry, how should the 
money be distributed?  
 - Who should distribute the money?  
 - If part of the money were to be put into a fund, how could you see this fund work? 
10.Is there a need and a base for a levy on broadband? 
 - Is there a need for a broadband levy after streaming? 
3.4.	The	interview	process	
There are several objections towards the qualitative interview method. These can for 
instance be that it just reflects common sense; that it is subjective, not objective; that it 
may be considered biased; that it may be based upon leading questions; that different 
readers may find different opinions; that it is dependent on person; and that it is merely 
exploratory (Ryen, 2002, p. 131). This is more general criticism. From an academic point 
of view, criticism towards the qualitative interview can be that it is individualistic; 
idealistic; immobile; cognitive, and even meaningless. (Ryen, 2002, p.135) 
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 The reason for bringing this up is not to fault the method of which I have gathered 
data, but more to show that there are plenty of issues to consider when conducting an 
interview of this type. The goal of the interviews have always been to gather several 
different opinions on the same matter, and to maintain different points of view in order to 
gather the complexity of the issue. The issue of a broadband levy is a very complex one, 
and reaches beyond the music industry, although this specific industry is the main focus 
of this thesis. Because of this, the goal when gathering informants has been to acquire 
informants that knows the music industry very well, but also has some insight into other 
realms in the cultural content industries, although not being a main criteria for selection. 
 As the study is explorative, the most important thing has been to gather informants 
who have a degree of knowledge of the music industry from different angles, and where 
some also must be said to have a high degree of competence of the technologies used in 
the distribution of the product. In this sense, the gathering of informants has been good, 
and I do believe that the four informants cater for a broad field of knowledge, 
competence and opinions. As mentioned earlier, I would have liked for someone from the 
major labels to also take part in this study, as I know that representatives from here would 
also have valid points and opinions into the exploration of a broadband levy.  
 During the interview process, I have tried to not dive too deeply into the areas where a 
qualitative study may be faulted. I have tried to remain open, unbiased and listening. I do 
see, however, when reading through the transcriptions, that I in some interviews may 
have been a little too participatory, in the sense that I sometimes give additional 
information when asking a question. These can be related to statistics or calculations. It is 
difficult to say if this changes the informant’s responses, and as I have never asked of the 
informants opinion of a broadband levy, in the sense «are you for or against», it is 
difficult to say if it changes opinion. Whatever the outcome, this has been, perhaps, my 
own biggest flaw when taking on the role as an interviewer.  
 A second thing that may have hindered the interviews slightly has been that three out 
of four have been conducted via Skype, either as a normal phone conversation or with a 
video link. Although I do not believe that the conditions for the interviews have been 
changed severely due to this fact, it may have caused complications, as internet 
connections sometimes differs in stability. Some minor parts of the interview may have 
come off a bit unclear in the recording process, but I do not believe that it has changed 
their validity, nor the meaning of the informant. The main issue may be that time has 
been a factor when doing the interview over Skype. Surprisingly, the interview with Peter 
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Jenner, conducted face to face, lasted around 30 minutes longer than the interviews over 
Skype, around 90 minutes, whilst the others lasted around an hour. It is difficult to say if 
this was due to the interview conditions, but all informants were asked at the end of each 
interview if they wanted to add something we did no touch upon, and in all cases they 
responded either no, or elaborated on previously mentioned topics. This tells me that the 
informants had managed to say what they wanted to say, and when looking over the 
transcripts or listening to the recordings, I cannot say that there are any topics that I 
missed overall, although all respondents may not have touched upon the exact same 
issues. I have asked and gained permission from all informants to write follow-up e-mails 
if I have had any more questions, so if more response is needed on a subject, there has 
been an opportunity to acquire it.  
 A third issue is the fact that three out of four interviews have been conducted in 
Norwegian, and then translated into English. Although I strive to keep the original 
meaning of the informant, there is a risk that some things may be «lost in translation». I 
have tried to avoid this by using the Norwegian term in parentheses next to the translated 
word when uncertain, and to clarify.	
 All in all, I believe that the interviews conducted have validity, and that they do 
provide good information in this exploratory setting, despite the fact that some flaws may 
have been uncovered.  
3.5.	Analyzing	the	interviews	
Analyzing data, in this case the interviews, is important in order to create a full 
understanding of the meaning and validity of the data. The goal of a qualitative analysis 
is to bring forward a full understanding of specific issues, or to develop theories of 
specific contexts. This is done by analyzing the data (Østbye et al., 2013, p. 129).  
 When working with interviews it is important to do the informants justice by 
presenting their answers and opinions as precisely as possible, and not in such a way that 
one can interpret their opinions differently. In chapter 4, the informants’ response to each 
question has been summarized in relation to key questions, presented at the end of 
chapter 2, and also in the introduction. To ensure validity, the transcripts of the interviews 
are included in the appendix, so that one is able to cross-reference. 
 There are especially three aspects that are important when analyzing qualitative data25: 
1. The data and the analysis of these data must be anchored in overarching issue and theoretical 																																																								25	Translated from Norwegian to English	
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perspectives.  
2. The gathering and treatment of data needs to be systematic, this way the data is able to «speak» 
3. One must figure out what relevance different types of data have for the issue that is raised.  
         (Østbye et al., 2013, p. 129) 
These are all aspects that have been taken into account when analyzing the data. This is 
so that the data can keep their validity and reliability (Østbye et al., 2013, p. 130).  
 In the case of this analysis, responses from each informant have a question as an 
overarching issue. This also leads to a more systematic presentation and treatment of the 
data, and the data is able to speak in the context of the question. The relevance that the 
difference types of data have, are rooted in the question asked. In essence: presenting the 
responsen in such a way maintains their validity and reliability. Attaching the 
transcriptions ensures this even more.  
 The data gathered is mainly used to help gather more data on some of the issues that 
arise from chapter 1 and 2. This is summarized and discussed chapter 5, and the data 
forms a solid base for this happening. Some informants have also had some other points 
that are not directly related to the issues from the end of chapter 2, but that have come up 
over the course of the interviews. These are brought up at the end, and used to determine 
if there are other issues that need to be taken into consideration. For instance, it is 
interesting to summarize the respondents’ views of the basis and need of a broadband 
levy. Issues that arise from this are also brought into chapter 5, as this also addresses 
other possible challenges connected to a broadband levy. The data is used this way so that 
they can help create a wider scope of issues to address, forming an even better foundation 
for developing theories, as well as pointers towards what may require even more 
research. After all, this study seeks to explore, rather than reaching a definite conclusion. 
 The responses are split up into parts that confine with the questions raised at the end of 
chapter 2. The responses are somewhat shortened, but are as close to the meaning of what 
each informant has responded as possible. As the questions of the interview guide have 
not necessarily addressed the specific issues brought forward in this paper, but has aimed 
to cover a broadened scope, some responses have been taken out of their original context 
at times. This is for instance when a respondent touches upon a relevant subject when 
responding to a question that is not as specific as the issues presented. As an example: if 
one touches upon a subject that relates to for instance copyright when being asked 
question number two from the interview guide, this is put into the context of part 4.3. 
This is of course done with the outmost care, and with focus on ensuring not to ascribe 
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opinions onto the informant that the informant has not originally had. Projecting the true 
opinions and expertise of the informants has at all times been the main concern.  
 Where needed to enforce meaning or clarify, direct quotations have been used; for 
example, Norwegian schemes do have a way of altering their names when translated into 
English, so the name of the scheme mentioned is included in a parentheses next to it as a 
direct quotation. The transcripts that are written in Norwegian have been translated to 
English in such a way that they strive to keep the meaning of the original answer.  
 The informants’ answers are presented in such a way that they relate to the issues 
addressed.  
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4.	Responses	and	analysis	
This chapter presents the responses from the respondents, grouped under the different 
questions asked, in addition to other topics that have come up during the interviews. 
4.1.	What	justifies	a	broadband	levy	for	cultural	content?	
The first matter that needs to addressed is what factors may justify a broadband levy for 
cultural content.  
  
Cathrine Ruud discussed how a broadband levy on cultural content may lead to a 
decriminalization of consumers, and lead to better terms for the creators:  
“The consumers, if one is talking about illegal downloading, they would be able to 
download in a justified way, without felling guilty, without prosecution or punishment. 
And if it is distributed individually, or would provide a very good compensation for the 
direct illegal downloading that is there. (…) A broadband levy is a very simple solution 
to the problem (…). It could secure that those who create music gains more money, the 
opportunity to create more music, be able to live from what they do; secure Norwegian 
culture, productions in Norwegian, and that they gain decent remuneration for what they 
do. There is a sense of justice to it. In principal it is a good idea for the rights holders.”   
 Ruud also pointed out that such a model could be a good compromise between rights 
holder and consumers, and that it may create more simplicity:  
“For the consumers (…) Even though that may seem like punishment, it is a more 
accommodating suggestion than punishment and fining. It is a suggestion to a solution, a 
compromise. A suggestion that can benefit both parties. It is very simple and 
understandable, and that is perhaps what the consumers need, something that is easy to 
deal with, but then it needs to well argued and well reasoned when it comes to why.” 
	
Knut Bøhn followed up on the terms for creators, and the potential increased cultural 
production.: 
“The purpose must be that more people contribute to the production of Norwegian 
artistic and cultural expressions. This way, in my world, it is completely reasonable that 
something similar to a broadband levy is expedient, and because it is expedient, it is also 
reasonable to introduce it, under the condition that it benefits the producers.” 
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Cathrine Ruud followed up on this:  
“(…) just look at the streaming services and all of that today, which is a good solution. 
But most are not completely happy with it, as it does not give a good enough 
compensation to all Norwegian musicians. One sees that the share of music produced in 
Norway is at twelve per cent, or something like that. That is a very small amount, and one 
sees that when it comes to films and others things as well, so to maintain the production 
level as high as possible, that more people can make a living out of it, one needs new 
schemes to protect it.” 
 
Peter Jenner is of the view that a broadband levy could contribute to increased cultural 
diversity: 
“The broadband levy could, (…)  help to reduce the growing linguistic hegemony of 
English. The language and cultural hegemony of Anglophonia. I think that is really bad. I 
would love to hear really good Chinese music come through, and in the end it will come 
through, that I can bare to listen to. Chinese movies, Brazilian music. African music. 
There is so much richness that we don't hear, and it is all being drowned out by imitation 
Anglo-American, more Anglo-American, sort of culture.” 
He also pointed at a potential a broadband levy has to help gaining more licensed 
content, which could in turn lead to more cultural diversity: 
“(…) it would open up the internet to all sorts of new services, new content services, 
which are not relying on getting licenses. (…) I've been struck by the fact that you can not 
get a very deep catalogue from France in the UK, as no one can be bothered to license it. 
It seems to me that the problem is the individual licensing of content. I think all content 
should be available from anywhere in the world” 
 
Bendik Hofseth also pointed at the issue of licensing. When asked about justification, he 
answerred:  
” It has to be that you get rid of the problem, because it is not so stupid, not hopeless. 
Look at online licensing today. It becomes more and more fragmented, it is harder and 
harder to find the content, and some services are unlicensed.” 
Hofseth hoped that a broadband levy could help simplify licensing, and pointed out 
that this is a challenge for the music industry: 
“(…) I think that the more fragmented licensing is, the closer Spotify is to go to Brussels 
and say that ‘this does not work anymore, that publisher negotiates here, and that 
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publisher negotiates there, and no one wants standard tariffs, everyone wants to be paid 
differently for their repertoire. It doesn’t work.’” 
	
When it came to justifying a broadband levy, Knut Bøhn addressed the issue of 
perception and willingness to pay:  
“(…) one has to try to make people understand that, especially in a small country like 
ours, there are the collective solutions that create the solutions we have. You cannot start 
to pay the National Insurance («Folketrygden») fourteen days after you have ended up in 
hospital. That is too late. One just needs to understand that, and if people do not 
understand that intuitively, the politicians must make sure that it is communicated. It is 
very hard, what has to do with having people to pay for something, when they can travel 
to Sweden or go on Pirate Bay to get cheaper. People with the best and most noble 
intentions, are still prone to look at price. That is very hard.” 
 
In summary, what justifies a broadband levy for cultural content could be four things: 
• It could decriminalize consumers, and it could, in theory, help legalize or monetize 
all cultural content on the internet.  
• It could lead to increased cultural production as more money could come back to 
creators 
• It could help license all material in all territories, as it could be monetized 
everywhere, hence create more cultural diversity 
• It could simplify the process of gaining licenses, leading to an even more 
competitive catalogue on legal content services. 
 
4.2.	Which	factors	determine	the	size	of	the	levy	for	internet	users?	Is	it	fair	to	put	
a	levy	on	the	internet,	when	it	may	be	regarded	as	a	utility?	
The next issue that needs to be addressed is how you determine the size of a broadband 
levy. The respondents gave some pointers towards how this could be done.  
 
Knut Bøhn pointed at determining it by amount of downloads, when being presented with 
three alternatives on how to pay a levy: Flat-rate, connection speed or by amount of 
downloads (the question also asked if there were other alternatives):  
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“The simple answer to a structure is the last alternative. One should try to maintain the 
perspective of the tree-step test, that the ones who acquire copyrighted material 
remunerates this directly. It is completely reasonable that one puts a tax on the fact that I 
acquire what someone has produced in a way that suits me. I need to be prepared to have 
a cost connected to that, as for instance the TV-license («NRK-lisensen»).”  
 Cathrine Ruud had a similar view, being presented with the three alternatives:  
“I don’t think determining it by connection speed is a very good idea. A flat rate is 
perhaps the simplest, but perhaps also the one that is the most unfair, as it does not take 
into consideration who does most, and who does nothing. (…) The third option seems to 
be the most reasonable, if it is easy to implement, and if privacy and anonymity and all 
that is maintained.” 
Peter Jenner was of a similar view, and presented the opinion that broadband could 
be looked upon as a utility:  
“I am not a technician, but I am sure it could be dealt with. The way it should work is a 
combination of standing charge and volume. There should be a meter measuring the 
amount of content you consume, or however you measure it. I see broadband as a content 
delivery utility. If you look at it as a utility, the way we charge for utilities is by standing 
fees and meters, and in a sense that is what I would do. What I would then look at is 
making sure that the content that is the most accessed, is the content that get's the most 
money. Basically, stuff that we like will get more money, and that means that the people 
who make the stuff that we like, will make more stuff that we like. I think that is what the 
market should be doing. At the moment that is not what the market is doing, because 
there are so many people getting in the way, there's so much rent-seeking on the way 
through, that that's not happening. The money isn't filtering back from user to the creator 
properly. That is a problem, stuff getting in the way of it getting from the end-user to the 
creator, that's what I want to see happening, and I think at the moment too much of it is 
taken up on the way. “ 
 Bendik Hofseth continued down the path of a model that follows that of utilities: 
“I think it would have to be the way it is with water and electricity. That could be a good 
model. The way that works is that there is a set fee, a grid fee in a way, and then usage 
over that. How that could be done, I trust that one is able to figure out. I don’t think that 
is a major challenge. We have models for how we can do that when it comes to sending 
out the bill.”  
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On the topic regarding if it was fair to put a levy on something that is may be regarded as 
a utility, Peter Jenner answered:  
“I think we insist on water being available for everyone? We insist on electricity being 
available for everyone, and gas, and telephones. It's the utility argument. Increasingly, in 
the modern world, you are going to need it, and to be part of society; you're going to 
have to know how to use and have access to the internet. In ten years time, if you 
suggested it is not a utility, people would laugh at you.” 
 
When it came to measuring amount of downloads, Cathrine Ruud pointed out that 
privacy might be an issue:  
“How do you measure it? How do you gather information in order to know how to 
distribute the money? In this instance privacy concerns may play a part. It might feel like 
surveillance.” 	In	summary,	the	consensus	seems	to	be	that	a	broadband	levy	should	be	determined	by	the	amount	that	you	download,	and	that	it	may	be	possible	to	do	so.	If	one	is	to	do	so	one	needs	to	find	a	way	to	measure	it	that	does	not	compromise	privacy	concerns.	When	it	comes	to	charging	for	a	utility,	this	can	be	argued	for	using	the	fact	that	there	are	fees	and	charges	on	other	utilities	as	well.		
4.3.	How	does	one	introduce	a	levy	on	broadband	that	does	not	breach	the	
foundations	of	copyright,	and	does	not	technically	permit	illegal	downloading?	
The third issue is that of copyright and that a levy might create a perception that illegal 
downloading is technically permitted. As presented in chapter 2, there are differing opinions 
on whether or not previously presented levies may stand the scrutiny of copyright. 
 
In terms of previous suggestions, Knut Bøhn was critical of the voluntary option that has been 
advocated in some of these when it came to copyright:  
“I do not believe in the model that is introduced in Germany at all, not from a copyright 
perspective, because it undermines the entire idea of it. It is a cute thing that it should be 
voluntary, but there are a lot of issues connected to this, at least when it comes to that one is 
not forced to pay.” 
 
Bendik Hofseth thinks a broadband levy would affect copyright, and in turn the way one looks 
	 	 	 	 43	
at artistic works: 
“It would affect the way we perceive art, as it would do something to copyright. I think 
the consumer would feel that all belongs to them. That they can use it however they like. 
That we barter moral rights and protection to gain some money from it. That is a 
weakness. I can’t see how we can maintain a control, as the Berne-convention suggests, 
for example when it comes to use for political purposes, pornographic purposes, 
commercial purposes, and so on. Everything will be perceived as free. As bought, and 
paid for, and belonging to everyone. I think that is a tremendous step to take, as you let 
go of the underlying exclusive rights.”  
 
In terms of copyright, Peter Jenner was of the opinion that a broadband levy would undermine 
copyright, but he did not see this as an issue: 
“I don't think there is any question it would undermine the foundations of copyright. It 
depends on what you mean. If you say that copyright is about getting peoples permission, I 
think it would undermine that, and I am quite happy about that. If it means that you're 
undermining the copyright as an existing institution, I would have no problem with that at 
all.”  
 He elaborated:  
“What I don't like about copyright are all the things like «take it down» (…) and I think 
content should flow pretty freely. I would let people have legal objections to some extent. I do 
think that the content should be freely available to everyone. But then everyone have got to 
pay quite a lot to get their broadband access.” 
 He continued:  
“Copyright and permissions are a way of extracting rent. You could say The Beatles have 
been extracting rent because they have been so famous for a long time. The big issue is 
rent. The current structure is a reflection rent, rent-seeking by the major labels.” 
 
Jenner also believed that moral rights might cater for some issues: 
“Is copyright about permission, or about getting paid? If it is about permission then I don't 
give a damn if it goes. (…) I think we can deal with that. It might undermine copyright as a 
permission thing. You could say «we'll leave that to moral rights», and if there is something 
you find to be a really offensive use of your music, you should be able to stop that on moral 
grounds. You shouldn't be able to stop it on financial grounds.” 
 Jenner thought the main issue was how creators could create more for the consumers: 
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“The value chain starts with the creators and ends up with the end user. What one needs 
to do is to work out how you can maximize the amount of creation getting to the end-
users. If the end-users like the content that should be reflected through, into a system 
where creators can afford to create more. The people who enable that transaction, the 
people in between, their job is to make it work better and more efficiently.” 
 
On the topic of whether or not a broadband levy technically legalizes illegal 
downloading, Knut Bøhn was of the opinion it could be avoided, but did see some 
problems, especially when it came to consumer behavior and those who could monitor:  
“ It is not difficult to follow activities from one terminal to another, so that can surely be 
implemented. The same challenge is somewhat connected to the Data Retention 
Directive. There is no incentive for the ones who is the closest to pay the cost. There is no 
incentive to argue for why one should take on the cost. The world we live seeks the path 
of least resistance when it comes to that type of pragmatism. That a commercial provider 
should offer to take a place in such a chain, that is to the disadvantage and an extra cost 
for the provider themselves, I do not think that that is a viable model.” 
 Bendik Hofseth believed it might not be possible due to the fact that a broadband 
levy would have to be introduced by regulators and the unpredictability of that when it 
came to the perception of internet freedom:  
“I think we should use history as a helper. When it comes to the development of healthy 
and sustainable business models, they often occur organically. They don’t occur as a 
result of the reactionary actions as this proposes. It is a very drastic action, which is 
unpredictable in a lot of ways. What I think is the fundamental issue is that the politicians 
have not wanted to regulate this area, because the argument of internet freedom is so 
strong, and because internet freedom has been connected to the entire way the medium 
intertwines us; us humans like to be to be intertwined.” 
 
Cathrine Ruud stressed the fact that the terms surrounding a broadband levy would have 
to be made clear to everyone, and that existing laws could help address this: 
“It has to very clear what such a levy involves, how it is to happen. There has to be 
certain criteria or guidelines for the levy. What it contains. Ways to circumvent it 
happens anyway, but we have laws. The copyright law («Åndsverksloven») still prevents 
that, if one does not change the laws to fit such a levy.” 
 
	 	 	 	 45	
Putting a broadband levy into the copyright scheme of today may seem a hard fit. First of 
all, it would probably need to be mandatory. Secondly it needs to find a balance of 
protecting content, whilst gaining remuneration. Third, some of the existing structures of 
copyright today may need revising in order for broadband levy to fit, if desirable. Moral 
rights may, however, help to cater for some of the most important issues, and there would 
still be protection that copyright laws give that would be applicable.  
 In terms of if it may create a perception that one can still acquire material illegally, 
consumer behavior and attitude is always an issue, but there are ways to track activity if 
needed. The argument of internet freedom also has a wide foothold. Whether or not it is 
possible to avoid such a perception at all ends is difficult to say, but it is nevertheless 
important to still certain criteria and guidelines to prevent it from happening.  
 
4.4.	How	does	one	distribute	the	money	from	a	broadband	levy,	and	how	does	
one	avoid	manipulation	of	the	numbers	that	the	money	is	distributed	upon?	
A main topic when it comes to a broadband levy is how it may be distributed. In this section, 
four three things are discussed: How is the money distributed, and who distributes it; How 
does one avoid manipulation on data, and; if the money is put into a fund, how should this 
fund work.  
 
Peter Jenner touched upon what determines collection, and how one could measure how 
money could be distributed: 
“You could have a standing charge and a metered charge, and you allocated the money that 
was received in order of what people had actually used, because they know what people are 
using. They know how much of its music, how much of its film, how much of its video, how 
much of its newspapers, and how much is other things. They could allocate that revenue 
according to those things, and they could analyze what is getting used within that content, and 
that could be done relatively simply.” 
 Jenner added: 
“I would allocate it according to who's watching or accessing the content, the music 
content. It would mainly go to the creators of that content, so therefore you would need 
people to decide who were the creators and what is a fair and right way of allocating 
money. But we do find ways of doing that for radio money. There is a base line of 
statistics. You have things like PPR (price per record), you have a different ratio on who 
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gets what from a recording, which sort of works. You could have that similar sort of 
structure for video and for anything else.”  
 Knut Bøhn discussed the distribution in light of pro-rata versus collective distribution. He 
pointed out that pro-rata distribution is relatively simple, but also saw good reasons to 
distribute collectively: 
“There are two possible distribution models. When this was discussed the first time, it was 
considered pretty unacceptable to leave the pro-rata model, and that the money followed the 
usage. Now, one has many years of experience in doing this. with the enormous amounts of 
data gathered from Spotify each month, for instance. It is not difficult to distribute based on 
use. I think there are many good reasons why one should handle this collectively, and 
distribute from organizations such as TONO, Gramo and others.”  
 He added:  
“(…) If a tax to stimulate Norwegian cultural production holds relevance, it would probably 
be better to if it were managed collectively, rather than one to one.” 
 He did see some issues, however: 
“What has been tricky, traditionally, has been to get those with a very large share of the users 
on board. Universal, for instance, has a market share of 40 per cent, or something like that, 
so it may be very hard to get them to go along with any other share than that.”  
 Bøhn added: 
“It could well be that the rights holders organizations should manage this, because in that 
way one would maintain an aspect of cultural policy. But one could also say that such a 
model belongs to the sixties, and that it is not hard to have the money stream follow the ones 
who acquire material. “ 
 Bendik Hofseth believed there were many benefits to the CMOs distributing the money, 
when asked who should distribute the money, he answered: 
“We have good devices for that. It would have to be those organizations who have registries 
and routines for this today, and that is the CMOs, or the copyright companies. They have 
overview and experience. They have membership lists, they know how to exchange the money, 
and how you gather the money. Those structures are in place.” 
 He added: 
“(…) we have experience and precedence, so I think that is doable.” 
 When it came to distribution, Hofseth thought this could be done both individually and 
collectively: 
“(…) one could consider a collective bit, that everything is not distributed individually, but a 
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collective bit that is withheld in the respective bodies for cultural purposes, used for stipends, 
shares for grassroots initiatives, and incubation.” 
 Cathrine Ruud shared the view of organizations distributing the money, but named a 
different organization than the CMOs as a natural distributor, in addition to considering other 
options: 
“Distribution could be done in a lot of ways. It could be type of fund, stipends, or individual 
distribution through Norwaco. They already distribute the private copying levy, which is an 
individual distribution, and it is natural that this may have been under them. On the other 
hand they have 35 member organizations who needs to agree that this is a good, and the way 
there is not very easy.“ 
 Ruud did not believe CMOs, in this case TONO, to be a natural distributor of broadband 
levy money: 
“I don’t think that is a natural part of them, based on what they do today. They already 
collect performance money in a very accurate way. They manage performance rights. I think 
it more natural that it falls under Norwaco.” 
 Peter Jenner shared the view of CMOs doing the distribution::  
“In terms of music I would have all the money coming through things like PRS and PPL, 
and they would have the information of who to give it to, and they would be under 
obligations to be efficient and economical, and I would leave that to very tough 
regulation.” 
 Jenner also had some views when it came to the fairness of this model: 
“I think the idea that you have someone who collects and distributes it amongst other 
worthy people is a pretty good idea. Collection societies are a very good idea. What does 
the cameraman get as opposed to the musicians, as opposed to the star, as opposed to the 
writer? It's not very fair now, that's the advantage. I would hope there would be a better 
distribution, more even distribution than there is now.” 
 
When it came to data collection, Bendik Hofseth saw the advantages of an international 
registry: 
“(…) there would have to be an international registry in one way or the other, that could be 
connected to this. That is what we tried to put up in Geneva, in WIPO. That is an essential 
element, because one can cheat a lot with data if it isn’t, and we are unable to mechanize 
those settlements.”  
 Knut Bøhn believed that current data collection methods were viable in this case: 
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“For music this is sufficient, perhaps excluding smaller radio stations, but apart from that it 
is sufficient.”  
 
When asked if the some of the money could be put into a fund, Cathrine Ruud had some 
thoughts of who such a fund could cater for: 
“Perhaps a fund for those who are difficult to collect for individually, groups where it is 
hard to distribute individually. At the same time someone who has their content used 
online. For the greater good; common solutions.” 
 Bendik Hofseth pointed at the opportunities a fund has to create more diversity:  
“It is about strengthening diversity, if necessary. It is about giving young people an 
opportunity. That they are able to eligibly finance those who have great ambitions. That there 
is schemes within the arts sector itself that can highlight what is more essential than others.” 
 Peter Jenner also believed in a type of fund, and had some opinions in terms of how these 
funds should be ran: 
“I think that one would not want to just be driven by popularity, but it would be one of 
the criteria. You don't want it all driven by, sort of, art snobs, or the middle classes, 
upper classes or whatever, or the masses.” 
 Jenner used art schools in England in the 60s as a reference to this, and how people 
had been taken in due to their folio and not academic or artistic qualifications:  
“From that a lot of great bands started, and I think that if you have that same sort of 
openness to that sort of approach. You could go in to someone and say "look, this is what 
I'd like to do" and they'd give you a small grant to do it, and then if you don't do it that's 
alright, it's just written off, but you will find it hard to get a second grant, you might be 
able to get a second grant if that is also a write-off, it would be very hard to get a third 
grant, and then you'd be in the dumper. Equally if you make the first grant work, it is 
easier to get a second.” 
 He pointed out that success is something that should be rewarded, but that potential 
funds should have a sense of diversity to them: 
“I would reward success. I would reward good ideas, initially, and then I'd reward 
success of what their ideas were, in other words, what people respond to best. But not 
entirely. I think a bit of both. You don't have to have a single system; you could have a 
variety of systems. You could have the cultural fund, the art fund, the popular fund, you 
know. “ 
 Knut Bøhn was of the opinion that one did not have to reinvent the wheel, and that 
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there were good models in place today:  
“I don’t see any major challenges with the way Fond for Lyd og Bilde functions today. 
Such a fund should bring back money to the productions environment. “  
 
Previously, commercial acts in the music industry have expressed a desire to be able to apply 
for funding to promote Norwegian music abroad. When asked if this was something that could 
be an option for a fund Knut Bøhn was clearly positive: 
“Yes. It has to be used to stimulate a professional environment.” 
 Cathrine Ruud shared this opinion:  
“I can see that. I think that is a good idea. Everything that contributes to the creation of new 
works and new music, which again is used online. I see that being a solution.” 
 Bendik Hofseth thought this could be good idea, but that this could vary from country to 
country:  
“The online segment is included in a cultural ecology, a biotope. In Norway, who has a small 
amount of national repertoire, it may be important to strengthen the Norwegian repertoire. In 
England, there are other things that are important. There, diversity may be under stimulated. 
In other countries the mono cultural may be under stimulated, that one has a need to 
contribute to the creation of great spearheads; stars. The needs can be very different, in very 
different countries, at very different times, so there has to be flexibility, a type of autonomy in 
each region when it comes to such a fund.” 
 Peter Jenner also shared the view that this could be a good thing, but emphasized that is 
should be for developmental purposes:  
“I don't mind that, but what I would do is making sure that you sort of ring fence that money, 
and you have a sort of Norwegian development thing, and it's not just used as a way of getting 
money from Norwegian government to promote Anglophone music. I think you can envisage 
things like that, and I see no reason why shouldn't. Sony Norway, who has a staff of like four 
people, but has a bit of taps into Sony stuff, can apply for development money for arts, and try 
to promote and market that. I don't see that as a particular problem, but I do think you have to 
be careful that it is not used to just subsidize overseas stuff. “ 
 
There seems to be a consensus that there should be some type of organizations involved 
in the distribution of the money, and that the money should be distributed according on a 
certain pro-rata basis after amount of plays and hits. One does, however, need to find a 
model of distribution that is satisfactory to as many parties as possible. When it comes to 
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the collection of data one has to ensure that as much content as possible is registered in 
the same way, for instance in an international registry. One does have good data 
collection in the music industry as is, but there may be a need for better coordination. 
Some of the money should be allocated into a fund, where both non-commercial and 
commercial players can apply for funding. There does, however, have to be some criteria 
to what and how.  
4.5.	Can	a	broadband	levy	work	as	a	supplement	to	the	existing	structure	of	the	
music	industry?	
The music industry as is holds many different structures, structures that have been the same 
for many years, and structures that have changed over time. As structural change has shown to 
be quite a demanding job, is it possible for a broadband levy to work as a supplement to this 
structure without changing it completely? 
 
Knut Bøhn was of the opinion that a broadband levy could work as a supplement as similar 
structures are already in place. However, he pointed out that the music industry may struggle 
to gain acceptance for structural change:   
“A broadband levy can work as a supplement to the existing structure. (…) I would assume 
that collective management could be natural. Without having vast knowledge of Norwaco, for 
instance, I know that there are enough groups of right holders who at all times are 
represented in such a discussion of distribution, and I think that perhaps music has a weaker 
position now, than in the previous round of the private copying levy 
(«Privatkopieringsvederlagsrunden»), all that time it is an established fact that the music 
industry is actually doing very well.” 
 Cathrine Ruud shared this view:  
“I think it could work as a supplement if it is implemented in a good and practical way. I 
don’t see that it necessarily has to replace something else, or that it does not fit into the 
existing structure. I associate it a bit with the private copying levy 
(«Privatkopieringsvederlaget»), that is has some of the same traits.” 
 She did, however, not see a broadband levy replacing an existing structure such as the 
private copying levy. When asked if it should replace such a model, she answerred:  
“No, I don’t think so. It might be a bit intertwined, but I don’t see that it could replace it. I 
think it has to be structured in a different way that what that is. It could be compensated in the 
same way.” 
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 Peter Jenner did not think the music industry would be affected by broadband levy so that it 
needed to work as a supplement, but that it may affect some of the services that are in the 
industry: 
“I don't think it affects the music industry. It would just generate more income, which is 
probably a good thing. I think it would affect the issue of charging and pricing of paid-for 
services. Would a broadband levy, as it where, legitimize people using other services which 
don't pay? Would the broadband levy end up with one just getting the same money as you are 
getting now from Spotify and iTunes; the legal services? Would it enable people to develop 
these services, which those existing services have developed? The interesting question off of 
that question is: what sort of services might developers be able to make as a result of having a 
broadband levy, and if you had the broadband levy would that mean that the labels could be 
expected to charge a lot less? If you have the levy it means that the paid-for services could be 
cheaper. Or if those were the same price they would have more curation, they would more 
value to them than just being locked into you own playlist.” 
 Bendik Hofseth could see a broadband levy working as a supplement if it was based on 
previous models: 
 “When it comes to thinking of it as a supplement, I think we have to look at is as a cassette 
levy model. That it is for the type of copying that is done outside of sales of copies, our outside 
of legally licensed services. This is problematic. Legal streaming services are all interested in 
having a strong as an economy as possible, because this would benefit the whole community. 
If we are to compete with a private copying scheme, how do you practice and enforce that?” 
 Hofseth added that he did not think this was a good idea, and pointed at the need for 
internet regulation: 
“(…) I don’t think it is a good idea to use a broadband levy as a supplement. It has to be 
either all encompassing, or we have to regulate the internet in the same way that we regulate 
other markets.” 
 
It may be possible that a broadband levy could work as a supplement to an existing 
structure. It may not even affect the main structures of the industry, although it may open 
up for more diversity in the development of existing services. The main question is 
whether or not it is a good idea to implement it as a supplement - all that time the internet 
may require more regulation – or if it should be an all-encompassing structure that needs 
more work that a supplement model would imply. 
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4.6.	Other	issues	
During the interviews there were especially two very interesting things that came up, 
which were not part of the original set of issues at the end of chapter two. The first 
discussed in this part has to do with platform services and cultural content. The second is 
more relevant when trying to reach a type of conclusion on the issue: Is there a need for a 
broadband levy, and is there a need after streaming is said to have solved a lot of the 
original issues, at least in terms of music? 
4.6.1.	Regulating	the	internet	
In his interview, Bendik Hofseth was very concerned with unlicensed content on the 
internet, platform services and the safe harbor agreement. Hofseth gave so much 
feedback on the matter that it arises as a prominent issue in the big picture, as well as 
helping to expand on the part connected to the topic in chapter one. In the context of a 
thesis that looks into some type of internet regulation, this is a topic that needs to be 
given attention. Therefore a part of this chapter is devoted to the issue. 
 
Hofseth put focus on the imbalance between platforms services who use cultural content, 
and legal services which has the legal spread of this content as their main objective. He 
pointed out that this imbalance created problems: 
“When it comes to Facebook for example, 60 per cent of what is one there is copyrighted. 
They have even made their own video format to avoid paying out money. They earn 
enormous amounts on advertising, but do not share this with the ones who make the 
service attractive. That is very strange, and also leads to that Spotify, Tidal and Netflix, 
and others who do this legally, are in a segment that is not regulated when it comes to 
competition. Google should perhaps pay as much as 50 to 60 per cent of their surplus to 
rights holders to be in the same segment as the streaming services. 70 per cent of 
Spotify’s revenue is used to gather and license content. If Facebook and Google had 
spent the same amount on the areas that depend on and use copyrighted material, we 
would have a completely different type of economy, and we would have a legal, regulated 
market, and stopping grey zones and borderline case would have been much easier.” 
Hofseth pointed towards the fact that art functions as a good catalyst for the platform 
services, and that some of this should come back to cultural content industries. He 
pointed out the Safe Harbor agreement as one of the main reasons for the imbalance, and 
called for policy makers to address this:  
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“Art, in a way, is a very good catalyst, it initiates processes in us, opens doors, in a way 
we are much more friendly towards close and distant friends and relations because one 
uses art as a starting point. The issue is that those who offers us this art, has offered 
access and collected the web or connection are the platform services. These services say 
that they are the ones who offer us the new world. You don’t need this nagging on 
copyright, we live in a new world, where we share everything, and all is free. But the 
ones who say this, are the same as those who don’t pay taxes, who are antisocial, not 
open, not transparent. That is a paradox. The fact that the politicians don’t wake up to 
this, and start to regulate so that we can avoid it, I think that is the biggest issue in why 
we don’t move forward. That is the biggest challenge. This is what we need to address. 
One made a mistake in the WIPO-agreements in 1996, and one made a mistake in the EU 
e-commerce directive in 2001. Back then, we thought of Google and Facebook as start-up 
companies, who needed a bit of help, which were interesting, and could gain easier 
access to Safe Harbor. It was not so important with privacy, and different bits and pieces. 
We cut some corners because we wanted this to be done quickly. After two, three years, 
they were the biggest. The politicians kind of gave it to them. They gave them that space. 
Because of that, they are the ones who need to take it back.” 
Hofseth did not see a broadband levy as a proper solution to this issue, and called for 
regulating the internet to a bigger extent than what has been done thus far. He did believe 
that a broadband levy could have a complementary effect, but believed it did not cater for 
the full problem on its own: 
“Personally, I think broadband levies are an evasion from regulating the internet. We 
have to regulate the internet. We have to do what we do in all other areas. There is 
nothing mysterious about the internet, it just seems that way, because it is an amazing 
way of binding people together, but it has to be a political courage to say that we need to 
have some rules there as well. We can not have a society where the likes of Google and 
Facebook just grabs all the money there is, and papers and knowledge, and local forces 
disappear, because someone are not paying attention, don’t dare. I mean the politicians. 
In that perspective a broadband levy is a desperate thing. We can do something radical; 
achieve something simple. I think there can be a need for complementary schemes that 
replaces a compensation scheme, like the cassette levy has been in all its variations. 
Some countries or areas may go for that, some may not. That would be smaller 
intervention in people’s wallets and choice. I think we need laws and guidelines and 
politics, which make it so that we can get money from those who earn them from us. The 
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platform services, who earn money on the content today, who do not pay. I think we need 
good international registries that we work on together. That is the web, what the internet 
is really about. Having the same standards, and devices at hand, with the possibility of 
transparency. “ 
Peter Jenner touched upon the same topic, when discussing the meaning of a 
broadband levy. He believed that broadband was a vessel for accessing content, and that 
there were issue with the content accessed, as well:  
“(…) If you're having broadband, or paying for broadband, it's probably because you 
want to access content. It's not the only reason, but it's a major reason, for having a 
broadband service, and it seems to me that the broadband companies, when they're 
selling broadband they are in fact selling, implicitly selling, access to content; to free 
content, or cheap content, probably free content. It might be legal free content, but it 
seems to me that it's as much problem with YouTube paying up enough money, and 
Facebook, and so on. As it stands at the moment, legal free content is as much of a 
problem as illegal free content.” 
 
It is quite clear that a discussion surrounding a broadband levy also needs to consider the 
issues of content on the internet, and how this – for several reasons – is not monetized as 
it perhaps should. A scheme that seeks to achieve some type of internet regulation, needs 
to consider the issues surrounding such a regulation. In conclusion, it has to be discussed 
whether a broadband levy can help to cater for the issues of Safe Harbor, platform 
services and cultural content, and how a broadband levy may function within these issues.   
4.6.2.	Is	there	a	need	for	a	broadband	levy?	Is	there	a	need	after	streaming?	
The last question of the interviews was always if there was a need or base for a 
broadband levy, and how streaming may have affected this need. This question is 
important, as it points towards some of the attitudes towards it, and creates arguments 
that one needs to consider in the context. As shown in the previous part, Bendik Hofseth 
believed broadband levies to be an evasion from regulating the internet. As his views on 
this specific matter was presented in the last part, they will not be repeated here, but they 
do go into the discussion. Hofseth’s views on the necessity of a broadband levy after the 
introduction of streaming services are, however, presented.  
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Cathrine Ruud pointed out that there were many issues that would need to be sorted out 
before one could really tell if there was a base and need for a levy: 
“There are many nuances, and it is very hard to answer without having more details in 
place. The need is probably there. For the rights holders we think that it is a good thing. 
The question is whether it is feasible, how it is legally; does it compromise that? There 
are so many factors connected to it. I definitely think there is a need, and perhaps a base, 
to explore it further. It is such a good idea, as long as the details are in place. Everything 
needs to come together, in a way, all considerations needs to be catered for. If one is able 
to do that, I think there is a basis and a need. I am a little unsure whether it is the best 
solution. That has something to do with the innovation, that it might prevent that, that one 
leans a little too much on it. Perhaps it is better to look at the streaming model that is 
there already, and try to tidy that up a bit.” 	 Knut	Bøhn	was	of	the	opinion	that	there	may	be	a	base,	but	that	the	way	the	landscape	has	changed	over	the	last	years	had	altered	the	need:	
“There is definitely a base for a broadband levy, all that time the money keeps flooding in 
to those who offer broadband access. But a need? 10 years ago, I would have said «Yes, 
are you crazy», but I think the issue is a little outdated when it comes to my current life in 
the music industry. I think it could be beneficial for Norwegian cultural production if 
money were supplied through for instance a broadband levy. If there is a need is not 
certain, but I think it could be beneficial. It wouldn’t hurt if the broadband provider 
shared some of the money with the content producers.”	
Peter Jenner believed a levy to be desirable, and that there have been many good 
reasons for levies in the past. He did point out that such a levy would have to have the 
ability to change if it did not work as desired.  
“I think that there is a lot to be said for it. I think that the reasons why we had levies, tape 
levies and so on, there were good reasons behind it. I think the need to stimulate and 
protect cultural goods within national boundaries is important; the need to look after 
rich and varied new experiences is all worthwhile.  The broadband levy as such I think 
could do something if it was used properly. (…) I think it's a question of how it is set up. 
(…) if it meant that there's a better chance of people getting their music and their works, 
their creative work, out to the public and being seen and being made, and there's a way 
for it to be promoted and new things can happen, then yes, it's great. . Is it necessary? 
No. Is it desirable? (…) If you could say what is desirable and you can then structure a 
system, which is likely to generate that, then that's a good thing. I think that one should 
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also be very careful of, and very mindful of the reality, and the law of unintended 
consequences. So whatever you do, it should be constantly under review. 
(…) you just have to be very mindful of it, and keep it very open and under constant 
review. (…) the digital world is going to be fundamentally different, and that we have to 
think about how we make it work.” 
 
On the topic of the need for a levy after streaming, Cathrine Ruud pointed out that the 
dissatisfaction surrounding distribution of streaming money may not rule out a broadband 
levy completely: 
“It depends on the topic of illegal downloading. Streaming has more or less taken over in 
that sense, so in that way there may not be a need. At the same time many are dissatisfied 
with the distribution of streaming money is today, so it is not completely solved. I would 
not say that there is not a need due to streaming.” 
Knut Bøhn believed that streaming may have changed the need for the music 
industry, but that there still were financial issues: 
”The need has definitely changed for the music industry. One still has a challenge that 
when it comes to liquidity, there previously was a quicker turnover rate of earnings on 
expenses, in that sense it is a displacement of liquidity, but the need for funding over time 
has definitely changed in the music industry’s favor through the streaming services” 
Bendik Hofseth pointed out that streaming services would have to operate on equal 
terms, and that streaming had potential if it was dealt with properly: 
“That is a good question, because streaming is some kind of scheme. Then we have to 
take away that strange competition these streaming services are in. They have to compete 
against companies who have equal terms as them, companies who are also licensing. 
Then we may gain an exciting flora of streaming services that are curated, which has the 
music you like.” 
Peter Jenner pointed out that there still were issues surrounding music services: 
”(…) I think we are coming from a position that isn't great. That's the positive, is that we 
are not in a position where it's an ideal world. A lot of money is not getting through to the 
creators. Too much money is going through to the middle men, and it's far too hard to 
open a new digital service using music because of this. That is something that we should 
definitely think about.” 
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The respondents do not completely agree when it comes to a base and need of a 
broadband levy. One things that is clear is that if it is to work, it has to gain more 
substance in what it is actually about, and how it should work. It is quite clear that 
streaming has unsolved issues; financial issues, issues that a broadband levy may be able 
to help cater for. Another thing that is clear is that if a broadband levy is something to 
implement, it has to be built up in such a way that it has the ability to change if it does not 
push the right buttons, and it has to be so simple that this can be done. One cannot expect 
a broadband levy to be something that will stand for a thousand years, but it may be able 
to sort of some issues of today. If this is the case, a broadband levy may only be a quick 
fix and an evasion of a much larger problem. In summary; a broadband levy must not be 
a way of losing sight of perhaps more pressing issues.  
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5.	Discussion	
In this part of the paper, the different issues that have been raised will be discussed with basis 
in the first four chapters. The chapter follows the template of discussing these issues in the 
order they have been presented in the analysis in chapter three. This is with one exemption: 
the question of determining size and utilities is split into two parts.   
 
5.1.	Justifying	a	broadband	levy	on	cultural	content	
When discussing a broadband levy, there is a definite need to look at justification. Why 
should cultural content be compensated through such a model? What justifies the 
remuneration of cultural content? 
 Firstly, compensating rights holders for their work is nothing new, and has been done 
through various schemes, institutions and levies for more than a hundred years, ever since 
the founding of SACEM and the many collecting societies that followed, as well as by 
introducing levies from the sixties onwards. In the modern society, there has always been 
some type of compensation on cultural content in various ways, and rights holders have 
for long had a right to be compensated for the exploitation of their works. In this sense, a 
broadband levy is merely a development of existing schemes that have up until today 
covered cassettes, CDs, hard drives and other blank media in many countries.  
 In the case of blank media levies, these seem to have reached a certain «best by-
date». As more and more consumers turn their storage needs to the cloud, and acquire 
cultural content through other means than recording off the radio, burning or ripping a 
CD or downloading from P2P services, it is evident that the schemes that cover these 
actions may need revising. The computer, smart phone or tablet is ubiquitous in many 
parts of the world, and a lot - if not most - of the usage is reached, done over or made 
available via a broadband connection in different shapes and forms. In this instance, 
moving a levy over to the technology that makes most content accessible today seems 
logical.  
 Over the years, especially in the last two decades, but ever since «home taping kills 
music»-campaigns and their likes, there has been a level of criminalization of consumers 
who do not acquire cultural content in the way preferred by the industry. As more and 
more people acquire material this way, especially younger people, there is a certain risk 
of criminalizing entire generations. This is not a way 
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but merely to question the outcome of this criminalization. As the number of consumers 
who acquire material illegally or unlicensed rises, it may become more and more difficult 
to follow or prosecute so many, and it may consume resources that could help to enhance 
and strengthen other areas. In terms of this, it seems logical to implement a system that 
could help to gain compensation. A broadband levy could help to monetize that content 
that is still not acquired legally, and perhaps create a wider scope of legal services. On the 
other hand, one needs to be very careful so that such actions does not imply that one has 
given up on the issue, and this is where the real dilemma lies: how can you create a 
system that gains some type of remuneration, but that at the same time has openings to 
follow and close down illegal services? In the case of the music industry, streaming 
services has been a way of making this happen. The industry has created a system where 
one, for a relatively small cost, can acquire most material legally, and that allows for 
continuing prosecution of the biggest offenders. One can argue, however, that this system 
still has room for improvement, and a broadband levy could help to gain income to 
continue to pay the costs of this improvement. As well as covering come development 
costs, a broadband levy could also help to create more income for the creators of the 
content, in turn leading to a wider scope of cultural production. This could, in turn, lead 
to more content being produced, giving streaming and other legal services a wider 
catalogue. 
 When it comes to a wider catalogue, a broadband levy could also potentially help to 
simplify the licensing structure, and make it easier for legal services to acquire licenses 
for as much content as possible. If a broadband levy has the ability to monetize more 
content, this could lead to interest in more content being licensed in more and more 
territories, and lead to a wider catalogue, not just with more music from creators in the 
territories where the streaming user or service is located, but also from other territories. 
This could in turn lead to increased cultural diversity.  
 There is no doubt that a broadband levy could be justified, using arguments such as 
existing schemes, technological development, de-criminalization of consumers, wider and 
more diverse catalogues, and more content available on legal services. This leads us onto 
how one is to determine how it should function. 
5.2.	Determining	size	
A major factor for a broadband levy to be implemented, is to find a way of determining 
what the size of the levy should be in terms of fees, and how one should determine how 
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such a fee is paid. When setting such a fee, it seems to be most reasonable to have the 
ones who acquire copyrighted material to remunerate this as directly as possible, hence 
favoring a structure that follows how much you download. There are technological ways 
of which this can be done, and one could see a type of meter-measurement, as used on 
electricity, being possible. However, it does have some drawbacks, mainly when it comes 
to managing resources and the topic of privacy. 
 When it comes to managing resources, one would have to implement a system that 
require as little labor as possible, meaning that it should be at automated as possible. Such 
a scheme would not have to be incredibly labor intensive. In many cases the ISPs may 
already have this type of information available in different ways, and this information 
would probably not have to be altered much to cater for this issue. In many cases the ISPs 
already know roughly what you use your connection for, and this could be foundation for 
this type of measurement.  
 In terms of privacy, there may well be that measuring usage can, by some, be seen as 
surveillance. On the other hand, the ISPs may already know quite well what one uses 
their connection for, and there are ways of implementing such a scheme without 
conflicting the issue of privacy. One could measure use of file formats, rather than 
domains. One could also implement a system where a type of recording code is 
implemented in the material, and registers how many times it is played. In many ways, 
this is how services such as Spotify and YouTube work today. The issue here is that this 
is difficult to do for unlicensed content, and implementing this structure here would be 
incredibly labor intensive. In this sense, one would have to use general statistics of what 
is being used in order to remunerate, and use general usage statistics in order to determine 
what each customer would have to pay. One could for instance measure how much video 
an IP-address watches, but not what type of videos, and then determine how much to pay 
from that - for instance NOK 0.10 per GB. A broadband levy determined by usage would 
probably not conflict with existing structures in this sense, and existing levels of privacy 
would probably not be affected severely. It is understandable that one has concerns, 
however, and this would have to be addressed in an expedient way.  
 An alternative to a usage-based model is a flat rate, which is the simplest, but perhaps 
also the most unfair. This model, like the previous, has both drawbacks and advantages. 
In terms of privacy there may not be an issue, as it does not require insight into usage. In 
terms of managing resources, it is not intensive, as nothing would need to be measured 
and reviewed to the same extent as a usage based system. Also, it is simpler to calculate 
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how much a flat rate would bring in, simplifying economic management and give 
pointers towards distribution. The perhaps biggest drawback is that it would only follow 
the user, and not the usage. There would be no difference between heavy and light users, 
and it would affect everyone. A counter argument towards this is evidently that we 
already have so many similar models in place, such as line rental, a TV-license, or even 
road tax. These models do not differentiate between how much you use your internet 
connection, how much you watch TV, or how much you drive.  
 Whatever structure is the most feasible, it has to coincide with two criteria: It has to 
compensate the rights holders who are affected in the fairest way possible, and; it has to 
bill the consumer a fair and reasonable amount of money.  
5.3.	The	internet:	a	utility?	
Another hot topic is whether or not it is fair to charge fees and taxes for a utility. To 
determine this, one first has to determine if the internet is a utility.  
 The short answer here is yes; the internet is a utility, at least in the developed world. 
As the infrastructure is improved it is likely that it may be regarded as a utility in 
developing countries in the future. As the UN considers internet a human right – along 
the same lines as electricity or access to water - this also leads the internet to becoming a 
utility. The internet is ubiquitous for most people, and more and more of our daily work 
and routines is done either via the internet or as a result of the information on there. The 
fact that the internet can be regarded as a utility means that one should not have to pay 
unreasonable extra amounts for gaining access, other than the cost of acquiring it. It also 
means that the government could, or should, be able to regulate the pricing to make it 
accessible for as many people as possible, and not allowing unreasonable entry fees for 
access. This is where one would have to make a distinction: a distinction between access 
and usage.  
 To consider if it is fair to charge fees or taxes for a utility, a good starting point is to 
compare it to other utilities. As most countries in the world measure the usage of 
electricity, this seems to be a reasonable starting point. The fact of the matter is that one 
pays for use of electricity, and not for access to it - although this has a small charge as 
well, regulated by the government. In addition, this usage is subject to taxation. One can 
try to decrease usage to make these costs go down, for instance through different 
electricity saving means, but one does not pay a lot for access to being able to use it. This 
could perhaps be a way of paying for the internet in the future, reducing access fees and 
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implementing usage fees. How this could be done, or if this is even a way of doing it, 
may be arguable, but it does provide one important point: It is fair taxing for a utility, but 
it would have to done be in terms of usage. The taxation would also have to be set by the 
government, and be reviewed by government-connected bodies.  
 
5.4.	Copyright	and	technical	legalization	of	illegal	material	
In terms of copyright, there are several points that would have to be taken into 
consideration when it comes to a broadband levy.  
Regardless of if one agrees with the existing copyright structure or not, a broadband 
levy would have to have a relation with copyright. The three studies conducted on content 
flat-rates and the three-step test shows that may be difficult to have the existing 
legislation encompassing a broadband levy, and there are probably changes in the 
legislation that would have to be made. In terms of copyright being used as a way of 
gaining remuneration, it may very well be that this could be left as it stands. The part of 
copyright that has to do with permission would probably require structural changes. If the 
consumer, as a consequence of paying a broadband levy, feels that everything «belongs to 
them», it would be increasingly hard to control those rights that have to do with 
permission. This may, however, be resolved by using moral rights. 
The main question is whether or not a broadband levy could pass the three-step test, 
and hence be implemented in national legislation without a change in copyright law. At 
this point in time, this is quite unlikely, hence it can not be seen as an exemption from 
copyright law, and something that has to be covered by the legislation. Although different 
studies disagrees on some of the topics, there is something to be said now, up to ten years 
after, when it comes to changes in how we see technology in the copyright landscape. 
First of all, one can argue that private copying, unlicensed content and illegally acquiring 
material is no longer a special case, hence, legislation covering this can not be exempt 
from copyright legislation. When it comes to the second step, acquiring content through 
unlicensed sources is a more and more widespread practice, but perhaps not standard 
practice. It does, however, compete with normal exploitation - besides, what is perceived 
as normal exploitation may have changed over the last ten years - as it may lead to lost 
income and unreasonable competition with this exploitation. In terms of the last step, a 
broadband levy would perhaps not unreasonably prejudice rights holders’ legitimate 
interests, as there would be some type of compensation involved. The issue here is that, 
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as it does not pass the first two steps, it can not pass the third as a consequence. In short: 
as acquiring cultural content via unlicensed - or even illegal - sources on the internet may 
no longer be deemed a special case, and as this competes with normal channels of sale - 
although it may not completely alienate the authors legitimate interests - a broadband 
levy can not pass the three-step test. As a consequence of this, introducing a broadband 
levy would have to call for changes in copyright law to be implemented legitimately. This 
would need to be taken into consideration if one is to implement the levy. 
When it comes to whether or not a broadband levy may technically legalize 
distribution of illegal or unlicensed content, this is also an issue. One can of course make 
clear what it covers, and what it means, and hope for the best, but the problem here is that 
people are prone to find ways of circumventing this, anyway. Laws and legislation may 
help, but one would also have to call more for the good will of the consumer. Besides, if 
one uses the decriminalization of consumers as an argument to justify a broadband levy, 
one would have to be very careful with prosecution and legal actions. In many ways, this 
issue is perhaps one of the most unpredictable ones, and there is limited how much one 
can foresee the consequences regarding this. 
One thing that is quite clear, however, is that such a levy would have to be mandatory. 
It is a nice idea that it should be voluntary, and some years ago this was an 
understandable viewpoint, but in this day and age where cultural content stands for so 
much of the way we use the internet, there is reason to believe that most consumers - 
consciously or not - have been in contact with material that is not gaining remuneration. 
This may not be a major challenge, as research shows that people are willing to pay a 
levy to have access to more material. Experiences with streaming underline this 
willingness to pay. 
5.5.	Distribution	
As mentioned, a broadband levy - in its’ simplest form - has potential to bring in a substantial 
amount of money to the creators of cultural content. But how should the money be distributed, 
and who should distribute? 
 One thing that becomes evident is that the money would have to be distributed through a 
CMO, meaning collectively. There are many reasons for this: If one is to collect some type of 
levy to stimulate the production of culture, it makes sense to distribute the money collectively; 
the CMOs have experience with and knowledge on the matter, hence less resources may be 
needed in order to conduct the distribution, as it can follow existing procedures; rights 
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holders’ organizations also maintains an aspect of cultural policy. In terms of who should do 
it, TONO, Gramo and their likes have experience, but Norwaco is the main distributor of 
similar schemes today. An answer here is to have Norwaco collect the money, and then 
distribute it onto the CMOs and other organizations, as long as it does not require such an 
amount of resources that it may undermine the purpose in terms of what is accumulated from 
the levy.  
 The sensible thing in terms of how the money should be distributed is to follow the existing 
scheme of for instance TONO, where the money is distributed proportionally, on a more or 
less pro-rata basis. Organizations like Gramo also use something close to this model. One 
does not need to revolutionize the distribution scheme in order for this to function properly, as 
it in its simplest form would only involve an increase of the monetary funds available for 
distribution. Put simply; it would give more money to each rights holder, as the income would 
only be put on top of what is already there.  
 In terms of manipulation of data, there are ways to avoid this, and data collection for music 
may already be seen as sufficient. There may, however, be a need for even better data 
collection, and one could see some income from a broadband levy being used to help 
implement such a system even better than what it already is. On the other hand, this would not 
cover unlicensed works that are available, so there may be a need for a balance in this instance 
between a pro-rata scheme based on data collection, supplemented with a scheme where one 
conducts estimations from radio plays and general popularity. To a certain degree, this is how 
it works today, but there is perhaps some need for improvement. A broadband levy could help 
to create funding and more initiatives to enhance this system.  
 There is little doubt that it may be preferable to transfer some of the income to a type of 
fund that could be distributed to those who wants to create new content, and also may not be 
favored too widely by the already existing structures. This could be new artists, composers 
and musicians; creation of new content that may break at a later stage. Increasing the amount 
of money that Fond for Lyd og Bilde have to distribute may be preferable in a more creative 
context, as it could also help increase diversity. As a consequence of more money to apply for, 
one should perhaps also change the criteria one has for applying. It seems preferable to 
incorporate some more commercial acts into this fund, for instance bigger labels, who can 
apply for money to market Norwegian music abroad. To achieve a fairness in this instance, as 
one may argue that commercial interests should not be able to earn money as a consequence 
of public funding, one may create refund schemes that has certain criteria connected to it. For 
instance: if Universal wants funding to market an exciting Norwegian artist in the German or 
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Anglophone market, and earns, for example, more than 50 per cent over the existing sum, the 
granted funding may be paid back to the fund. This way, the label is able to take more risks in 
promotion, but the fund would also earn back money if their endeavors proved successful. 
This way the fund could get their money back as a consequence of good commercial work, 
and at the same time the labels would earn money if they were successful, perhaps to be able 
to take more risk in the future. This way, both are better off than they were before, and the 
fund has proved to be helpful in helping to promote Norwegian culture. One would of course 
have to take into consideration which artists may get funding: A smaller band may need more 
help than international superstars such as Kygo or A-ha.  
 Regardless of how this is to be dealt with, one has to cater for the fact that commercial 
interests also should be able to apply for money from a public fund, for the better for 
Norwegian cultural production. One also needs to construct guidelines that are so simple and 
fair that success proves useful for all parties, and so that taking risk and perhaps failing is not 
punished. Such a scheme could help stimulate a professional environment, create an enhanced 
national repertoire, and create new music.  
 In summary: one part of the money could go to the authors, artists and rights holders 
already under existing schemes to increase the pay-outs from the CMOs, a second part 
could go to public funds - similar to the funds of today - but which have a clear mandate 
to also fund commercial interests if it helps to stimulate the production of more national 
repertoire and content. 
 
5.6.	Supplementing	an	existing	structure	
A major question when it comes to the broadband levy is if it is able to work as a 
supplement in the existing structure of the music industry. The different three-step-tests 
conducted on the cultural flat-rate shows that it may not. This does, however, depend a 
lot on which type of levy is introduced.  
 It seems to be some consensus that a broadband levy can work as a supplement if it is 
built along the same lines as the cassette or private copying levy. The question is whether 
or not this is preferable. One may argue that one needs to think of this in an entirely new 
way, and not strive to supplement, but rather substitute and enhance, for a reality that has 
little physical copying and more unlicensed digital content. If the broadband levy is only 
able to cover some aspects, and not be all encompassing in terms of digital content that is 
not related to illegal activities, but rather unlicensed ones, there may be a need to look at 
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it as a substitute. This could mean that one would have to abandon old models and come 
up with different, new schemes in order to cater for a new reality. In short: do a more 
widespread regulation of the internet. As this is discussed in the next part, this part will 
focus more on discussing a broadband levy as a supplement, rather than a substitute.  
 There are some reasons why a broadband levy should work as a supplement to the 
existing structures. First of all, procurement of physical storage media is declining, and as 
a consequence, so is the money brought in from the levy. There may be several reasons 
for this, but there is reason to believe that it has a lot to do with cloud storage and 
streaming; things that are in the cloud, not there as a physical structure - at least not for 
the average consumer. A broadband levy may help to gain some of the lost income back 
by thinking differently, and incorporate this aspect. Secondly, one rarely downloads 
music files illegally anymore - at least not as a file from a network to a folder on your 
computer or external hard drive. The main issue today is that of illegal streaming 
services, which excludes the need for terabyte-sized hard drives, hence not covered by the 
existing schemes. A broadband levy could help cover for this, as well, and gain some of 
the money lost from physical media levies back to the creators. These two aspects are 
perhaps, in themselves, a good enough argument to shift the focus of levies. All that time 
we do know that the procurement of illegal or unlicensed content is not necessarily going 
down on all levels, but perhaps only shifting to different media and methods, there seems 
to some argument for a shift in the levies as well. The answer here could be a levy on 
broadband, with a similar distribution scheme as today, thus supplementing and 
incorporating itself into the existing structure. There may still be a need to ensure that the 
levies on physical storage media are there, in order to cater for as many aspects as 
possible. One could perhaps say, that for this to work ideally broadband would also be 
part of the private copying levy, as downloading into you cache may also be considered 
private copying. If this is the answer, the broadband levy could work as a supplement to 
the existing structure, and help cover as many bases as possible, creating more money for 
creators. 
 One could of course also look at it as a substitute, which replaces old schemes. 
Whether this is the best way or not, remains to be seen. As mentioned, there may not be a 
need for it, if we can regulate and monetize the issues in a better way. This is discussed 
further in the next part of this chapter.  
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5.7.	Regulating	the	internet	
As at least two of the respondents touched upon, there may be a need to regulate the flow 
of content on the internet. This may be especially true when it comes to platform services, 
where creators gain very limited compensation for their works.  
 The first issue that needs to be addressed in this instance is the fact that some 
platform services earns quite a generous sum of money on content or searches that is 
directly or partially related to cultural content, with some basis in the Safe Harbor 
agreement. As it stands at this time, the ECJ have ruled the Safe Harbor agreement 
invalid, meaning a new type of directive or agreement is needed. This is yet to be 
introduced, but the EU has made some movement on the matter in relation to the Digital 
Single Market. What the suggestions and outcomes will be from this, more concretely, 
remains to be seen. 
 Despite the fact that new laws and regulations relating to platforms services and safe 
harbor are still in the making, there is little doubt that the issue of remuneration is 
something that would have to be taken into account when moving forward. The potential 
for gaining income from the platform services to a wider extent than today is evident, and 
achieving this remuneration may be a game changer in the digital cultural content realm. 
What is needed to achieve this may be political will, will that seems to be coming bit by 
bit.  
 Regardless of if one believes that a broadband levy is an evasion from regulating the 
internet as a whole, or whether it can help to build the foundation for a more prosperous 
cultural industry economy, there is no doubt that one has to move in a direction where 
one is able to better monetize the content available. In addition, some platform services, 
most notably YouTube, have large amounts of data connected to rights. The question here 
is; could the content industry accept lower remuneration, in return for better data? One 
may argue that this could be done, as it would be simpler to gain some type of 
compensation for all types of material out there. In this sense, both parties may benefit 
from such a solution, and a potential broadband levy - or however one chooses to gain 
compensation - would be more statistically accurate and be able to incorporate even more 
content into the equation. This way, more creators could be remunerated, as one has an 
even better overview of what is out there, both licensed and unlicensed.  
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 The main goal, however, must be to strive to have a minimum of unlicensed and un-
monetized content out there, and cater for as much licensed content as possible, so that 
one is able to monetize this even more. Whether this is possible to achieve remains to be 
seen, depending on political will and decent outcomes of existing work-in-progress 
issues. It could well be that a broadband levy could help to kick start this, and also help to 
gain money for development for better solutions. The extending question from this is if 
there is a point in implementing a broadband levy when it could have an expiration date, 
and possibly undermine the fact that the internet needs to be regulated legally, rather than 
on a more economic basis? One may argue that it could actually help this development, 
and create even greater income, that could be used to develop systems that may be able to 
handle this issue in the future, and actually help to kick start the internet regulation that 
some are calling for. Regardless if one considers a broadband levy to be able to go hand 
in hand with more internet regulation or not; could the two live side by side, as a 
supplement to a substitute? 	
5.8.	Is	there	a	need	for	a	broadband	levy?	
It is not clear whether or not a broadband levy is necessary or not. What is clear is that 
something needs to be done when it comes to the monetization of online cultural content. 
 A broadband levy may not be the sole answer to all issues, but it may be an answer to 
some. The fact of the matter is that something that is still as theoretical as this seems hard 
to discuss, and that it may be that more details are needed. It could also be that the idea is 
outdated, and that it caters for issues that were more pressing 10 years ago.  
 The benefits of a broadband levy could be all the ones listed, such as simpler licensing, 
more cultural diversity, a new way of gaining income to an industry where some parts are 
still struggling to keep their head above water after the internet has become an integrated 
part of our lives. In addition it could also help to create more money for development and 
innovation, if one chooses to do so.  
 The disadvantages are also quite a few: It may contribute to a shift of focus, and 
contribute to leaving more pressing issues; it may contribute to a more complicated 
copyright scheme, and be seen as a new tax - one can understand the reluctance to back 
new taxes - in addition to challenging the privacy schemes of today.  
 Although there may not be a need, all respondents seem to agree that there may be 
something to be said for it, but only if done in the right way, and not losing sight of other 
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issues. A broadband levy cannot be something that allows one to take a breather when 
trying to solve the issue of regulating the internet, for example. These issues give the 
opportunity to discuss this further, aiming to reach a conclusion and answer to the issues 
at hand 	
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6.	Conclusion 
In the introduction to this paper, five questions that needed to be resolved in order to do 
further work on a broadband levy were presented. The first part of this fifth and final 
chapter addresses these questions yet again, with the goal of providing a type of 
suggestion to resolve each of them. This addresses the «how»-part of the research 
question. When all of this is done, the chapter seeks to give a pointer to whether or not a 
broadband levy is a good idea, aiming to answer the «why»-question. The provided 
material must not be seen as a definitive conclusion - this paper is merely exploratory - 
hence there may be several ways to reach «how», and possibly even more ways to answer 
«why». This paper, however, seeks to suggest and introduce possible ways forward based 
on the conducted research.  
6.1.	“How”	
In relation to justifying a broadband levy, this is technically possible. Of course, one 
never knows how such a suggestions may turn out to be received by the general public, 
but there are some good arguments for such a levy. Firstly, it is nothing new, and a 
compensation scheme and levy on different materials have been present for more than 50 
years in some countries. Of course, moving away from an existing scheme which is only 
present in some countries, such as the private copying levy, is a risk. As the private 
copying levy is funded by the government in Norway, and not on a consumer basis, it 
may prove to be a hard fit, but a broadband levy - if used as a supplement - is not severely 
different from a cassette levy, or even a TV-license. It even has some advantages to it, as 
a decriminalization of consumers in return for a levy that is more relevant and forward 
leaning than older models, may be preferable. On top of this, it could perhaps also help to 
complement the TV-license when it comes to internet television platforms, so that for 
instance NRK is able to monetize this area to some extent without having to introduce a 
license fee that is harder to regulate, or put up payment walls on their services. This is of 
course far into the future, but describes one of the potential uses for a broadband levy 
after implementation. Another consequence could be better and simpler licensing terms, 
leading to more material being available on more platforms. If a broadband levy could 
mean more content on for instance audiovisual streaming services, it may be worth it for 
the consumer, if the price is fair.  
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 One thing that is clear is that a levy would have to be adjusted in such a way that it 
creates as little challenges for the consumer as possible, and be set at such a rate that it 
may be perceived as fair and payable. There are a number of reasons that justifies a levy, 
but as always, introducing a new «tax» may not be the most popular of policies. 
Therefore, a broadband levy has to intervene as little as possible into existing structures, 
and be sold on its advantages. There surely are many disadvantages, mainly monetary and 
tax-wise, but if you can get something in return that is worth it, it may help to shift public 
opinion. A broadband levy could therefore be justified, but only if one is able to have the 
advantages in place before introducing the disadvantage that many see a new «tax» to be.  
 
In terms of payment, a broadband levy has to be introduced with a focus on usage. One 
could set a minimal flat-rate fee, of for example NOK 1 per subscription or subscriber, 
and then have something like NOK 0,1 per GB, or even NOK 0,01. One needs to ensure 
that the fee is so small that it does not influence the freedom of usage, but still is able to 
bring in money. This is possibly best done if the end bill is not severely affected, but still 
holds a quantity that functions well, based on the mantra «every little helps». Basing a fee 
mostly on usage, would also help to strengthen the utility aspect, as it is normal to have a 
utility payment system that focuses on usage, rather than access. A usage fee on NOK 1 
per 100 GB may prove sufficient (meaning NOK 0,01 per GB), and there may not be a 
need for the flat-rate fee. Starting with this may also prove helpful in order to enhance the 
scheme if needed, as one has more room to act if the initial scheme requires improvement 
from a low starting point. One could also see such a rate being based on traffic to certain 
domains, or preferably certain file types. The file type aspect is preferable as it would not 
harm privacy severely, and as this information could be easily obtained. This need not be 
the full answer, but could be a good starting point if one is to move forward on the 
matter. This aspect could also help to justify a mandatory license, as usage is a fairer way 
of measuring it. This may lead to more acceptance of a mandatory levy. 
 To the question surrounding the utility issue, this way of doing it also seems to give a 
sufficient answer, and caters better for this aspect than a scheme based solely on a flat 
rate.  
 
An obstacle for a broadband levy may be todays copyright legislation, as it would 
probably have to be amended. One may of course argue that a broadband levy may be 
built up after the copyright laws of today, but there is a chance that it may not work as 
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intended if this is done. One should at least be on the safe side, and consider revising the 
principles of copyright law if one is to implement a broadband levy. If one is to be 
optimistic, this is doable, as the reward is likely to surpass the work one has to put into it. 
A broadband levy revision may also help to ignite a revision of the copyright law, that 
one could argue is sorely needed for the digital marketplace. Whether or not this is doable 
and desirable remains to be seen, but there are good arguments for why it is possible. 
However, it may be a complicated matter, that needs to be dealt with in a thorough way.  
 The matter of technically legalizing illegal activities is perhaps the most unpredictable 
one as it depends more on consumer aspects, than those of legislative bodies and the 
industry. It may be naive to think that only decent guidelines could help prevent it, and 
that stricter rules need to be in place. The issue then, is that one loses the aspect of 
decriminalization, and one has to spend the same amount of resources on the matter as 
one does today. However, people who have an interest in circumventing the models of 
today to acquire material illegally, may be able to do so anyway. It is not desirable to 
open up for illegal downloading to as big an extent as indicated by the cultural flat-rate 
and their likes, but the difference is that with such a scheme, the ones affected by this 
would be compensated, rather than not monetizing this at all, as is the case today. Music 
streaming, and other streaming services, also show a willingness among the consumers to 
acquire material legally for money, and if the services are good enough, there should be 
little reason why this could not continue, making the problem a minimal one. One would 
still have to prosecute the ones who facilitate illegal services such as Popcorn Time, as 
the legality of facilitation would not be changed, but the advantage is that one could leave 
the individual consumer out of it.  
 
When it comes to distribution, it seems sensible for Norwaco to collect the money, and 
then distribute them onto CMOs. This way one ensures a regulated way of initial 
collection, and a distribution that follows years of experience and knowledge, hand in 
hand with good data. Some of the money could go into funding schemes, open to both 
commercial and non-commercial acts. This could still be done by Fond for Lyd og Bilde 
or similar, and would not require a major structural change, although it would call for 
some changes in the terms for application. The major question how the money is 
distributed onto the different types of cultural content. One could see a starting point, 
where half of the total amount is distributed evenly on different types of public funds that 
cater for different cultural content. This would mean that the other half could be 
	 	 	 	 73	
distributed onto the CMOs, perhaps at a level where one third goes to music, and two 
thirds to audiovisual content. This is losely based on the distribution Fond for Lyd og 
Bilde have today, and is only a little different to the distribution of Norwaco. One could 
help this distribution to be even more precise if one bases it on data. This data is already 
collected each year, and forms a foundation for the Norwaco distribution. This is, of 
course, only a suggestion to a solution, and would need to determined even better if one 
is to implement a broadband levy.  
 
It is somewhat possible to implement a broadband levy into an existing structure, at least 
when it comes to justification, distribution, and even how one determines the amount to 
pay. The major obstacle is copyright law. One could choose to implement it accordance 
with the existing law, with the limitations this may give, but one could also choose to 
revise it to make an even better fit. Whether this is doable or not, remains to be seen, but 
if one is to be compensated through a broadband levy, one may need to leave some older 
principles and laws in order to create a perhaps more sustainable structure. This depends 
somewhat on the purpose of a potential levy, as this may help determine willingness to do 
so.  
 
In terms of how, a broadband levy is doable. One should however keep some things in 
mind if one is to introduce it. American law scholar Matthew Gluth in 2010 introduced 
four criteria for a file-sharing levy, and this does hold relevance today. The four criteria 
were: 
“1. The government must be involved, yet the actual implementing agency must be independent 
enough to adapt quickly to new technologies and shifting economic realities.  
 2. The system must bring together a significant majority of both copyright infringers and 
copyright holders in order to bear the weight of its administrative costs.  
3. Inequities in taxation must be tailored narrowly, so as not to destroy the legitimacy of the 
enterprise, and not to encourage wasteful consumption.  
4. Inequities in distribution could be fatal to whole sectors of the music industry, yet any efforts to 
minimize them must be carefully calculated against the ensuing administrative costs-“ 
(Gluth, 2010, p. 139) 
 
In terms of these four criteria, having a CMO distributing in cooperation with an agency 
like Norwaco is in accordance with criteria one. A mandatory system based on usage, and 
handled by already existing bodies is in accordance with criteria two, the usage aspect 
also covers criteria three.  If the levy distribution is based on well-founded data, this 
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seems to cater for criteria four. Although these criteria are in no way a perfect measurer, 
the hows do seem to fit into it, giving validity to a broadband levy based on these 
suggestions.  
 
A broadband levy is doable, at least when it comes to the practicalities. If it is doable 
when asking why one should do it, is another matter. 
6.2.	”Why”			
Having asked «how», one needs to move onto «why». Why is a broadband levy something 
that should be introduced? There are a number of reasons for this, many explained in the 
«how», section, but in short the answer is fairly simple: To help monetize unlicensed cultural 
content to a wider extent that what is done today.  Other advantages may be more diversity; 
simpler licensing terms; decriminalization of consumers and last, but not least; better 
remuneration for rights holders. 
 The earlier suggestions have had some flaws, as a type of broadband levy today may also 
have. It does, however, initiate a regulation of the internet, one that is much needed. The 
question is therefore, in the extension of this: can better regulation go hand in hand with a 
broadband levy? The danger with a broadband levy is the fact that it may become a breather 
when it actually comes to regulating the internet in an even wider way. One could perhaps 
help to monetize the content to a wider extent than today, without a broadband levy, if one 
were to get new deals with platform services in place. This is something that the industry is 
working on, and we may see an end-result in some time. But what if this does not happen? 
 A broadband levy can help cater for eventualities that may arise if failing to monetize 
platform services to a wider extent fails, in this way it still has a part to play. It may also help 
to cause more awareness of the issues, and therefore it may also be a good starting point when 
monetizing cultural content. It could be a good starting point, but also a decent compromise if 
one is not to reach a solution. The disadvantage is that one should perhaps focus more on 
monetizing the possibilities out there, with help from recent court rulings, rather than focusing 
on an unproved model. In this regard the broadband levy may not have a part to play, as it 
shifts too much focus from what is already being worked on.  
 It may very well be that better monetization can walk hand in hand with a broadband levy, 
therefore it may still be an issue for the future. For now, however, one should perhaps focus 
more on the work that is already being done to increase pay-outs from platform services, and 
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leave the broadband levy discussion for a while.  
 
The research shows that one may be able to implement a broadband levy, if desired, and that it 
is a way to monetize and address the challenges of unlicensed cultural content. This is all well 
and good, and one should definitely look further into it. It may even be that a broadband levy 
could be an integral part of the internet in the future. For now, however, one should focus on 
getting deals in place that deal more concretely with platform services, and try to solve the 
issues that are there. One should not leave the broadband levy completely, but it needs to be 
worked on more than what it has. Therefore, this exploratory paper ends on a term and 
conclusion that is somewhat clichéd in academic circles - however, a cliché is a cliché because 
it works. That is that: more research is needed.  
 
This paper may prove to be a good starting point for this research.
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Appendix		
E-mail	communication	with	Elin	Urkedal,	Norwaco,	11.03.16	
The e-mail was sent after a phone conversation the day before 										
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Interview	guide		
A) Introduction 
Purpose of interview, choice of theme 
Why a broadband levy? 
As sales of hard drives go down, and the income of existing private copying levies 
continue to decline (In Sweden, at least 50% over 7 years) it is worth asking if there 
is a need for revising the existing structure. More and more activities that were done 
by file transfers in the past, justifying such levies, are today done over the internet, 
either by storage in your personal cloud, or simply by streaming. As more and more 
bandwith capacity is required, meaning that the ISPs can earn more when one 
wants to consume cultural content faster and better, it is worth asking if some of the 
money earned by ISPs can come back to the music industry. The decline of private 
copying levies on physical formats, and the growth of internet services, speed and 
data raises the question: should one abandon the private copying levy for a levy on 
broadband? As Norway does not have a private copying levy, the main question is:  
If one were to introduce a broadband levy in Norway: how could it   be done, 
and how would it work? 
 
What will the interview be used for? 
A structured interview that will touch upon different issues - Digressions and 
examples are very much allowed! 
Inform of recording and transcription 
Ask informant for consent of recording 
 
Ask if informant has any questions related to the interview 
Start interview/recording 
 
B) Interview questions 
1. What do you think of when hearing the term broadband levy? 
 
2. Why do you think a levy on broadband has not become a reality, although it 
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has been discussed for the last decade?  
 
3. How could a broadband levy work as a supplement to the already existing 
structure of the music industry? 
 - Could/should a broadband levy replace the private copying levy on physical 
 storage? 
 
4. What are the benefits of introducing a broadband levy today? 
 
5. What disadvantages are connected to introducing a levy on broadband? 
How can you implement such a levy without compromising the foundations of 
copyright? 
Is there a way to avoid the issue of technically legalising illegal activites surrounding 
copyrighted material when introducing a levy? 
 
6. How do you see a broadband levy working if it were to be introduced 
today? 
How would you determine what to pay?        Flat rate? 
Connection speed? 
Based on amount of downloads? 
Any other types of solutions? 
 
7. How could one justify a broadband levy to the parties involved? 
Consumers, Rights holders, Polticians, ISPs? 
 
8. How can a levy be financiallly beneficial to the different acts in the 
industry? 
 
9. If a levy could have the potential to bring in money to the music industry, 
how should the money be distributed? 
Is there a minimum requirement you would set for distribution 
If yes: How? 
Who should distribute the money? 
Is there a need for substantial data collection to determine distribution or 
could it be made simpler than this? 
	 	 	 	 83	
If part of the money were to be put into a fund, how could you see this fund 
work? 
 
10. Is there a need and a base for a levy on broadband? 
Why? 
Why not? 
Any alternative solutions?       
Is there a need after streaming? 
 
C) Summary 
Summarize findings 
«Have I understood you correctly?» 
Is there anything you would like to add? 
May I contact you if any other questions should come up? (specific questions via e-
mail) 
Thank you! 
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Transcriptions		
Knut	Bøhn	
Intervju med Knut Bøhn, Phonofile. 23. februar 2016, via Skype.  
 
INTERVJUET STARTER MED AT Lars Reiten GÅR GJENNOM INTERVJUGUIDEN MED Knut Bøhn. 
OPPTAKET STARTER I DET SAMTYKKE FOR OPPTAK HAR BLITT INNHENTET. 
Lars Reiten: Da starter jeg på spørsmål 1. Hva tenker du når du hører uttrykket bredbåndsavgift? 
 
Knut Bøhn: Det er jo en skattlegging av en kommersiell aktør for, ja, retten til å eie infrastruktur på privat 
nivå 
 
Lars Reiten: Tror du den skattleggingen, går den kun på en kommersiell aktør eller havner den hos 
forbrukerne på et vis? 
 
Knut Bøhn: Den vil jo havne hos forbrukerne som en økt aksesskostnad. Dette er jo allerede på private 
hender, ikke sant. Staten avviklet vel egentlig sin egen ambisjon om å eie den type infrastruktur, og det skal 
veldig mye til at de... Jeg klarer ikke helt å se for meg den norske staten ekspropriere Telenors infrastruktur. 
Det tror jeg ikke kommer til å skje. Dermed så er det jo ingen... Det finnes jo ikke noe grunnlag i noen som 
helst slags historie at den kostnaden ikke skal ende hos forbrukeren.  
 
Lars Reiten: Nei, og det viser seg jo i disse harddiskleviene som er i Sverige, også... I form av ordet, 
terminologien eller praktiske ting rundt det, har du noen andre tanker rundt det uttrykket og konseptet bak? 
 
Knut Bøhn: Begrepet bredbåndsavgift? Nei... Jeg har vel ikke det.  
 
Lars Reiten: Nei, ikke sant... Hvis du skulle bruke det du vet, for jeg tenker at dette har jo blitt diskutert siden 
2003/2004 tror jeg. Det er vel de første forskningsrapportene på dette iallefall... Det har blir diskutert de siste 
10-15 årene. Tror du det finnes en årsak til at det ikke eksisterer, selv om det har blitt diskutert? Og hva er 
den årsaken eventuelt? 
 
Knut Bøhn: Årsaken er jo at de kommersielle hensynene er jo fra Venus og Mars, og det har enda ikke vært 
en politisk vilje til å legge vekt på rettighettseiernes side. Det er jo ingen grunn i verden til at 
bredbåndsleverandørene på et eget kommersielt nivå eller grunnlag skulle gidde å ofre denne diskusjonen en 
tanke. Du har sikkert sett, jeg tror ikke det er to dager siden, overskriften på forsiden i Dagsavisen, tror jeg, 
hvor det står at Telenor må betale norsk tv-produksjon, som selvfølgelig er en smule forenklet fremstilling. 
Du har jo fått utrolig mye, helt rykende fersk offentlig retorikk knyttet til det du egentlig tar opp. Det er 
mulig... Musikk er sannsynligvis en... Det er en sak som på en måte... Det har på en måte ordnet seg. Jeg 
forstår at Bendik Hofseth på vegne av alle opphavsmenn i TONO og CISAC er bekymret for det faktum at 
internett egentlig ikke demokratiserte inntektsstrømmen i noen særlig... Det viser seg at folk fortsatt velger 
minste motstands vei i form av hva de velger å høre på, og det er det som honoreres i størst grad fortsatt. 
Bortsett fra det aspektet, som kommer fra et helt strikt rettighetshaverkontrollperspektiv, så har egentlig 
musikk gått seg til. Det er på en måte... Ferdig med det. Neste bøygen er jo levende bilder, film og tv-
produksjon. Det diskuteres jo i media as we speak, du kunne jo nesten bare overvåket norsk media de neste 
ukene for grunnlaget ditt... 
 
Lars Reiten: Akkurat den artikkelen har jeg ikke fått med meg, men jeg har fått med meg en del annet... 
 
Knut Bøhn: Det er veldig interessant... 
 
Lars Reiten: Det er jo det som er bakgrunnen for problemstillingen, selv om den kanskje er litt i endring... Jeg 
snakket forsåvidt litt med Bendik om det du sier at han også sier der... Om det aspektet også, om det på en 
måte er en del av en større utfordring, og det kan jo være, det er på en måte noe av det jeg vil finne ut av det. 
Det har jo blitt aktualisert litt igjen, først og fremst via filmbransjen, også er jo da min oppgave da å se på om 
dette kunne vært noe i dag for musikkbransjen, eller har det, som du sier, på en måte løst seg. Det jeg lurer litt 
på da, Knut, kan en bredbåndsavgift fungere som et supplement til den eksisterende strukturen i 
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musikkindustrien? 
 
Knut Bøhn: Den kan jo det... Uten å ha tenkt så veldig mye over hvordan det skulle organiseres i 2016, så 
antar jeg jo at kollektiv forvaltning ville være naturlig, og det vil jo være en fordeling da, av det som 
forvaltes. Men... Nei, jeg vet ikke... Jeg har ikke så inngående kjennskap til f.eks. Norwaco, men jeg vet jo at 
det er såpass mange rettighetshavergrupper representert til enhver tid i en sånn type fordelingsdiskusjon, og 
jeg tror kanskje musikk stiller enda svakere nå, enn i den forrige privatkopieringsvederlagsrunden, all den tid 
det er opplest og vedtatt at musikkbransjen egentlig går så det griner. Jeg tror egentlig også at det definitivt er 
andre uttrykk i kulturlivet som har større utfordringer enn musikkbransjen. Altså, bokbransjen... Musikk er 
veldig enkelt, ikke sant. Jeg har en favorittartist, favorittlåta mi har jeg sikkert hørt 5000 ganger. Jeg har noen 
favorittbøker, jeg har lest de kanskje 3 ganger. 3-4 ganger, fordi jeg tilfeldigvis liker å lese bøker flere 
ganger. Det sier seg selv at modellen ikke er så veldig vanskelig å etablere for musikk, men det er veldig 
vanskelig å etablere modellen for bøker, og nesten like vanskelig, sikkert, å etablere en modell for film. 
 
Lars Reiten: Du kan si det sånn at, om du har en inntekt fra en privatkopieringsavgift som er nedadgående, så 
kan du si at det selvfølgelig er positivt fordi folk bedriver mindre privatkopiering. Eller så kan du si det sånn 
at det er ikke nødvendigvis slik at man bedriver det mindre, vi vet jo at i Norge så bedriver man det mindre 
iallefall i form av musikk... Men så kan man snu det litt på hodet og si at folk bare har funnet andre måter å få 
tak i ulisensiert innhold på, i den forstand at det kan streames via ikke-lisensierte opplastninger på Youtube, 
eller at folk legger ut bootlegs på Soundcloud, eller sånne ting. 
 
Knut Bøhn: Mhm... Med forbehold for Soundcloud, så gjelder jo det i veldig liten grad musikkbransjen... 
 
Lars Reiten: Ikke sant. Tror du da at en bredbåndsavgift kan erstatte en privatkopieringavgift på fysiske 
lagringsmedier? 
 
Knut Bøhn: Ja, altså... Det kommer litt an på hva fomålet er, ikke sant. Formålet må jo være å ha flere som 
bidrar til produksjonen av norske kunst- og kulturutrykk. Sånn sett er det i min verden aldeles rimelig at noe 
som ville lignet på en sånn bredbåndsavgift er hensiktsmessig, og fordi det er hensiktsmessig, er det da også 
fornuftig å innføre det fordi det forutsatt at det faktisk kommer produsentene til gode. Det må man jo anta, for 
det har jo privatkopieringsvederlaget gjort i form av disse fondsordningene. Det er ikke noen grunn til å tro at 
det ikke vil være et kjærkomment tilskudd, og derfor så er det effektivt fordi det når produsenten. Det kan jo 
hende... Jeg vet ikke helt... Når det gjelder musikk, spesifikt... For meg personlig er det en god ide at Telenor 
deler på overskuddet sitt som oppstår fordi folk vil ha rask bredbåndsaksess. Det er fornuftig. Men jeg synes 
jo det er ganske enkelt å forstå at Telenor ikke nødvendigvis deler den oppfatningen, ikke sant.  
 
Lars Reiten: Finnes det noen fordeler ved å introdusere en avgift på bredbånd sånn det står i dag? 
 
Knut Bøhn: Ja, med det forbehold at det forvaltes på en sånn måte at det faktisk når... Forsterker og stimulerer 
et produsentmiljø, et produksjonsmiljø, så er det jo helt klart fordeler med det.  
 
Lars Reiten: Hva kan de være...? 
 
Knut Bøhn: Hva de kan være? Hvis man klarer å stimulere et produksjonsmiljø så har jo det ringvirkninger i 
alle mulige retninger. Ikke minst at... At den som er interessert fortsatt har muligheten til å oppsøke 
norskproduserte, men selvfølgelig, den som har lyst til å delta i den norske kulturproduksjonen må jo se at det 
finnes en produksjon å delta i.  
 
Lars Reiten: Hva tror du ulempene kan være da? 
 
Knut Bøhn: Nei... Ulempene må jo være at man på et eller annet nivå ender opp med en modell som var så 
dårlig at forbrukerne oppfatter at bredbånd er overpriset, pga. denne avgiften da. For alt jeg vet synes folk at 
bredbånd er overpriset i dag, det vet jeg ikke noe om, men det vil jo være veldig uheldig selvfølgelig. Det vil 
jo være en ulempe om det sprer seg en slags oppfatning, at fordi man vil produsere norsk film så må jeg som 
ikke er interessert i norsk film i det hele tatt, betale en skatt. Det er jo, liksom, det er ikke så veldig fjern type 
innlegg på en million Facebook-sider, ikke sant. Det vil jo være uheldig. 
 
Lars Reiten: Dette har jo vært undersøkt... Jeg leste nettopp en rapport om en kulturflatrate i Tyskland, hvor 
det foreslås at en kan betale... Dette er riktignok fra da ulovlig nedlasting var et mye større problem i dag, 
ihvertfall i musikkbransjen... Det foreslås at det kan være sånn at en betaler frivillig 5 euro i måneden, kan 
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laste ned til privatbruk alt du vil, og dele med dine 50 nærmeste venner... Det som jo er en av mange 
utfordringer, er jo når det kommer til opphavsrett, at den ikke består trestegstesten fra Berne-konvensjonen, 
såvidt jeg har forstått. For å spille litt videre på dette... Tror du det kan finnes en måte å implementere en sånn 
type avgift, kanskje på en annen måte og med en annen struktur, uten å gå på akkord med grunnlaget for 
opphavsrett? 
 
Knut Bøhn: Nei... Når du beskriver den modellen som da er foreslått i Tyskland, det har jeg ingen som helst 
tro på. Ikke i et opphavsrettslig perspektiv, for det underminerer jo hele ideen, og som du sier med 
trestegstesting. Nei, det må... Det ville være veldig vanskelig å... Det er jo søtt det at den skal være frivillig, 
men det er mange andre problemer knyttet til det, hvertfall at en ikke er tvunget til å betale... 
 
Lars Reiten: Ikke sant... Den modellen har jo blitt gått bort fra etterhvert, utfra mange grunner... Et annet 
aspekt ved dette er jo at om en innfører en bredbåndsavgift, og det har jo blant annet Marte Thorby sagt litt 
om for et par år siden, i forbindelse med et forslag fra Storstein Spilker, at dette på en måte kan... Det kan det 
jo i dag, også, som er grunnlaget for dette spørsmålet... Det at en sier at en betaler en lisens, kan teknisk sett 
legitimere at en laster ned ulovlig, eller konsumerer ulisensiert materiale, hvor pengene ikke kommer tilbake 
til den rette verdikjeden... Kan det finnes en måte å unngå den problemstillingen på? Rundt det å teknisk sett 
tillate ulovlige aktiviteter knyttet til innhold beskyttet av opphavsrett? 
 
Knut Bøhn: Ja, det kan det jo helt sikkert. Det er ikke noe vanskelig å følge aktiviteten fra den ene terminalen 
til den andre, så det kan jo helt sikkert implementeres det altså. Det er jo litt den samme utfordringen som 
gjelder datalagringsdirektivet. Det finnes jo ikke noe insentiv for den som er nærmest til å betale kostnaden. 
Det finnes jo ikke noe insentiv for den for å argumentere for hvorfor man skal ta på seg kostnaden. Da 
forsvinner liksom hele... Den verden vi lever i søker jo minste motstands vei hva den type pragmatisme 
angår. At en kommersiell tilbyder skal tilby seg en plass i en sånn kjede som er til ulempe og en ekstra 
kostnad for tilbyderen selv, det tror jeg ikke er en modell som er levedyktig. 
 
Lars Reiten: Dette er veldig gode svar på litt klønete formulerte spørsmål... Hvis en skulle en introdusert en 
bredbåndsavgift i dag, hvordan kunne den fungert... Da tenker jeg litt på om man kunne finne struktur for 
hvem som betaler hva... Kan det være en fastpris, utfra tilkoblingshastiget, basert på antall nedlastinger, eller 
finnes det andre måter å løse det på? 
 
Knut Bøhn: Det enkle svaret er jo det siste alternativet. Det finnes jo sikkert andre måter... Det vet jeg ikke... 
Det aspektet ved tretrinnstesten har vi jo tatt, altså at den som tilegner seg opphavsrettsligbeskyttet materiale 
skal på en måte honorere det direkte. En bør jo forsøke å holde det perspektivet i siktet. Hvis man... For meg 
så er det helt rimelig at man skattlegger... Det er jo denne diskusjonen som foregår med NRK-lisensen... Det 
er helt rimelig at man skattlegger det faktum at jeg tilegner meg det noen har produsert på en måte som passer 
meg. Det må jeg være forberedt på å ha en kostnad ved, som f.eks. NRK-lisensen så langt, eller det som nå 
blir etterfølgeren til den. Det er helt rimelig. Også kan det godt hende at det skal være 
rettighetshaverorganisasjoner som forvalter dette, fordi du på den måten kan ivareta et kulturpolitisk aspekt, 
eller så kan man si «sorry mac, det hører hjemme i 60-åra, det er ikke noe vanskelig å la pengestrømmen 
følge den som tilegner seg material» og velge den løsningen istedet. Det kan godt hende. Det er mulig det er 
andre typer problemstillinger knyttet til det, det vet jeg egentlig ikke, men en kan jo tenke seg at... Bortsett fra 
sånne rene statistikkhensyn, så har ikke NRK brydd seg om hva det er av deres produksjon du har tilegnet 
deg for prisen av lisensen, ikke sant. Det kan jo hende det er noen sånn mystiske personvernhensyn som noen 
ønsker å bringe inn i diskusjonen, fordi at... Hvis det nå var sånn at jeg skal betale en slags 
kulturproduksjonsskatt, bare for å kalle bredbåndsavgiften noe annet et øyeblikk, så  kan det godt hende at jeg 
var komfortabel med det, men ikke så veldig komfortabelt med at noen visste hvilke kulturproduksjoner jeg 
tilegnet meg fordi jeg la ut for den skatten. Det er mulig det er veldig søkt, men det kunne være en type 
problemstilling knyttet til hvordan en implementerer en sånn type avgift i det hele tatt. Det er mulig jeg spora 
helt av her... 
 
Lars Reiten: Nei, du, det er bare bra det. Det er mange aspekter ved dette her. Jeg har ikke tatt på meg noen 
lett oppgave, det er ikke sikkert jeg har tatt på meg en veldig aktuell oppgave en gang... 
 
Knut Bøhn: Nei, jeg får litt sånn ekkel følelse på akkurat det altså (ler...) Jeg ville ikke henvendt meg til 
musikkbransjen ihvertfall... 
 
Lars Reiten: Nei, det var som jeg sa da jeg snakket med noen fra IFPI her forleden, at det kan jo hende at 
istedet for at jeg lander på 70 sider med akademisk materiale, så kan det hende at jeg lander på at svaret på 
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problemstillingen rett og slett bare er «nei». (ler...)  
 
Knut Bøhn: Jeg tror det er veldig mange positive effekter som kunne oppnås for andre produsenter enn 
musikk, men det tror jeg også handler om at musikk er i en særstilling, for folk er villige til å bruke utrolig 
mye tid på å høre den samme musikken om, og om igjen, og det setter musikken i en særstilling. Som 
internettprodukt, som vann, liksom...Du skrur på krana, du blir aldri overrasket, men du blir jo heller aldri 
at... Det er bare vann som kommer ut uansett, liksom. Mens de andre, der er jo terskelen for å slutte å skru på 
krana mye lavere. Det er en grense for hvor mange ganger du leser den samme boka... Jeg tror det er en 
grense for hvordan folk flest kan utnytte et bokabonnement for eksempel. Det er andre som har mye, mye 
sykere mødre enn musikkbransjen har da... 
 
Lars Reiten: Ja, ikke sant. Mye av grunnen til at det fungerer i musikkbransjen er jo at en faktisk tillater at det 
aller meste av innholdet er tilgjengelig. For å se på film- og tv-industrien f.eks., der er det så mye rettigheter, 
et mye mer intrikat nettverk av rettigheter til en viss grad, og mange flere folk som har forskjellige interesser 
for ikke å lansere ting på allmenne og lovlige internettplattformer innenfor et visst tidsrom, mye pga. kino og 
reklameinntekter, osv. Men det er jo der musikkbransjen har lykkes, at det er er produkt som er så åpent og 
tilgjengelig, at folk sier at det lovlige alternativet er bedre enn det ulovlige alternativet... Det er jo der jeg 
tenker at dere (Phonofile) medspiller, eller ihvertfall respondent på dette her, for dere er jo midt i den 
utviklingen som har vært i bransjen de siste årene, etter at Spotify og andre begynte å komme opp fra 
idéhatten. 
 
Knut Bøhn: Mhm. Samtidig, er vi bare den som stilte til rådighet lastebilen, ikke sant, vi verken bygde veien 
eller lagde trafikkreglene. 
 
Lars Reiten: Nei, men innimellom så må man jo se på lastebilen som... Hva lastebilen frakter også... Jeg går 
litt videre, Knut, dette er veldig interessant. Hvordan kan det være mulig å rettferdiggjøre en bredbåndsavgift 
ovenfor de forskjellige partene som er involvert? Da tenker jeg på forbrukere, rettighetshavere, 
internettleverandører, kanskje til og med politikere... Det er jo de som må ha noe å si på dette også... 
 
Knut Bøhn: Det er jo som på alle andre måter, at man må forsøke å få folk til å forstå at det er... De kollektive 
løsningene som gjør at, spesielt i et lite land som vårt, at vi har de løsningene vi har. Det er ikke sånn at du... 
Altså... Du kan ikke begynne å betale til Folketrygden etter at du har ligget på sykehus i fjorten dager, det er 
for sent... Det må man bare forstå, og hvis ikke folk forstår det intuitivt, så må det jo en politisk vilje til for å 
ta den dugnaden for å folk til å forstå det. Jeg tror egentlig folk forstår det, altså, men du har jo den der... Det 
er veldig vanskelig, det med å stille folk opp mot at du skal betale for noe, eller dra til Sverige, eller Pirate 
Bay for å få det billigere. Det er selvfølgelig bøygen. Folk med de aller beste og edleste og nobleste 
intensjoner, har lett for å skjelle til pris allikevel. Det er klart det er veldig vanskelig. Men hvis man var 
politiker så må man bare si at «hør nå her, fra i morgen så er det 300 kroner i året for hver husstand» eller hva 
det nå er «ferdig med det». Men jeg skjønner jo at det er veldig få sånne... Stortinget... Jeg synes de 
overrasket litt i forhold til å ta en diskusjon - før de var nødt - med å diskutere offentlig sitt syn på hva som 
kommer etter NRK-lisensen. Det synes jeg var... Det hadde jeg ikke trodd. Det tenkte jeg var litt lovende, i 
den forstand at det kan bety at det kanskje kunne være forståelse for, og kanskje også vilje til, å gjøre noe i et 
litt mer utvidet perspektiv, hva kultur angår. Kanskje. 
 
Lars Reiten: Hvordan kan en avgift være økonomisk gunstig for de forskjellige aktørene i musikkbransjen? 
 
Knut Bøhn: Det kan tilføre mer penger? 
 
Lars Reiten: Ja, ikke sant... Finnes det noen annen måte det kan være økonomisk gunstig på? Jeg kan gå litt 
videre over på neste spørsmål, som har litt mer med dette å gjøre. (tar resonnement rundt potensielle 100 
millioner fra bredbåndsavgift) Det kan være et inntjeningspotensiale her, hva tenker du om distribusjon av de 
pengene dersom det potensialet eksisterer? 
 
Knut Bøhn: Det var jeg forsåvidt inne på i sted. Det er to modeller. Da dette begynte å bli diskutert så var det 
nok ganske uaktuelt gjele ved en sånn... Pengene prorateres og følger bruken. Det har man jo nå mange års 
erfaring med å gjøre, med det voldsomme datagrunnlaget som er fra Spotify hver måned f.eks., så det er ikke 
noe vanskelig å fordele det basert på bruk. Jeg vet ikke helt... Jeg tror det er mange gode grunner til at man 
skulle håndtere det kollektivt, og så distribuere det utifra organisasjoner som f.eks. TONO og GRAMO eller 
den type rettighetsforvaltere. Det som jo tradisjonelt har vært litt vanskelig med det er å få med de som har en 
veldig stor andel av bruksgrunnlaget. I musikken så har jo Universal en markedsandel på 40% eller noe i den 
	 	 	 	 88	
duren, det er veldig vanskelig å få de til å med på noe annet enn at de skal ha noe annet enn 40% av de 100 
millionene. Men, man kan jo også... Det vet jeg ikke helt... Man har vel etterhvert anledning til å... øremerke 
distribusjonen av skatteinntekter, tror jeg. Og det offentlig kunne jo bare bestemme det der, sikkert. Jeg vet 
ikke helt. Hvis det skal ha noe for seg som en skatt for å stimulere norsk kulturproduksjon, så ville det nok 
være bedre om det var kollektivt forvaltet, enn en til en. Det med en til en, det forsterker jo på mange måter 
bare dagens mektige produsent. Jeg klarer ikke helt å se for meg at det er... Jeg vil tro at en kollektiv 
forvaltning som så distribueres i et system hvor også nye produsenter har en sjanse til å få finansiering for 
nye prosjekter, det vil jeg tro var veldig gunstig. Sånn rent for utviklingen av norsk kultur.  
 
Lars Reiten: Der leder du meg veldig elegant over på et sidespørsmål. Hvis man skulle tatt en del av pengene, 
si 25% bare for å ha noe å operere med, og satt de inn i et fond. Har du noen tanker om hvordan et sånt fond 
ville fungert? 
 
Knut Bøhn: Jeg kommer ikke på i farten, ihvertfall, noen veldig store problemer med Fond for Lyd og Bilde, 
fond for utøvende, at man gjorde noe sånt. Jeg kan ikke se noe problem med det.  
 
Lars Reiten: Jeg leste en rapport fra... Nå er jeg litt farget iom. at jeg er på UiA kanskje... Leste en rapport fra 
Nordgård-utvalget hvor det ble sagt fra plateselskapene, noe de også har sagt andre steder,  at de kunne 
kanskje sett for seg en løsning sånn som filmbransjen har, hvor noe penger kan komme tilbake for å 
promotere norsk materiale i utlandet, eller eventuelt ta mer risiko på nye artister... 
 
Knut Bøhn: Men det er vel meningen med et sånt fond at det skal komme tilbake til produksjonsmiljøet? 
(Uklar lyd) ...ikke et problem, liksom?   Lars Reiten: Nei, ikke sant. Spørsmålet mitt er egentlig om 
kommersielle aktører kan ta del i dette fondet, da. 
 
Knut Bøhn: Ja, det er klart. Ja. Selvfølgelig. Nå antar jeg du snakker om de kommersielle tilbyderne, film- og 
musikkprodusentene. Nei altså, det fondet... Jeg tror ikke man skal reise rundt med en pengesekk på 
folkehøyskoler, liksom... Altså, dele ut penger til folk som har lyst til å synge. Det må stimulere et 
profesjonelt miljø, så får TV2 holde på med The Stream liksom, og synes det er morsomt. Det får være deres 
risiko. 
 
Lars Reiten: Du var litt inne på det isted, men om distribusjonen skulle fungert optimalt, ville det vært behov 
for en enda bedre datainnhenting for å fastsette hvordan pengene kunne blitt distribuert, eller er det 
tilstrekkelig sånn som det er idag? 
 
Knut Bøhn: For musikk er det tilstrekkelig, kanskje med forbehold for mindre radiostasjoner, men utover det 
er det helt på stell hva musikk angår, og jeg klarer ikke se for meg at det ikke skulle være det for film- og tv-
produksjon heller. 
 
Lars Reiten: Da har jeg kommet til siste spørsmål jeg, og det er på en måte dealbreakern her... 
 
Knut Bøhn: (ler...) Svaret er nei... Nei jeg mener ja! 
 
Lars Reiten: (ler...) Jeg har landet på et kanskje, selv... 
 
Knut Bøhn: (ler...) Det er godt, da tar jeg det 
 
Lars Reiten: Nei, altså, spørsmålet er om det er behov og grunnlag for en bredbåndsavgift? 
 
Knut Bøhn: Et grunnlag er det jo definitivt, all den tid pengene renner inn til de som tilbyr bredbåndsaksess. 
Så grunnlaget er det ikke noe å si på. Behovet... Der er det jo veldig vanskelig... For 10 år siden ville jeg svart 
«Javisst, erru gæærn» også kjenner jeg jo at problemstillingen er litt sånn utdatert min hverdag i 
musikkbransjen angår. På den annen side så er min hverdag i musikkbransjen tilfeldig. Hvis min hverdag var 
i filmbransjen så ville jeg sannsynligvis svart «Ja, erru gæærn» så... Jeg tror at det kunne være gunstig for 
norsk kulturproduksjon om penger ble tilført gjennom f.eks. en bredbåndsavgift. Om det er det samme som et 
behov er jo ikke sikkert, men om det ikke er et behov så... Det ville være gunstig, tror jeg. Også kan man 
kanalisere som forbrukeren, tross alt... Det gjør ikke noe om bredbåndstilbyderen deler litt av de pengene 
tilbake til innholdsprodusentene, altså. 
 
Lars Reiten: Grunnlaget for temaet er jo å se om det er mulig utifra hvordan strømmen av penger går i dag å 
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kunne innhente mere penger til f.eks. musikkindustrien, vi en alternativ løsning til de gamle modellene. Fra et 
avgiftsperspektiv, så er det som du sier kanskje litt utdatert i forbindelse med den teknologiske utviklingen, 
men samtidig så er det jo en gang sånn at det er mindre penger i innspilt materiale i dag enn for 15 år siden.  
 
Knut Bøhn: Ja, men det kan minst like gjerne bety at folk lot seg forføre til å betale en avsindig overpris for 
en CD. Jeg tror nok at man kommer til å se tilbake på CD-alderen som seddelpressen i musikkbransjen, selv 
om totalverdien av musikkindustrien, den kommer sikkert bare fortsatt til å øke. Det er jo ikke så rart, det er 
jo mere... Det er flere folk, flere som produserer og en større samlekatalog, så det er jo ikke så rart at 
totalverdien øker.  
 
Lars Reiten: Nei, det er jo noe med at folk, utifra den forskningen jeg har lest, bruker den samme andelen på 
musikk i dag som i 99, for å ta et år som var gullalderen for innspilt musikk på CD. De bruker jo den samme 
andelen, det er bare litt annerledes fordelt... 
 
Knut Bøhn: Mhm 
 
Lars Reiten: Helt til slutt så er det jo et spørsmål om det er behov for en sånn type bredbåndsavgift etter at 
streaming kom inn i bildet? Jeg vet ikke om du har noen tanker om det? 
 
Knut Bøhn: Behovet for finansieringstilskudd har jo ikke endret seg med streaming, for filmbransjen f.eks. 
Behovet har definitivt endret seg for musikkbransjen, fordi... Man har fortsatt den utfordringen at hva 
likviditet angår så var det en mye raskere omløpshastighet på inntjening av utgifter tidligere, så sånn sett er 
det en forskyvning av likviditeten, men behovet for finansieringstilskudd over tid har definitivt endret seg i 
musikkbransjens favør gjennom streamingtjenestene. Uten å ha så veldig inngående kjennskap til det, klarer 
jeg ikke helt å se at det samme har skjedd for andre kulturproduksjonssektorer. Det er veldig vanskelig for 
meg å forstå at det går like mye penger gjennom  Netflix f.eks. tilbake til like mange produsenter, som det 
gjør på Spotify. Det går jo mere penger inn i Netflix, men jeg tror ikke de... Altså den... Den totale 
pengestrømmen, jeg klarer ikke se for meg at den fordeles på så mange som f.eks. musikkstreaming gjør. 
Dermed så er det jo... en brukbar mulighet for å kunne drive med musikkproduksjon som næring. Det tror jeg 
egentlig er ganske brukbart som det står, uten bredbåndsavgift. Jeg vil anta at det stiller seg litt annerledes for 
film og tv ettersom de produserer dyrere, opererer med mye dyrere produkter.  
 
Lars Reiten: Er det noe du brenner etter å legge til som jeg ikke har vært innom? 
 
Knut Bøhn: Nei... Det er vel ikke det... Jeg tror jeg ville forfulgt det faktum at Stortinget gjorde det de gjorde 
ved å diskutere arvtakeren til NRK-lisensen i full offentlighet, og egentlig på eget initiativ, og samholdt det 
med diskusjonen rundt bredbåndsavgiften. Hvis man utvidet perspektivet littegrann for den NRK-skatten, 
eller kringkastingsskatten, så er den ikke helt ulik det som vi for en liten time siden begynte å snakke om som 
bredbåndsavgiften... Finnes det noe som... Ting må jo modnes, og bredbåndsavgift er et veldig negativt ladet 
begrept. Kringkastingsskatt... Det kan godt hende det ikke er så negativt... Kanskje ikke det ploger så negativt 
i befolkningen som bredbåndsavgift nok har gjort. Kanskje... Det vet jeg ikke... 
 
Lars Reiten: Det er et veldig godt perspektiv... 
 
Knut Bøhn: Det er veldig spennende dette her altså, synes jeg, at de tar litt tak. Jeg syns de har surra seg litt 
bort, selvfølgelig, i forhold til dette med det å... Egentlig gi avlat til de aller fleste konsesjonsvilkårene til 
TV2 gjennom en kringkastingsskatt, men det er klart, de klarer å hente seg inn igjen på det. Det er litt 
imponerende de greiene der... 
 
Lars Reiten: Mhm... Jeg tar å takker deg på bånd der, og stopper opptaket, så kan vi ta oppsummeringen 
utenfor opptaket.  
 
Knut Bøhn: Ja.  
 
Lars Reiten GÅR IGJENNOM RESTEN AV INTERVJUGUIDEN MED Knut Bøhn. (SE 
INTERVJUGUIDE FOR NÆRMERE BESKRIVELSE) -  
Total intervjutid: ca 45 minutter
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Bendik	Hofseth	
Intervju med Bendik Hofseth. 16. februar 2016, via Skype.  
 
INTERVJUET STARTER MED AT Lars Reiten GÅR GJENNOM INTERVJUGUIDEN MED Bendik 
Hofseth. OPPTAKET STARTER I DET SAMTYKKE FOR OPPTAK HAR BLITT INNHENTET. 
Lars Reiten: Yes. Spørsmål en, er egentlig ganske åpent, hva tenker du når du hører uttrykket 
bredbåndsavgift? 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Jeg tenker på to ting. Jeg tenker på en ordning som kanskje erstatter den ordningen vi har i 
dag med copyright levy, eller kassettavgiftsfond, som på en måte handler om å få det vi kaller fair 
compensation for ureglmentert bruk, eller privatkopiering, som vi har i Norge og i mange andre land, ikke i 
USA, men som vi har i Europa stort sett. Det er det ene, det andre er jo at en betaler en høyere avgift sammen 
med bredbåndsavgiften til opphavsrettslig beskyttet materiale på internett i sin helhet. Det vil jo da være mye 
mer omfattende og en dyrere affære, som ville syntes bedre og som henger sammen med mer kompliserte 
strukturer, som tvangslisensiering og endring av rutiner i mange land, faktisk globalt kan man nesten si. Jeg 
tenker på de to tingene, og at det to tingene ofte forveksles når man bruker uttrykket bredbåndsavgift. Det er 
jo noen varer, som strøm og vann, som har en sånn type økonomi at de er regulert som naturlige monopoler, 
også betaler vi per husstand. Det går an å tenke seg at man gjør det samme med verdensarven og med 
kunstnerisk, opphavsrettsbeskyttede verker.  
 
Lars Reiten: Hva tror du er årsaken til at en sånn avgift ikke allerede eksisterer, for jeg tenker at det har blitt 
diskutert i forskjellige former i de siste ti, femten årene. 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Ja, da må jeg spørre hvilke av de to jeg nevnte er det du tenker på da?   
Lars Reiten: Det kan du egentlig få lov til å velge litt selv. Dette med fair compensation er vel egentlig, har 
vel egentlig vært tatt opp til, altså det å kompensere for ulovlig nedlasting tidligere, gjennom å sette levies på 
det i en eller annen forstand, men det er egentlig et veldig åpent spørsmål, så du kan få lov til å velge litt. 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Ja, når det gjelder en sånn kassettavgiftsordning er det vanskelig å få til fordi det er mange 
som har mye å tape på det, og det er mange som har mye å vinne på at de offline-ordningene som finnes ikke 
erstatter online-ordninger. Det er også mange offline-ordninger, sånn som den franske og tyske som biter inn 
på segmentet fordi de har avgift på harddisker og alle lagringsmedier, så de er på en måte allerede inne i 
dette, og da vil det være rart å be om en bredbåndsavgift i tillegg. Det man har betalt for på bredbånd er jo 
hastighet og tilgang, også har det vært en viss roaming-avgift, men den er så liten, så ubetydelig, at den har 
ikke vært sett på som... Men en mulig finansieringsmodell her er jo at en betaler for den båndkapasiteten en 
faktisk bruker, for det er jo det som er interessant for teleselskapene. Med andre ord, hvis Netflix, som bruker 
42% av båndkapasiteten, de betaler for det. De betaler faktisk en roamingtariff or det i Norge, og at det 
anerkjennes at dette er beskyttet materiale, da har vi finansiering, men da har vi en avansert 
finansieringsmodell som går på hvilken bruk man har. Mange vil hevde at det er en konkurransehemmende 
modell fordi de store betaler mer enn de små. Det vil nok ikke Netflix være så glad for. Også har du en annen 
type tankegang her, som ville være at Telenor eller de som er båndtilbydere, legger på 100-200 kroner fordi 
de vet at du bruker opphavsrettsbeskyttet materiale. Inititativer vi har sett i den retningen, de tenker seg jo 
sånn at man kan eventuelt opte ut, si at «jeg bruker ikke opphavsrettsbeskyttet materiale, derfor vil jeg ikke 
betaler». Det vil jo være veldig forskjellig her. Mange vil jo være som ekorn da, samle på filmer og musikk, 
mens andre vil bare bruke det til Facebook og e-post og vil synes det er urimelig. Det er en lang og vanskelig 
diskusjon uansett hvilken ende du begynner i.  
 
Lars Reiten: Ja, det er jo det jeg tenker også her... Bare for å ta litt bakgrunnen for det spørsmålet: EU har jo 
kommet med veldig mye. Man har jo hatt en visjon om... De Grønne i Tyskland har jo hatt en sånn 
kulturflatrate som mange tyskere og også mange andre innenfor det segmentet i Tyskland, har tatt litt til orde 
for for å kompensere for det. Jeg leste en EU-rapport her om dagen hvor de nevner 42 nøkkelfaktorer for å 
lykkes. En betaler 5 euro i måneden og kan laste ned alt du vil og dele med dine 50 nærmeste venner... Det 
har jo vært en veldig komplisert prosess med veldig mye oppi det. Nå legger jeg kanskje litt føringer for 
spørsmålet, men jeg tenker at hvis en har undersøkt dette mye tidligere, så er jo da spørsmålet om hvorfor har 
en ikke fått det til dersom man har jobbet med dette de siste 10-15 årene. Er det noen andre grunner til det? 
 
Samtalen avbrytes grunnet tapt tilkobling. Intervjuer ringer informanten opp igjen, og starter opptak etter en 
	 	 	 	 91	
liten påminnelse om spørsmålet.  
 
Lars Reiten: Er det rett og slett, som du sier, bare vanskelig å få til...? 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Jeg sier at... Delvis så er det uortodokse forretningsmodeller... Vi har jo ikke tenkt over 
musikk, eller det er jo bredere enn musikk, vi har jo ikke tenkt over bøker, filmer, musikk og bilder på samme 
måte som... Som skal være tilgjengelig og upersonlig på samme måte som vann og strøm før. Det har vi aldri 
gjort. Det er et paradigmeskifte, som uttrykker seg også økonomisk.  
 
Lars Reiten: Jeg tror jeg... Vi kan vel egentlig gå videre. Jeg tror jeg fikk et godt inntrykk av hva du mente 
der... Hvordan tror du en bredbåndsavgift, om den kan, da... Om vi legger til grunn at den kan... Hvordan kan 
en bredbåndsavgift fungere som et supplement til den allerede eksisterende strukturen i musikkindustrien? 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Som et supplement? Da tror jeg vi må tenke at det er den første varianten, en 
kassettavgiftmodell vi ser på. At det er for den type kopiering som gjøres utenom salg av eksemplarer, eller 
utenom lovlige lisensierte tjenester. Problemet er jo her, at... Du kan tenke deg Tidal, eller lovlige 
strømmetjenester, alle er interessert i at de får til en god og sterk økonomi, for det vil jo komme hele 
fellesskapet til - (uklar lyd - til gode?) - . Men hvis vi skal konkurrere med en privatkopieringsordning, 
hvordan skal vi praktisere eller håndheve det? Det er veldig vanskelig. Allerede i dag er det sånn at, 
Facebook f.eks., 60% av de som de sender, når du scroller nedover, er jo faktisk opphavsrettsbeskyttet. De 
har til og med laget et eget videoformat for å unngå å betale penger. Men de tjener jo enormt med penger på 
reklamen sin. De deler det ikke da med de som gjør tjenesten attraktiv. Det er jo veldig rart, og gjør jo også at 
Spotify og Tidal og Netflix og andre som gjør dette legitimt, de er inne i et segment som ikke er regulert 
ordentlig i forhold konkurransetilsyn og konkurransevridning. Google, ikke sant, burde jo betalt, kanskje 50-
60% av overskuddet sitt til rettighetshavere for å være i det samme segmentet som disse er. Spotify, sist gang 
jeg leste om det nå, bruker 70% av omsetningen sin til å hente inn og lisensiere innhold. Hvis Facebook og 
Google hadde brukt det samme, så hadde vi... Eller... Det samme for de områdene de lener seg til og bruker 
opphavsrettsbeskyttet materiale på, så hadde vi hatt en helt annen økonomi, og vi hadde hatt et lovlig regulert 
marked, og det ville vært veldig mye enklere å stoppe gråsoner og grensetilfellene. Nå ble dette litt 
komplisert, men det jeg egentlig sier er at jeg tror ikke det er noen god modell at det er et tillegg. Det må 
enten være all-encompassing, eller så må vi regulerer internett på samme måte som vi regulerer andre 
markeder. Det er det som er vanskelig her, og det er jo det amerikanerne ikke vil, og det kan en jo godt 
skjønne at de ikke vil, fordi det er de som tjener alle pengene for de har mye svakere vern og kan gjøre ting 
som europeerne og asiatene ikke kan.  
  
Lars Reiten: Det er jo det du sier der som jeg tenker at er... Det er jo det som er nøkkelen til en viss grad. Det 
er utfordringen mellom et supplement og et substitutt og hvordan du legger opp de to... Eventuelt om de 
modellene, om det blir den eller andre eller noen i det hele tatt, det er utrolig komplisert og det er mange 
interesser, og du nevnte jo litt tidligere at det har et utilityaspekt ved seg, at bredbånd begynner å bli like 
vanlig som elektrisitet og disse tingene... Det som er en utfordring... At det ikke er en luxury lenger, som det 
heter på dårlig engelsk. Men, tror du at man kunne sett noe i en retning av at... Hvis man skulle innført det i 
morgen, hva kunne vært fordelene av å introdusere det? 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Det er mange fordeler... Hvis en tenker seg at dette er en all-encompassing modell så ville jo 
fordelene være at vi ganske raskt ville skape store pengestrømmer i innholdsindustrien, for å bruke et veldig 
meningsløst, men dekkende uttrykk, altså i forhold til film, bilder, alt som er opphavsrettslig beskyttet. Det 
ville vært fordelene, og ville nok også gjøre at mange av de politiske uenighetene som i dag gjør at 
musikkindustrien, innholdsindustrien, ikke samlet lobbierer for en slik løsning, de ville nok forsvinne. Det 
ville skape et moment... Men, hvor begynner det og hvor slutter det, det er det som er vanskelig da. Hva skal 
beskyttes, hva skal ikke beskyttes... Det er dette som er vanskelig da... Du ser jo selv på strømmetjenester... 
De mest iherdige amatører kan lage meningsløs musikk som de klarer å få omsetning for, fordi de bruker 
virkemidler som digitalteknologien kan, da. Det vil ta lang tid før en sånn ordning vil bli presis, men det ville 
kickstarte innholdsindustrien igjen, det er jeg ganske sikker på. Det ville ta veldig mye tilbake posisjonen fra 
disse plattformtjenestene som idag på en måte er garantist og vennene til konsumentene, altså Facebook, 
Google, Youtube, de sitter mye tettere på konsumentene enn musikkindustrien gjør i dag. Musikkindustrien 
oppfattes som disse klagende, sytende folk som er negative til den utrolige tilgangen og positive veksten som 
internett har vist seg å være. 
 
Lars Reiten: Du leder meg ganske elegant over på neste spørsmål her, og det er jo hva som er ulempene. Om 
det er noen flere ulemper enn de du har nevnt, for du har jo vært litt innom det.  
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Bendik Hofseth: Det er mange ting, det. Jeg er nok... Det er et veldig bastant skritt å gå, da, i forhold til... Nå 
blir det litt sånn estetikk og moral her... Beethoven sa alltid når han skrev musikk, at han skrev det fordi man 
ikke kunne henge det på veggen og gjøre det til sin egen. Altså eide det, da... Det vil påvirke hvordan vi 
oppfatter kunst, for det vil gjøre noe med opphavsretten. Jeg tror konsumenten vil føle at alt er deres. At de 
kan gjøre hva de vil med det. At de kan behandle det... At vi på en måte bartrer inn moralske rettigheter og 
vern for å få noen penger ut av det. Det er svakheten, da. Jeg kan ikke se helt hvordan man kan opprettholde 
en kontroll. sånn som Bern-konvensjonen tilsier, f.eks. i forhold til bruk i politiske øyemed, pornografisk 
øyemed, reklameøyemed osv. Alt vil jo, da... Oppfattes som fritt, da. Og som kjøpt, og betalt, og alles. Og det 
tror jeg er et voldsomt skritt å ta, for du gir slipp på de eksklusive rettighetene som ligger under der.  
 
Lars Reiten: Tror du det kunne vært en måte å unngå den problemstillingen på? Den 
opphavsrettproblemstillingen hvor man føler at man kan gjøre de fleste aktiviteter på nettet med 
opphavsrettsbeskyttet fordi man betaler en avgift. Tror du det kunne det vært en måte å unngå det på? 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Jeg tror at... Skal bruke historien til hjelp, da... Når det gjelder utviklingen av sunne og 
bærekraftige forretningsmodeller så oppstår de ofte organisk. De oppstår ikke som resultat  av sånne 
(?reaksjonære?) grep som dette tilsier. Det er et veldig drastisk grep, altså, som er uforutsigbart på mange 
områder. Jeg har jo skrevet en artikkel om dette som jeg kan sende deg... 
 
Lars Reiten: ...det må du veldig gjerne... 
 
Bendik Hofseth: ...hvor jeg peker på en annen løsning... Det jeg tror er den fundamentale problemstillingen 
her er at politikerne ikke har villet regulere dette området, fordi argumentet om internet freedom er så sterkt, 
og fordi internet freedom er blitt koblet til hele den måten mediet vever oss sammen på, vi liker så godt å 
være sammenvevd, vi mennesker. Kunst er på en måte en veldig god katalysator, det setter igang sånne 
prosesser hos oss, det åpner dører, vi blir på en måte mye mer vennligsinnet mot nære og fjerne venner og 
relasjoner fordi man bruker kunst som åpner... «Ah, du liker David Bowie, det gjør jeg også», ikke sant. 
Tilfellet er at de som har tilbudt denne kunsten, har tilbudt denne tilgangen eller samlet denne veven eller 
sammenkoblingen, er jo plattformtjenestene. De er unnlatt å betale, de skal ikke betale lisens. Da har vi et 
kjempeproblem, for da er vi på en måte lekk. Da er det en sektor av industrien som sponser en annen, og det 
er aldri noen god løsning. Det er det at disse plattformtjenestene sier at «det er jo vi som tilbyr dere den nye 
verden, det er vi som er de nye profetene, det er vi som er... Det er dette du trenger. Du trenger ikke det maset 
om opphavsrett, det er bare tull. Vi lever i en ny verden nå, hvor vi skal dele og alt er fritt». Men det er jo de 
samme som hevder dette som stjeler alle pengene, og som ikke betaler skatt, ikke sant, og som er asosiale, og 
som ikke er åpne, som ikke er transparente med det de driver med. Det er et paradoks. Det at politikerne ikke 
våkner opp til dette og begynner å regulere slik at vi unngår dette, det tror jeg er den ene store årsaken til at vi 
ikke kommer videre nå. Det er den største utfordringen. Det er der vi må ta fatt. Det ble gjort feil i disse 
WIPO-avtalene fra 1996, det ble gjort feil i e-kommersdirektivet til EU i 2001. Da trodde vi at Google og 
Facebook var start-ups som trengte litt hjelp, som var interessante, og som kunne få litt lettere tilgang til Safe 
Harbour, og... Det var ikke så nøye med personvern og ting og tang. Vi kutta noen hjørner fordi vi ville at 
dette skulle gå fort. Så tok det bare to-tre år, så var det de største - (uklar lyd) - ... Politikerne på en måte ga 
de det. De ga de det rommet. Da er det også de som må ta det tilbake.  
 
Lars Reiten: Jeg bare sier det for the record, så jeg får det med i transkriberingen, at jeg bytter rekkefølge på 
to av spørsmålene, fordi du var inne på en ting som jeg kunne tenke meg å vite litt mer om, og det er... Hvis 
man skulle innført det, hvordan kunne man rettferdiggjort en sånn type avgift ovenfor de forskjellige partene? 
Du var jo spesielt innom politikerne, så jeg tenkte jeg skulle høre om du hadde litt mer om det. 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Hvilke parter tenker du på da?   Lars Reiten: Jeg tenker hovedsaklig på de som ville vært 
involvert i en slik avgift. Det går jo fra forbrukerne, som bruker det, rettighetshavere som er med i det fordi 
det er deres stoff som ligger ute, og som da vil havne under den avgiften på en eller annen måte, så er det 
politikere, for du trenger jo lovendringer, ihvertfall litt politisk drahjelp i en eller annen retning - og også 
motstand, forsåvidt - også er det selvfølgelig internettleverandører, de som skal sette dette ut i livet. Det er 
rett og slett fra et bruks og sette-ut-i-livet-perspektiv, hvordan man kan rettferdiggjøre det. 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Spørsmålet er hvordan man kunne bevisstgjøre politikerne? 
 
Lars Reiten: Ja, eller rettferdiggjøre det, selge det...  
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Bendik Hofseth: Ja, sånn ja... Det måtte jo være at da er du kvitt problemet da, for det er ikke så dumt, så 
håpløst... Du kan se på online-lisensieringen nå... Den blir mer og mer fragmentert, det er vanskeligere og 
vanskeligere å finne innholdet, og noen tjenester er ulisensiert. I et veldig uryddig markedsbilde er det 
fristende å si at her må bare alle betale, alt må være tilgjengelig, og alt må betales for. Da har du det som 
kalles mandatory licensing, egentlig en sånn tvangslisensieringsmodell som vi har i Norge, og da vil det jo 
være tvistemålsordninger, og sannsynligvis sånne arbitration eller mediation... Det ville være organer som 
kan bestemme tariffer, og tradisjonelt har jo kunstnere kommet godt ut av det, bedre enn når markedet har 
regjert selv, fordi det er mindre for intermediære, ikke sant... De intermediære vil jo da jobbe konsentrert om 
markedsføring. Forlag, plateselskap, disse funksjonene vil jo være mindre relevante i en sånn sammenheng. 
Da er det er rent promoarbeid. Det er det å kuratere det materialet du representerer fram som ville være 
interessant. Så industrien ville blitt slankere, den ville bli mer effektiv, og handle om det den egentlig burde 
handle om. Det ville være mindre fett på skinka. Det måtte jo være et argument, og jeg tenker jo at jo mer 
fragmentert lisensieringsbildet er, jo nærmere er jo Spotify å gå til Brussel og si at «dette går ikke lenger, det 
forlaget skal forhandle der, og det forlaget der, og ingen skal ha standardtariffer, alle skal ha forskjellig betalt 
for sitt repertoar. Snart må vi forhandle med Elton John om sitt, og Lars Reiten om sitt... Det går jo ikke det! 
Da gjør vi ikke annet enn å...» Det er noe med at... Grådigheten og det å ta ut eget repertoar er blitt så 
attraktivt, og så mange gjør det, at det kveler den andre delen av industrien, som er nødvendig for å nå frem 
til konsumentene 
 
Lars Reiten: Tror du det kunne ovenfor rettighetshavere også, at det ville blitt mindre fragmentering?  
 
Bendik Hofseth: Jeg tror det. Og jeg tror det ville vært et veldig godt argument ovenfor rettighetshavere at det 
ville vært tvistemålsordninger, at det ville være en ny juridisk instans som satt tariffer, for det har vi veldig 
god erfaring med. 
 
Lars Reiten: Du har noen overganger her som leder meg veldig elegant over på neste spørsmål... Hvis man 
skulle introdusert en bredbåndsavgift i dag, på et mer praktisk nivå, om en ser bort fra det juridiske og 
teoretiske, men på et mer praktisk nivå. Hvordan kunne det fungert? Hvordan kan en finne en struktur for 
hvem som betaler hva? Går det på flat-rate, tilkoblingshastiget, måler man antall nedlastinger, eller kan det 
være noen andre løsninger? 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Jeg tror det må være sånn som det er med strøm og vann, det kan være gode modeller. Der er 
det sånn at det er en fast avgift, en nettavgift på en måte, også er det etter bruk over det. Hvordan det gjøres 
stoler jeg på at det går an å finne ut av, det tror jeg ikke er noen stor utfordring. Vi har modeller for hvordan 
vi kunne gjort - (uklar lyd) - i forhold til å fakturere.  
 
Lars Reiten: Det er jo som du sier at det er dette med vann og strøm, og ordninger der...  
 
Bendik Hofseth: Jeg tror ikke det er verre enn det altså... 
 
Lars Reiten: Ikke sant... Hvordan tror du en sånn avgift kunne vært økonomisk gunstig for de forskjellige 
aktørene i musikkbransjen? 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Det var jeg inne på isted, det tror jeg er fordi at det i prinsipp innebærer tvangslisensiering, 
og da vil vi av erfaring få høyere tariffer til de mykere rettighetshaverne. Du får ikke det forhandlings... eh... 
målene som Universal, plateselskap har i dag. Elton John ville... Hans markedsposisjon ville nok svekke, 
ihvertfall på dette området. Men det ville kanskje styrkes på konsertområdet, for det ville blitt likere for alle. 
Det er jo bra for mangfoldet, det er bra for konsumentene, det er bra for konkurransen, men det er ikke bra for 
de store gigantene 
 
Lars Reiten: Tror du man kan finne en slags inngangsport for at det også kunne vært bra for de store 
aktørene? 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Det tror jeg egentlig ikke, det er derfor de kjemper imot, derfor de ler av dette her. De er ikke 
interessert i dette for de mister makt, de mister kontroll over markedet, de mister muligheten til å styre 
utbudet. Det er jo det de gjør i dag, og det er det masse penger å hente på, og det vet de veldig godt. Så de 
ville da - (uklar lyd) - bli aktører i en helt annen bransje de... Og det vil de nødig. Men som sagt, du må veie 
dette opp mot de eksklusive rettighetene... Ville forsvinne... Og nå snakker vi om å selge sjela si til Faust her, 
altså, det har elementer av det. Det er betenkeligheter fra diversitetsrepertoaret også. Det vil jeg si. 
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Lars Reiten: Litt av årsaken til den spørsmålsstillingen, og du svarte jo fint på det tidligere også... Jeg tenker 
at for å gjøre ting i en bransje med så mange aktører så må konsensus følge det til en viss grad, for det er jo 
sånn som vi har snakket om tidligere utenfor dette, så må man komme frem til en enighet, og så mange som 
mulig må være med på laget for at det skal fungere. Alle parter må jo ha en viss interesse av det, men som du 
sier det noen som kan tape på dette også... Det var en slag oppsummering... Men... Hvis vi legger til grunn at 
en avgift har et potensiale for å hente inn penger til bransjen, hva tenker du om distribusjon da? Hvordan 
kunne man distribuert pengene? 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Det har vi jo et greit apparat for. Det måtte jo være da... Type... De organisasjonene som i 
dag har registre og rutiner på dette, og det er jo disse CMOene, eller opphavsrettsselskapene, de har oversikt 
og erfaring. De har medlemsregistre, de vet hvordan man utveksler pengene og hvordan man henter inn 
pengene, så de strukturene er på plass. 
 
Lars Reiten: Utfra strukturene, men mer sånn praktisk sett, kan du se for deg et minimumskrav som du ville 
satt for hvordan man distribuerer det?  
 
Bendik Hofseth: Hvordan da?   Lars Reiten: Hadde det vært greit med en sånn type avgift om en f.eks. kunne 
garantert at femti prosent går tilbake til de som eier åndsverket i en komponist/opphavsmannsforstand? 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Ja sånn, ja. Hvordan man deler internt mellom rettighetshavere? 
 
Lars Reiten: Ja.  
 
Bendik Hofseth: Ja, det tror jeg faktisk også det går an å bli enig om. Der har vi erfaring og vi har presedens, 
så det går det an å tenke seg at en får til. Det vil jo være forhandling, men det tar man jo på bakrommet. Vi 
har jo gjort dette i andre sammenhenger, sånn som i Norwaco-selskaper, så er det jo mange rettigheter kokt 
inn, og det vil det jo være her og. Det vil jo være vanskelig å skille ut ren musikalsk fremføring fra 
fremføring med bilde osv. Du kan jo si at de som har mest å vinne her er jo bildesiden, for de tjener mye 
mindre på sånn type forvaltning i dag enn musikksiden har gjort. 
 
Lars Reiten: Har jeg forstått deg riktig da om du sier at det finnes strukturer på plass allerede som en enten 
kan trekke inspirasjon eller konkrete erfaringer fra istedenfor å, på en måte, måtte finne opp hjulet på nytt? 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Absolutt. Det finnes presedens både i forhold til de (?indre?) problemstillinger og det finnes 
presedens i forhold til hvordan man fordeler i forhold til sammensatte verk. 
 
Lars Reiten: Tror du det er behov for å gjøre den distribusjonen enda mer nøyaktig, tror du er behov for å ha 
en enda bedre datainnhenting rundt... 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Ja det tror jeg absolutt, og det måtte jo være et internasjonalt register på en eller annen måte 
som det kan kobles opp mot. Det var det vi forsøkte å sette opp i Geneve, i WIPO. Det er et veldig vesentlig 
element her, for hvis ikke kan en jo få masse juks med data, og vi klarer ikke å mekanisere avregningene. Så 
kan en også tenke seg at det er en kollektiv bit, at ikke alt er fordelt individuelt, men en kollektiv bit som 
holdes igjen i de respektive som er en kultur... Brukes til stipender, grasrotandeler, inkubasjon... 
 
Lars Reiten: Ja, og der skal jeg takke deg igjen, for der ledet du meg nok en gang elegant over på neste 
sidespørsmål... Dersom deler av pengene kunne gått inn i et fond eller en stipendløsning eller noe sånt, 
hvordan kunne du tenkt deg at det kunne fungert da?   Bendik Hofseth: Det hadde jo, som jeg sa... Det handler 
om å styrke mangfoldet om nødvendig. Det handler om å styrke, eller gi unge muligheten... Dyrere musikk... 
At de har mulighet for å finansiere de som har store ambisjoner berettighet... Høy kvalitet... At det finnes 
ordninger innen kunstfeltet selv som kan trekke frem noe som er mer vesentlig enn annet. Det vi snakker om 
nå er en grå upersonlig masse av filer som fyker rundtomkring, og som avregnes automatisk. For å 
komplementere det, utdype det, for å korrigere det tror jeg det er nødvendig at det er en form for kuratering 
fra det kreative fellesskapet. 
 
Lars Reiten: Et eventuelt fond... Kunne det vært rom for der at en kunne tillatt at de mer kommersielle, 
plateselskaper osv... Aktørene kunne søke på det også for å promotere i utlandet, eller få norsk musikk ut i et 
annet segment, eller ta mer risiko, eller hva de nå sier at de skulle ønske seg at de hadde mere midler til? Litt 
av grunnen til at jeg stiller det spørsmålet er at jeg leste gjennom rapporten fra Nordgård-utvalget, og både 
der og andre steder sier de (Plateselskapene) at det kunne vært ønskelig å ha en sånn type fond som f.eks. 
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filmindustrien har i Norge, hvor man kan få midler for å promotere og eksportere norskprodusert innhold til 
utlandet. Jeg vet ikke om spørsmålet kanskje forsvant litt i redegjørelsen her... 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Nei... Det jeg beskriver er jo et fond - (uklar lyd) - ulike territorier... Onlinesegmentet inngår 
i en kulturell økologi da... I en biotop... I Norge som har veldig lite nasjonalrepertoar på samvittigheten ville 
det kanskje vært viktig å styrke det norske repertoaret. I England så er det helt andre ting som er viktig. Det 
kan være at det er mangfoldet som er understimulert, det kan være at... I Carracas, hva vet jeg, kan det hende 
at nettopp det monokulturelle er understimulert, at en har behov for å bidra til å skape store spydspisser, 
stjerner... Det kan være veldig ulike behov, i veldig ulike land, til veldig ulike tider, så det må være en 
fleksibilitet, tenker jeg, og en form for autonomitet i hver region, i forhold til en sånn ordning.  
 
Lars Reiten: Da har jeg egentlig tenkt å ta siste spørsmålet mitt, og det er på en måte «dealbreakern»... 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Ja... 
 
Lars Reiten: Er det et behov eller grunnlag, eller begge deler, for en bredbåndsavgift, sånn som du ser det? 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Nei, jeg synes ikke det. Jeg synes vi skal forlate det. Personlig synes jeg at bredbåndsavgifter 
er en unnvikelse fra å regulere internett. Vi må regulere internett. Vi må gjøre det vi gjør på alle andre 
områder. Det er ikke noe hokus pokus, det er ikke noe mystisk med internett, det bare virker sånn, for det er 
en sånn fantastisk måte å binde oss sammen på, men det må et politisk mot for å si at vi må ha kjøreregler der 
også. Altså, sønnen min... Instagramkontoen hans oversvømmes av porno. Han er 11 år. Det er helt ute. Vi 
kan ikke holde på sånn som samfunn, slippe til det styggeste av oss i alle mulige... Det dukker opp overalt, de 
mest prompete menneskene. Et sånt samfunn kan vi ikke ha. Et samfunn hvor sånne som Google og 
Facebook, de bare tar med seg alt som er av penger og aviser og kunnskap og lokale krefter forsvinner, fordi 
noen ikke følger med i timen og ikke tør. Da mener jeg politikerne. Jeg tenker at i det perspektivet så er 
bredbåndsavgift en sånn desperat... Vi kan gjøre noe radikalt, få til noe enkelt her da... Og dette er veldig tabu 
å si sånn i forhold til Peter Jenner, for Peter har vært veldig ivrig på denne ideen i alle år, men jeg har alltid 
opplevd den som en sånn våt sosialistisk drøm, mer enn en mulig realitet. Jeg tror det kan være behov for 
komplementære ordninger som erstatter en kompensasjonsordning, som kassettavgiften har vært i alle sine 
avskygninger. Noen land eller områder vil kanskje gå for det, mens andre ikke vil det. Det vil jo være en 
mindre inngripen i folks lommebok og valg. Fristelsen er så stor, at den friheten... Det er det at vi faktisk vil 
hverandre vel, vi mennesker som fører internettet frem. Den myten der må knekkes, for den er veldig farlig. 
Den kommer internett til å knekke på, for vi drukner i porno og ultrakapitalister. Så det er min personlige... 
Jeg skriver jo i artikkelen du fikk av meg nå... Jeg tror vi trenger å få lover og retningslinjer og politikk, 
regulering, som gjør at vi kan ta penger fra de som tjener penger på... Plattformtjenestene, som tjener penger 
på innholdet i dag, som ikke betaler. Jeg tror vi må ha gode internasjonale registre som vi samarbeider om. 
Og det er egentlig veven, det er det internett egentlig handler om. Det er å ha samme standarder og et apparat 
til rådighet med mulighet for transparens. Det er det som vi kan, på en måte, få til. Også... Skal jeg si noe mer 
om det, da... Eh... Hvis vi skulle hatt... Jo... En tredje ting som vi ikke har snakket, som er veldig 
ødeleggende, er jo dette såkalte «notice and takedown» som også henger sammen med safe harbour, jeg vet 
ikke om du kjenner til det begrepet, Lars? 
 
Lars Reiten: Safe harbour, notice and takedown... 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Ja, altså, det det handler om er at hvis jeg spiller i Stuttgart da, det har skjedd, også er det en 
eller annen i salen som tar opp det og legger det ut på Youtube. Da må JEG gå til Youtube å si at «vet du, 
hva, jeg liker ikke det opptaker av meg, jeg synes ikke jeg spiller noe bra på det, det er ikke noen bra versjon 
av den sangen som jeg prøver å selge plater av. Ta det ned». Det synes jeg er feil. Så lenge vi har det sånn, så 
lenge jeg må gjøre jobben og Google kan tjene alle pengene på det, da har vi et kjempeproblem. Det må være 
motsatt. De må spørre meg «her er det en som vil legge ut musikken din, er det greit for deg?», også kan jeg 
si ja eller nei. Da er min eksklusivitet ivaretatt, min eksklusive... I forhold til at det er mitt skaperverk som 
blir fremført, og jeg burde da kunne bestemme om jeg ønsker det eller ikke. Jeg skal ikke kunne... Så 
regelverket er på en måte snudd på hodet, da. Da har vi... Google fikk jo 560 millioner sånne notice and 
takedown-varsler, og vet du hva de bruker de til? Til å bygge opp en kjempedatabase. Da har jo de bedre 
oversikt enn noen over hvem som har skrevet hvilket verk, hvem som er rettighetshavere av ditt, og hvem 
som er rettighetshavere av datt. Så uansett hvordan du snur og vender på dette her, så er det en kjempe, 
kjempe, kjempekreftbyll i dette systemet som heter Google.  Som vi må addressere... Som noen må tørre å si 
at suger all kraft, og da mener jeg ikke bare pengekraft, men all innovasjonskraft, og all skaperkraft, ut av 
mange industrier. 
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Lars Reiten: Jeg tror det du er inne på der også var noe jeg hadde håpet du skulle komme innom, så det var 
kjempefint. Det er noe med det å kunne finne et system, uavhengig av... En quick fix, en kanskje litt for lett 
løsning, kunne vært en bredbåndsavgift, om jeg har forstått deg riktig? 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Ja... 
 
Lars Reiten: Men det bøter ikke på hovedproblemet. Det kan hjelpe til med å forsinke det litt, kanskje, men 
hovedproblemet her ligger jo, som du sier, rundt safe harbour og rettigheter og det å kunne ta seg til rette på 
internett, da. Det er jo akkurat det som er... Problematikken her er jo rett og slett om man kan finne noe som 
kan bøte på hele problemet, eller må en ta det stykkevis og delt. Så er jo spørsmålet også at hvis du tenker en 
bredbåndsavgift som en komplementær/supplementsgreie, om det er behov for det etter at streaming kom inn 
i bildet? 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Ja... Det er et godt spørsmål, for streaming er jo en slags sånn ordning. Men da må jo også... 
Da må vi ta bort den rare konkurransen som disse streamingselskapene også er i, da. De må konkurrere mot 
selskaper som har like vilkår som de, med andre ord selskaper som også lisensierer. Da kan vi jo få en 
spennende flora av strømmetjenester som er kuratert, som har den musikken du liker.  
 
Lars Reiten: For å følge opp det litt, for det kommer litt an på det mangfoldsspørsmålet også... Litt på siden... 
Tror du at streaming kan gå i en retning hvor ikke alt er tilgjengelig på en plattform hele tiden, at en kuraterer 
mer og får mere spissede tjenester?   Bendik Hofseth: Ja, og hvis det ikke gjør det så tror jeg uansett at måten 
musikken vektes på, tilbys på... Jeg var veldig imponert av Apple Music nå. Det tror jeg er det beste jeg har 
sett av forsøk på å trace min musikalske historie. Mange gode forslag, og gode ansporinger. Jeg tror nok at 
det er mye å hente på å kuratere ulikt. Men det betyr jo ikke at de trenger å ha mindre repertoar, men at de er 
bedre på å hjelpe deg til å finne det du virkelig har bruk for.  
 
Lars Reiten: Er det noe du føler vi ikke har rørt innpå, som du brenner for å få med på bånd? 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Neida, Lars, dette er veldig spennende for meg også det, å bli spurt om disse tingene og 
tenke litt over det. Det blir gøy å følge det videre, nå.  
 
Lars Reiten: Det håper jeg også... Jeg tar å stanser opptaket her nå jeg... 
 
Bendik Hofseth: Ja, det kan du gjøre.  
 
Lars Reiten GÅR IGJENNOM RESTEN AV INTERVJUGUIDEN MED Bendik Hofseth. (SE 
INTERVJUGUIDE FOR NÆRMERE BESKRIVELSE) -  
Total intervjutid: ca 49 minutter 
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Peter	Jenner	
Interview with Peter Jenner. 10th february, 2016 
INTERVIEW STARTS WITH Lars Reiten GOING THROUGH INTERVIEW GUIDE WITH Peter Jenner. 
THE RECORDING STARTS ONCE ACCEPTANCE OF RECORDING HAS BEEN COLLECTED: 
Lars Reiten: Right, Peter, what do you think of when you hear the term broadband levy? 
Peter Jenner: Oh, what do I think... (long pause) It depends what you mean by broadband levy. ehm, and, 
ehm, I  think it's an, I mean, I am of the view that it's possibly, probably, no. Possibly the way to go, in the 
sense that, given your background about the declining hardware levies and the problems that they have with 
that, I've been of the view that a broadband levy makes more sense, in as much as, you know, it was clearly 
political problems with the idea of putting on a levy on smartphones. And since, who's smartphones can cope 
with accessing content it's a real problem, that it' sort of this, you know, arbitrary levies on old technology in 
some place, and it's not in other devices and not in other territories, and it's now become a very dysfunctional 
structure. I think the levies weren't a bad idea. They generate money which is a good idea. And, so, I would 
switch it around and be basically in favour of broadband levies, because it seems to me that if you are 
accessing content you're going to have broadband. If you're having broadband, or paying for broadband, it's 
probably because you want to access content.  
Lars Reiten: Yeah.  
Peter Jenner: It's one of the, not the only reason, but it's a major reason, for having a broadband service, and 
it seems to me that the broadband companies, when they're selling broadband, are in fact selling, implicitly 
selling, access to content, and to free content, or cheap content, or probably free content, and... It might be 
legal free content, but it seems to me that it's as much problem with Youtube paying up enough money, and 
Facebook, and so on. So that legal, as it stands at the moment, legal free content is as much of a problem as 
illegal free content, you know. 
Lars Reiten: Ahm, but you know, I think, you know, you've been, or people in general have been discussing, 
or different authorities have been discussing a broadband levy for the last decade, or so. Probably the last 
fifteen years. Why do you think it hasn't become a reality?' 
Peter Jenner: Partly because there's a sort of hysteria about taxes, and the politicians are really frightened of 
taxes. They're frightened of a new tax, and, though it's always the problem where you put something on for 
people. so what I don't ever download this, I don't ever use it for accessing content, and I always pay for 
content, and... I think you either have it or you don't have it, you can't say "Oh well, you're a good boy, so 
you don't have to pay the levy, but you're a bad boy so you have to pay the levy." How do you decide who's a 
good boy and who's a bad boy, and so on after the event. So, I think, you know, you either have it or you 
don't have it. I think there's a lot to be said for having a broadband levy. But then I think you do have to deal 
with them problems of double payment. So, then you have a problem of... If you're going onto services as 
Spotify where you have to pay, you know, you're paying a broadband levy and you're paying Spotify. Or if 
you're not accessing content at all, although you got the availability, you're not paying at all for that, so I 
think you've go to balance the actual usage with, ehm, the access charge. So, I always think somehow, how 
can we deal with that, ehm, it's like dealing with electricity, where you have a standing charge, and you have 
a, ehm, meter on how much electricity you're using, or with phones you have a, a... Line charge, and then you 
have some sort of payment for what you're getting on your line which includes broadband or phone calls.  
Lars Reiten: I think I'm getting back to that... To, you know... to a little bit more philosophing... 
Peter Jenner: Yeah, so I, I mean, I think that the major problem with broadband levies is people saying I 
don't use my broadband for anything other than, you know, ehm, Skyping my grand children in Australia. 
And... Its very hard to argue that you, you... Tough s***. And I think I would argue tough s***. I mean, at 
the end of the day you are, you know... The reason there is such, you know, such, you know, ehm, broadband 
levy, is because everyone uses broadband, everyone is accessing content, you know, ehm... Legal and non-
legal, and... I don't see a problem, I think the alternative is that you got to make the, ehm... I think it's very, 
very hard, because it's so easy to get the content. People are gonna find free ways to get the content, unless 
it's just, you don't notice, and I, my feeling is that people just don't... I don't think many people would mind if 
you say: look, you know, the fee is so much a month and you can access all you want, all the content you 
want, you can get hold of for this, you know. Ehm... I think that's not a bad deal, and I think in terms of time, 
people might just think, well fine, that means I... And I think, sorry, the most important and valuable thing 
about this is that it maybe enables new, ehm, new entrance, new, new models developed, new ways of 
delivering content. And delivering content with other things, in other words that if you've got an online game 
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which has an online music with it as well, then you can get paid for that online music. And, you could afford 
to put music onto the games without having to go through licensing, enormous licensing. I think the great 
advantage of broadband levies is it reduces the amount of the transaction cost of, you know, who's getting 
what from where and how, you know, and who's licensing what now and... And all the black box issues and 
all the data issues, I mean, it... In a way, my attraction to broadband levies is in a sense a reflection of my 
dislike of what's happening at the moment in terms of how people get paid, and who gets paid, and, ehm, who 
isn't paying, and my idea of paying and, ehm... How you have free services and you have paid services, and, 
you have freemium services, and... I don't know... I don't seems to me a very sensible way... I can just look at 
it in terms of, in the UK we have very good BBC structure, nobody pays for it, a few people moan, but most 
people pay for it, and it's three pounds a week, about, you know thirty NOKs a week, and you get seven or 
eight radio stations, and, ehm, all... Very good in their way, all leaders in their set of the market, and you have 
TV stations and, you know, four TV channels and the world service. All this is paid for three pounds a 
month, I mean we get and enormous amount for that three pounds a month, and... 
Lars Reiten: Three pounds a week, or... 
Peter Jenner: Three pounds a week, and it's so valuable because everybody has... The BBC is able to do so 
much cuz it has such good revenues, ehm... That it can provide good services all across the board, which is 
why we have good, great coming out of the UK TV, and I think it also enables the record companies to do 
that, they don't have to destroy their programs with a lot of advertising, so it helps drive music, ehm... And I 
think the role of the BBC in the, ehm, in development of British pop music has been incredibly important, 
and, probably, partly because it is able to be innovative and exploratory, they don't have to just play the hits. 
What's interesting is that, in almost every, everywhere I've looked at it, commercial radio, which is ad-driven, 
plays a lot less number of tracks than paid-for-radio, you know, or government sponsored radio, you know. I 
don't know what the figures are in Norway, I've seen them in the past, but it's and enormous difference in the 
number of different tracks that are played on national radio, than are played on commercial radio, which just 
play the hits over, and over, and over, so... 
Lars Reiten: There's even a Norwegian radio station that has a set playlist, which, they just rotate on the set 
playlist, and that playlist is set for... I don't know, a year, two years maybe. So they choose songs from, you 
know, one, one some type of hits, and then just rotate that, and they think they've been under criticism lately 
for introducing very, very little new music, and especially very little home grown music, into... that 
environment 
Peter Jenner: No, no, no, because. The thing is that that sort of radio programming is all about playing what 
people are used to hearing, and not... So there's a predictability... So in a sense I could see that'd they not want 
to play new music, cuz that's unpredictable. The familiarity is part of what drives the thing, so, it can just go 
on, and you dont have to listen, you know. 
Lars Reiten: You know, my third question is somewhat... 
Peter Jenner: I've deviated, sorry. 
Lars Reiten: (laughs) No problem... My third question is, ehm, it might have a little bit of pretext to it... How 
could a broadband levy work as a supplement to an already existing structure in the music industry? 
Peter Jenner: Why, I don't think it affects the music industry, I think it affects the, ehm... It would just 
generate more income, I think, which is probably a good thing. No, I think it would affect the issue of, the 
charging and the pricing of, paid-for services. Would a broadband levy, as it where, legitimize people doing 
other services which don't pay? So, would the broadband levy end up with you just getting the same money 
as you're getting now, from Spotify and iTunes, and so on. Legal services. And, ehm, you know, would it 
enable people to develop these services which those existing services have developed. I think, the interesting 
question, variation, question off of that question is: what sort of services might developers who result of 
having a broadband levy, and if you had the broadband levy would that mean that the, ehm, the labels could 
be expected to charge a lot less? In other words, if you have the levy it means that the paid-for services could 
be cheaper. Or, ehm, if those were the same price they would have more curation, they had more value to 
them than just being locked into you own playlist. I think that the problem with playlist is you get stuck on 
you playlist, and you just go round in a revolving way, and then perhaps, you end up with a Pandora thing 
where you just end up going round and round in circles, and it becomes very conservative, cuz, you know... I 
think the interesting thing is how you develop and widen peoples listening, you know, so... To me, that's 
what's really interesting about the golden age of FM radio in America, and also sort of John Peel, in the UK 
later on, is that, that, the issue of widening people's choice, presenting things they wouldn't otherwise have 
heard... And, you know, that, I mean, is really valuable, and... I think broadband levies could enable that to 
occur, and enable people to bring on services which, actually, are more genuinely curated. Because you could 
be able to do that, and you wouldn't have to pay very much, cuz you're collecting money from the broadband 
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levy, so that in a sense the need for the revenue, which is, you know, from Spotify. Okay. The need for the 
revenue from digital because of lost physical sales could be reduced by the broadband levy, therefore, in a 
sense, you would a much freer approach to programmin online, and you'd have a lot more of more interesting 
music coming in, and, ehm... Potentially, in the context of a broadband levy, which I think would be a good 
thing.  
Lars Reiten: But, you know... 
Peter Jenner: I wouldn't lose people's playlist if that is what they want, but I think a lot of people want new 
things to listen to as well as old music. 
Lars Reiten: Yeah. In the extension of that question, do you think a broadband levy, do you think it should be 
a substitute, or do you think it should be a supplement to the existing structure? There are structures in 
place... 
Peter Jenner: That's the question. I mean, I think that is absolutely the key question, and... I think that, you 
know, what those things do, the best of the services provide something other than just revenue. So, and the 
danger is that if you lose the revenue, do you then also lose what they do... So, and how do we, ehm, how do 
we cope with that. And also, what does a broadband levy cover? Does it cover video as well, does it cover 
games, ehm... 
Lars Reiten: I think in this instance, from my point of view, it's to cover music... 
Peter Jenner: Yeah, but then the answer would be, I don't listen to music, why should I pay a broadband 
levy? 
Lars Reiten: No, exactly. 
Peter Jenner: I think in a sense you have to accept that a broadband levy makes sense in terms of just 
content, you know. So my point in way is that is should be relatively high, but it should cover newspapers 
you read, it should cover films that you watch, videos that you watch. You know, that in other words is 
should be almost all content, and in a sense all content then becomes free, and you just pay a levy for your 
broadband access. And maybe then, if you use a lot of broadband you pay a bit more. Cuz, I think, that's the 
other thing, is it standard charge or metered  charge, or both? And, I think, again that makes a lot of 
difference, and it seems to me you could have a standing charge and a metered charge, and you allocated the 
money that was received in order of what people had actually used, because, they know what people are 
using, they know how much of its music, how much of its film, how much of its video, how much of its, you 
know, newspapers, and how much is other things. And they could allocate that revenue according to those 
things, and they could analyse whats getting used within those contents, and that could be done relatively 
easy, relatively easily, ehm, and, ehm... It would be, probably, very good, it would be great, but then, you see, 
people who don't listened to any content, just wanted to be Skyping their grand children are going to winge 
and moan. 
Lars Reiten: Yeah, exactly, ehm... 
Peter Jenner: And politicians are very responsive to people winging and moaning, and on the whole people 
are much louder with winging and moaning, than they are with praise and, you know, rejoicing. 
Lars Reiten: Do you think a, you know, do you think a broadband levy should, or could it, replace a private 
copying levy on the physical format? 
Peter Jenner: How do you mean, the private copying levy? 
Lars Reiten: You know, you have the private copying levy, or the blank disk, or the blank media levy, 
whatever you wanna call it, and... Should it, ehm, as we talked about earlier, that's decreasing. Do you think a 
broadband levy could replace that? 
Peter Jenner: Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, I mean, I.. There'd be no case for having... I mean, the number of faults 
with the existing levies as such, that I think it should go. I think that is on the good reasons for broadband 
levies to get rid of the current device levies. 
Lars Reiten: What are those faults? 
Peter Jenner: The faults? The faults are that vary from country to country, they're very anti-competitive, they 
don't keep up with all the media, so that mobile phone, by a large smartphones don't have broadband levies 
on them because they would be too unpopular. In as much as, everyone is, there is likely to  200 per cent 
penetration of broadband devices in not too long, i.e. that the average person has two devices, and, ehm... It 
don't make sense to be paying levies on those. I think that the overall usage gives a sense of what needs to be 
charged. I mean, you're not charged by the number of lightbulbs you have, you are charged by how much 
	 	 	 	 100	
electricity you use, with you lightbulbs. If you don't turn them on, that's your decision. 
Lars Reiten: What do you... I think that, you know, this is very good. I think I am just going to move on to 
the next question, for a little bit, cuz i've kind of asked my follow up questions on this topic. If you were to 
introduce a broadband levy today, what are the benefits of doing so?  
Peter Jenner: Why, I think the benefits is that it would open up the internet all sorts of of new services, new 
content services, which aren't relying on getting licenses from people who want enormous amounts of money 
up front. Ehm, and who, ehm, are playing various games to extract as much money as possible. It seems to 
me that rather than having to pay up front to get access, you should be paying for what is accessed. We 
should be encouraging the content - the spread that of content - and that would also enable us to encourage 
the spread of international content, in other words that, I've been struck by the fact that you can't get enough 
of not very deep catalogue from France in the UK, because no one can be bothered to license it. It seems to 
me the problem is the individual licensing of content. I think all content should be available from anywhere in 
the world, and what you should perhaps be paying for is the curation of that content. You could have a thing 
where you had a sort of intro. Intro to Brazilian music, you could listen to a bit, and go "Oh, I like that" and 
press a button and you get a whole lot more by that artist, that person or that type of music. I just think that 
the potential for cultural diversity is enormous. I think it could end up with Latvian people singing in Latvian 
being available in England. I think the richness... I'm really bored with the, sort of, anglo-american repertoire, 
and I think a lot of is has to do with language, and the feeling that people have to sing in English. Where they 
come from. I think it's terrible. I think it undermines cultural diversity, because I think language is an 
important part of music, and that music in foreign languages usually has a different feel, because of the 
rhythm of the language. And, ehm, I think the music of rock and roll is English, and that's why people sing in 
English, but I think that means that, sort of... What's could is the Icelandic where you get something because 
they are all, sort of, they all sing in, they all have their strange language and that leads to strange music, ehm, 
and I think the same thing applies in all sorts of ways. The rhythm of the language is reflected in the rhythm 
of the music, and the diversity of music reflects the diversity of language. Therefore, if you reduce the 
diversity of language in music, you will reduce the diversity in music. 
Lars Reiten: Just a follow up on something you said. How, I might not have understood you correctly... How 
do you see a broadband levy strengthening cultural diversity in a sense? 
Peter Jenner: I think in a sense it would enable what appears initially to be small audience to be developed 
by fans, so in other words the Brazilians - I use that as an example - the Brazilians in the UK could put up 
Brazilian music and it would be available for people in the UK to listen to, and UK people would listen to 
Brazilian music a little bit, and that could help to develop Brazilian music in the UK. Not because it's a 
question of helping Brazil, but simply because it is different, has different feel, different sorts of music. Say 
for Spanish music, Flamenco music or Indian music. 
Lars Reiten: Following up on that, if there is an advantage, my next question is disadvantages. Are there any? 
What disadvantages are connected to introducing a broadband levy? 
Peter Jenner: I think the price, obviously the question is what price the levy would be, and could one still 
have paid-for services. I think it is hard. If you were to reduce all the paid-for services, which would include 
things like Netflix, if you're replacing all the paid-for services, ehm, the levy would be very high, which 
means it would put off young people, important people, and I think that is a real challenge. That I think is the 
biggest negative, whether the broadband levy would reduce the paid-for services and the curated services that 
are provided. Am I right in thinking it would encourage and stimulate services, or would it in fact discourage 
and destimulate new services. I think there are argument both ways. I suspect that people will still pay for 
things, you know, there are free libraries and people still go to book shops. I suspect that if you can get all the 
music that you want if you are poor, you are still going to get more curated things and things that you want 
which are more specialist. If you're a gamer and you like games, and you don't want to have any f****** 
music in your games, you just wanna get on with gaming, or you might want to have music. Well, if you want 
to have music, let's have music there and collect some of the money, and if you don't want music you could 
turn it off. That too should be reflected in the end on how you split the money on a broadband levy. I think 
the other disadvantage is that it would require the cooperation of Telcos which might not be interested. 
Without them it would be very hard, and if they set their heads against it, they could make sure it's a failure. 
Lars Reiten: Yeah, I think I'm getting back to that... Some people might say, or some organisations, or some 
acts in the industry might say that introducing a broadband levy could in a sense compromise foundations of 
copyright... 
Peter Jenner: I don't think there is any question it would undermine the foundations of copyright. Depends 
what you mean. If you say that copyright is about getting peoples permission, I think it would undermine that, 
and I am quite happy about that. If it means that you're undermining the copyright as an existing institution, I 
	 	 	 	 101	
would have no problem with that at all. I think that, in other words, all the other things I don't like about 
copyright is all the things like "take it down", do this, and I think content should flow pretty freely, unless it's 
really, ehm... I would let people have (?law?) objections to some extent. I do think that the, ehm, you know, 
content should be freely available to everyone. But then, what I am in a way saying, is that everyone have got 
to pay quite a lot to get their broadband access. What would come with this is that you got to somehow make 
broadband pairable, so that poor people, old people, have got to be able to get it, and clearly also deaf people 
and blind people have got to have access. In some way or another, how we deal with that, seems to be a 
problem, you know.  
Lars Reiten: Do you think... Or rather, I'll stick with the original question, how can you implement a 
broadband levy without compromising the foundations of copyright. 
Peter Jenner: Well, is copyright about permission, or about getting paid? If it is about permission then I don't 
give a damn if it goes. If its about getting then I think we can deal with that. So I think it undermines 
copyright as a permission thing. You could say "we'll leave that to moral rights", and if theres is something 
you find to be a really offensive use of your music, you should be able to stop that on moral grounds. You 
shouldn't be able to stop it on financial grounds. Whether you can draw that distinction, whether that makes 
sense, whether if that is workable I'm not sure. I think the reality for me is that moral objections to the use of 
your music, I'm going to go with. Financial objections, you know, damn I don't care, it's culture, it's all right 
stuff, everything belongs to everyone. No one invents anything from scratch, we all build on the shoulders of 
giants and all that nonsense, but it is true, you know. No one invented the scales, no one invents language. 
Language is constantly shifting, music is constantly shifting. No one invents it. People do change it, or steals 
it or uses it, or absorbs it. I think that being able to access content and not having to pay big money up front 
and having to find people is what's required, but the big expense is that everything would have to have a 
numeric identifier attached to it in some way. That is a huge issue. All this audio, these clips from films, all 
these pieces of music... The data issues are enormous, but in a way I don't mind that, if you can say that if you 
don't want to provide the data you don't get paid. If you want to get paid, get yourself registered, and if you 
don't bother to register, then you don't get paid. You still got your copyright, you are still gonna try and get 
paid. To me copyright is about getting paid for their work, is not about people demanding permission for 
people to use their work, or for using their copyright. Copyright and permissions are a way of extracting rent. 
You could say the Beatles have been extracting rent because they have been so famous for a long time. The 
big issue is rent. How far is the current structure a reflection rent, rent-seeking by the major labels. 
Lars Reiten: Just to follow up on disadvantages, the opposing of the opposition to a broadband levy in the 
past, not necessarily the model we are talking about here, but the previously introduced models, which have 
been on the terms of illegal downloading and piracy, and on how to deal with that. People who are opposed to 
the model itself argue that on a technical level, a broadband levy - in whatever shape or sense you see it - 
could legalize illegal activities surrounding copyrighted material... 
Peter Jenner: That I've got not problems with. On moral grounds I'm with it. If it means you are not getting 
paid for the use of your material, fine, cuz you would get paid for the use of your material. You might not be 
able to extract rent from it as well, getting something because of it's scarcity, you are just extracting extra 
money, not for it's functionality, but because you can. Rent is about money you can get. Rent is what 
Universal charges Spotify for the content, so that they can get A, B and C. They need the content for their 
services, instead of just being paid for their content, they have to pay extra cuz if they don't they won't get it, 
and they have to have it. The economic content of rent.  
Lars Reiten: Just to clarify a bit, I think the opposing voices in this discussion have been very much saying 
that if you were to for instance, you know, older models have been saying that you get a sort of carte blanche 
to download of your hearts desire from wherever you want in different shapes and forms. People say that is 
essentially legalizing piracy, it is essentially saying it is in a grey zone. It is not saying that on paper, it's not 
saying that what used to be illegal has now become legal, essentially distributing copyrighted material. On 
paper it is still illegal, but on a technical, practical basis, people could say that I am paying this, so I could 
download whatever I like. 
Peter Jenner: I would go along with that. In a way I have no time for copyright. I think copyright is about 
rewarding creators, it is not about people playing games of copyright. If people access some particular 
content bundle, the people who created that content bundle should get paid, should have remuneration, 
because we want them, if we like that bit of content we want those people to make more content. We don't get 
bundles if we dont't provide them with money from the first, then they will never make the second bundle. 
You have got to pay, you got to reward, creators who people like in order to stimulate them to do more. There 
is an album and I want to buy that. We will get more content getting created, I think. I think that the problem 
of the number of permissions that one has to get to make anything work now has gone right out of hand, so 
that multimedia works become very, very difficult. I think there is a lot of development that will occur with 
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multimedia products in the future, simply because of cut and paste. We could be cutting of new development 
because people can't afford to clear things. That's already the case that people can't clear things, and that 
things can't be done because you can't get clearance. I think that's not right. If people are just holding stuff to 
ransom, that to me is not right.  
Lars Reiten: Have I understood you correctly that you are saying that if it's on a term where it should not 
compromise technically with the copyright held by creators, but doesn't matter too much if it compromises 
copyright held by other rights holders, such as labels, etc. Or? Because it's too much? 
Peter Jenner: The value chain starts with the creators and ends up with the end user. What you need to do is 
to work out how you can maximize the amount of creation getting to the end-users. If the end-users like the 
content that should be reflected through, into a system where creators can afford to create more. The people 
who enable that transaction, the people in between, their job is to make it work better and more efficiently 
Lars Reiten: Moving on to the next question, we already touched upon some of it... On a more technological 
level, how do you see a broadband levy working if it were to be introduced today? You could say on a 
technical level, without it having to be, but my follow-up question is a little bit technical. 
Peter Jenner: I am not a technician, but I am sure it could be dealt with. My view in a way, is that the way it 
should work is a combination of standing charge and volume. There should be a meter measuring the amount 
of content you consume, or however you measure it. 
Lars Reiten: It is almost if you know my follow up question. How would you determine what to pay? Is it 
based on flat rate, connection speed, amount of downloads, or any other way? 
Peter Jenner: It's very interesting, cuz I too see it, the broadband, as a content delivery utility. If you look on 
it as a utility, the way we charge for utilities is by standing fees and meters, and in a sense that is what I 
would do. What I would then look at is that we want to make sure that the content that is the most accessed is 
the content that get's the most money. Basically, stuff that we like will get more money, and that means that 
the people who make the stuff that we like will make more stuff that we like. I think that is what the market 
should be doing. At the moment that is not what the market is doing, cuz there are so many people getting in 
the way, there's so much rent-seeking on the way through, that that's not happening. The money isn't filtering 
back from user to the creator properly. That's a problem, stuff getting in the way of it getting from the end-
user to the creator, that's what I want to see happening, and I think at the moment too much of it is taken up 
on the way.  
Lars Reiten: How could you justify a broadband levy to those parties who are involved, everything from 
consumers, rights holders, ISPs or Telcos, or even politicians. If you were to say that "this is what we should 
go for", how could you justify it? There probably is a lot of different objections, but justification is key. How 
could you justify a broadband levy to the parties involved? 
Peter Jenner: It might be just transaction costs, which would be initiation costs. It would stimulate 
innovation, it would mean we could do things, and the technology could be used properly, and it seems to 
that one of the key things is that of cut and paste. If you think of the potential of cut and paste, it is absolutely 
enormous. We are hamstrung with cut and paste, because you can't clear everything, or it's practically or 
economically or informationally too difficult. How can I clear this clip form the 30s, or how can I have 
Mickey Mouse dancing to my music that I just made, which might be a really interesting thing. How can 
Mickey Mouse dance with an ewok, and have Charlton Heston coming in telling them to be on their way? I 
might want to do that. I do love the idea of having imagery from WWI or WWII or imagery from gangster 
movies in the context of things. The rich imagery we have from photos and TV and film from the past, and all 
the rest of it is fantastic. We should be using it. It's great. Both in terms of information, and in terms of 
entertainment and broadening horizons. The broadband levy could, and this I think is the most important 
thing for me in many ways, could help to reduce the growing linguistic, ehm, hegemony of english. The 
language and cultural hegemony of anglophonia. I think that is really bad, I would love to hear really good 
Chinese music come through, and in the end it will come through, that I can bare to listen to. Chinese movies, 
Brazilian music. African music. There is so much richness what we don't hear, and it is all being drowned out 
by imitation anglo-american, more american-anglo, sort of culture. I think that to me is the big thing. If young 
people around the world feel that they have to sing in English in order to get a wider, global market, then that 
is a very bad thing in the long run. If younger people increasingly sing and speak in English, the language 
will die, or culture will die, like the sami culture which is only just holding on. Globally that is going to go 
on, slowly, if we are not careful. The cultural monotheism of english, I think is really bad. Certainly in this 
context of Europe we should be very vary of people not writing or singing in... One of the things happening at 
the moment that I find interesting is the growing availability of non-English speaking, long form video, 
which seems to be gathering speed. It's the richness. I don't want to hear just Americans and Brits on TV. 
Having Scandinavian, although not being far-away different, is good. It's a different thing. If we are getting 
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French and Italian things, maybe we'll start getting African soaps on British TV, or available online. It's 
beginning to happen, that we can get away from the dominance of national TV companies and the big 
corporates. It will be much more choice, too much choice, but if there is enough choice it will form itself into 
sections, so that it again becomes like library, so you have the history section with the British, American and 
European history. You have that range of things, you don't just get the top ten Dan Brown books at Starbucks, 
but you also have the other things. That is what is really important, is that we have the other things.  
Lars Reiten: I'm guessing this is more or less from a consumers point of view, increasing cultural diversity... 
Peter Jenner: Yeah, but it's also from a creators point of view. 
Lars Reiten: Yeah. Practically speaking, how do you see a broadband levy helping to improve and enhance 
cultural diversity? 
Peter Jenner: If the content is there, people will start watching and engaging with it. If we all become much 
more aware of each others culture it will do the world a lot of good. If I understand more about what happens 
in Africa and what happens in the Middle East, that will actually be better for all concerned. What are the 
tumults in the Middle East all about? Part of it has to do with and awareness of what we are not getting. An 
awareness of what they are getting in America and so on and so forth. In order to get American stuff that we 
like, we have to get rid our own indigenous culture, but I think you keep your indigenous culture, if you want 
to wear a fallos you can do all that stuff, but you could also look at other stuff and have a combination. 
Diversity, I mean it seems to me its about diversity, the more we see that the other is different, but like 
ourselves. That I think is the big bonus, as we remove or limit the fear of the other, or the prejudice against 
the other.  
Lars Reiten: On the topic of diversity, some people could argue, if they were to argue against the broadband 
levy, that 30 per cent of the content on Spotify has never even been played, and just because there is a 
possibility, just because the catalogue is big, doesn't mean that there's an interest.  
Peter Jenner: Whatever happens, the amount of stuff that is available is going to exponentially explode. 
Whatever happens. I think that in the broadband levy what we could be doing is that the payment will be 
paying for curation rather than paying for content. That I think is very interesting, because then you could 
have people explaining, you know, selecting, the best of Brazilian music, the best of Nigerian film, the best 
of, you know... These things I think could become really interesting an really positive. Iranian movies, I think 
there are some fantastic Iranian movie. I've never seen one, but I know there's a lot of good Iranian movies.  
Lars Reiten: Well, that was the clarification I was looking for, not a specific answer, but a clarification. How 
could you justify it to the telcos? Why should the telcos and ISPs go along with this? 
Peter Jenner: I think it's encouraging more broadband usage, so they'll get growth or charge more. It's simply 
gonna drive their business. I think that we are not utilizing... There should be good content for everyone, at 
the moment there isn't, you know, sort of stuff for kids... There'd be great to have a lots of music for old 
people. One of the best things, apparently, for people with dementia is music from their youth. That's not 
available, but it could be, but no one could be able to license it, but they could be there A lot of it's just 
knocking around, people could dig it out and put it up. I think that the... It might also make the... In some 
senses the internet's been something for young people, so in some senses tend to lock out old people. The 
more we go into the internet, the more it locks out old people, and the more old people feel isolated from 
society. In some sense I think we've gone so far we got to make it available for everyone, and we've got to 
make sure there is content for everyone, and we got to make sure that everyone can use it, in the same way 
me make sure that everyone can speak and read. We need for everyone to be able to use it, a computer to 
access content online. The more government uses internet to do their social services and their data collection, 
health service things and all the rest of it, the more everyone needs it, and we got to all get into it cuz it is 
coming anyway. What is happening at the moment, is that there is some things which old people can't use, 
and there's government data... Say we have voting online, if I don't know how a computer works, I am not 
gonna vote. I'm gonna be disenfranchised. 
Lars Reiten: That leads me to a different question in this circumstance, as well. It's really two questions, but 
let's do the first one. In terms of consumers, you have Phil, 29, who uses the internet a lot, and is more literate 
on the internet than Mary, 84, who uses her internet connection to check her bank account, because the bank 
has a two quid charge if you go there physically. If you were to say that everyone has to pay, it's simple 
enough to justify it to Phil who watches Youtube and downloads different material, but how do you justify it 
at the other end of the aspect? 
Peter Jenner: Well, I think we insist on water being available for everyone? We insist on electricity being 
available for everyone, and gas, and telephones... 
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Lars Reiten: So it's the utility argument? 
Peter Jenner: It's the utility argument. Increasingly in the moder world you are going to need it, and to be 
part of society, you're going to have to know how to use and have access to the internet. In ten years time, if 
you suggested it is not a utility, people would laugh at you... 
Lars Reiten: How do you justify it to politicians? 
Peter Jenner: To the politicians? 
Lars Reiten: How do you tell it to the politicians that "we want to introduce a broadband levy, could you 
please help us get it out there?". As you said before, no one wants to be the politician who introduces a new 
tax. How do you justify it, how do you say that this is the way to go? 
Peter Jenner: Well, the government could pick up the tab. Some of the tab, because of using it for 
governmental reasons, for health, for information, for feedback on policy and all the rest of it. In some sense 
to be able to access the population is of enormous value, and no one queries that there should be radio, the 
only queries are whether it should be private radio or semi-national radio like we have with the BBC or NRK. 
I think you could argue that having access to broadband is something everybody should have. I think you can 
deal with that, I think that's a trivial issue. What isn't trivial is the idea that... It has got to be sold as a positive, 
so you go to remove something to give you something. I think that what you do is that you say it's reducing 
the cost of government, and therefore the government will subsidize it's spread and will introduce it, and the 
government will give you basic coverage.  
Lars Reiten: In terms of cultural content; if you were to put a broadband levy of cultural content, cuz that's 
essentially what we are talking about. Do you put a broadband levy on content, or do you put a broadband 
levy on the entire broadband? 
Peter Jenner: I think you put in on the broadband... 
Lars Reiten: But if the money goes back to the cultural content industry? 
Peter Jenner: It's what people use. It's for what people use which needs to be paid for, so in other words you 
don't have to recycle the money back to people Skyping their grand children in Australia, you don't have to 
compensate for that. If people are using it to look at films from Australia, the money should go to Australia, 
for people watching that film. The interesting question is what should be the rates that you charge, but then 
we have a similar problem with what should be charged for electricity, and we have regulators for that. I 
think it would have to be a regulation issue working out how... It would have to be international. I mean, it's 
not gonna happen straight away. How do you deal with it all? The amount of electricity we use now, versus a 
hundred years ago. Somehow or another, we have to accept that we are going to need to have... Find a way of 
paying for content online, which shortcuts the route from the end-user to the creator. At the moment, in a 
sense, partly the answer is that at the moment we are spending far too much money on the intermediaries. If 
we tidy up the intermediaries, it would probably end up being overall not the levy... I mean, for heavy users it 
would probably mean that they are paying less, and for moderate, medium users would be paying about the 
same. For light users they would be paying a little more, probably, cuz the assumption that in a way, the 
average use would go up, so the average payment in some ways would go up. But I think that there's all the 
advances of scale, as well, involved. At the moment there's a financial restriction on who can really get into 
the broadband game. I would like to reduce that financial restriction on the creative side, and on the content 
provision side. The cost thing is one of the keys things, back to your thing on how do we sell it to politicians, 
they've got to be able to see that there is some benefit, some cost benefit of providing this additional thing. If 
we are just providing cheaper broadband for everybody, why? 
Lars Reiten: Going back a little to the original topic in a sense, how do think a broadband levy could be 
financially beneficial for the different acts in the music industry? 
Peter Jenner: Well. It depends on the whole structure, but basically the computers would allocate all the 
money that's coming through, and it would be based on registries and on identification of use. At the moment 
I think that if everybody saw how much money was going to the record companies, as opposed to how much 
was going to the creators, there would be outrage.  
Lars Reiten: But if it has the potential to bring in money, if a broadband levy has that potential, how should 
you distribute the money? 
Peter Jenner: Well, if you know there's a revenue source, people will lend you money. If you have got a 
record showing that you have a thousand hits today, 2000 tomorrow, the day after you had 5000 hits, and the 
day after you had... Two months later you had a million hits, then people would invest in things. At the 
moment it's very hard to see how you can access the content without giving a lot of money to record 
companies who then keep it to pay themselves huge wages, and also to distraught the market and to make life 
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difficult. The amount of money that is involved in accounting, and in things like the discovery that the 
average TV or radio stations use, is being charges a 140% of what they should be paid, because of the 
confusion and lack of... We've got to clarify... In many ways we get the worst of both worlds. 
Lars Reiten: Do you see a way where... If you said you had ten million pounds, how do think that money 
should be distributed? 
Peter Jenner: I would allocate it according to who's watching or accessing the content, the music content. It 
would mainly go to the creators of that content, so therefore you would need people to decide who were the 
creators and what is a fair, what is the right way of allocating money. But we do find ways of doing that for 
radio money.  
Lars Reiten: In essence you are saying that there's a base line of statistics.  
Peter Jenner: Yeah.  
Lars Reiten: So you would need substantial data collection... 
Peter Jenner: Well, you have a, say in things like PPR (price per record), you have a different ratio on who 
gets what from a recording, which sort of works. You could have that similar sort of structure for video and 
for anything else.  
Lars Reiten: Who should distribute the money, then? 
Peter Jenner: In terms of music I would have all the money coming through things like PRS and PPL, for 
music, so that all music content would get through through PRS and PPL, and they would have the 
information of who to give it to, and they would be under obligations to be efficient and economical, and I 
would leave that to very tough regulation. 
Lars Reiten: Who should give them the information? 
Peter Jenner: They've got to develop the information, we have to between us all we have to develop the data. 
If you want to have accurate distribution, not accurate, but good and fair distribution of revenue, you've got to 
have a very good information on what's being accessed. If we decide that "that is one per cent of what people 
are watching" then what is that one per cent? Who are the people within that one per cent. You'd have to 
develop ways of doing it, in the same way that we developed in some way or another with copyright. Notions 
on how we deal with PPL, you know. It's not perfect, everyone has it slightly differently, but you don't hear a 
lot of complaints.  
Lars Reiten: Is there a minimum that you would set for distribution, a minimum requirement? 
Peter Jenner: In terms of amount?  
Lars Reiten: In term who should get what, is there a minimum? Cuz... 
Peter Jenner: I think the question is whether... That is another very interesting question, what would be the 
impact of this on the structures of the content industries, in terms of origination. I think the idea that you have 
someone who collects and distributes it amongst other worthy people is a pretty good idea. Collection 
societies are a very good idea. I think also you need to have... What does the camera man get as opposed to 
the musicians, as opposed to the star, as opposed to the writer... You would just have to in the course of time 
develop your own views on that, and come to some sort of "wisdom of Solomon",  you know. It's not very 
fair now, that's the advantage. I would hope there would be a better distribution, more even distribution than 
there is now. It might be that it would be less even due to the amount of content that's coming through, and 
the problem of choosing it, that it may be very much a thing that is going to drive people into hits. Because of 
the amount the content, hits become even more important, and therefore gobble up in a higher proportion of 
the revenues, so I would hope that we would do our best to make sure that it's as wide... The revenues are 
spread widely... But at the end of the day, if people wants to watch s***, then s***'s going to be paid better 
than the other stuff.  
Lars Reiten: Just to come back to... You have been saying a lot on the topic of cultural diversity through the 
interview... If you were to put money into, say a fund, some type of fund. How would you see that fund work 
if it were to get, say 30 per cent of the ten million quid that we already talked about. If they were to get 3 
million quid to put into the fund, and distribute it into some of type of music, diversity, or some type of music 
fund. As you know in Norway we have a fund that gives out money to people who wants to record, and who 
wants to make installations, and compose music for different things. How do you see such a fund work? It 
might be one of those questions with a riddle wrapped in an enigma, wrapped in a... 
Peter Jenner: Yes, exactly, I think it is one of those... I think that one would not want to just be driven by 
popularity, but it would be one of the criteria. You don't want it all driven by, sort of, art snobs, or the middle 
	 	 	 	 106	
classes, upper classes or whatever, or the masses. I think you just have to hope. In way it's like the BBC. I 
mean the BBC is one of the most popular radio stations, it's also the most popular classical radio station, and 
the most popular news station. Somehow or another... To some extent, if the flow back of money reflects the 
popularity or the amount of usage, then there would be some way in which that is going to be reflected. At 
the same time you have to have start up funds, so that, say, two per cent goes into start up funds so that 
people could apply. In a sense everyone should have a chance. Interestingly, I keep on talking about the art 
schools in England in the sixties, and what was important about the art colleges is that you didn't have to have 
any A-levels, any academic qualifications, you just had to have folio. You got your folio and you got into art 
school, and you got paid a grant, and your tuition was paid for for three years, and the you could of and be on 
the dole, and go of be paid unemployment benefits for several years. From that a lot of great bands started, 
and I think that if you have that same sort of, ehm, openness to that sort of approach, so you could go in to 
someone and say "look, this is what I'd like to do" and they'd give you a small grant to do it, and then if you 
don't do it that's alright, it's just written off, but you will find it hard to get a second grant, you might be able 
to get a second grant if that is also a write-off, it would be very hard to get a third grant, and then you'd be in 
the dumper. Equally if you make the first grant work, it is easier to get... I mean, I would reward success. I 
would reward good ideas, initially, and then I'd reward success of what their ideas were, in other words, what 
people respond to best. But not entirely. I think a bit of both. You don't have to have a single system, you 
could have a variety of systems. You could have the cultural fund, the art fund, the popular fund, you know.  
Lars Reiten: Should there be room for commercial powers, in this sense the labels, to apply from the same 
fund. In Norway there was a discussion, it may have been a few years ago, that the commercial film industry 
does get a lot of government funding because they want to promote movies abroad, although that has changed 
with Music Norway a little bit. For instance Sony, or Universal or Warner can't apply for money because they 
have a commercial interest in it. I know from before that the labels themselves have been saying that it would 
be very nice if they could have some type of fund where they could apply, the commercial music industry 
could apply for as well, because that would mean that they could take more risk, in creating a larger portfolio, 
giving three or four more homegrown artists the chance to release their material, and market and distribute 
that. Do you think that is a valid argument? Do you think they should be able to apply for the same money? 
Peter Jenner: Yeah, I don't mind that, but what I would do is making sure that you sort of ring fence that 
money, and you have a sort of Norwegian development thing, and it's not just used as a way of getting money 
from Norwegian government to promote Anglophone music. I think you can envisage things like that, and I 
see no reason why shouldn't have a... Why Sony Norway, who has a staff of like four people, but has a bit of 
taps into Sony stuff, but can apply for development money for an arts, and try to promote and market them. I 
don't see that that's a particular problem, but I do think you have to be careful that it is not used to just 
subsidize overseas stuff.  
Lars Reiten: I'm actually at the last question, and it's a defining question. Is there a need for a levy on 
broadband? I know it is a yes/no question, but in that case why/why not, you know... 
Peter Jenner: It's something we should go on looking at, I think that there is a lot to be said for it. I think that 
the reasons why we had levies, tape levies and so on, was a legitimate... There were good reasons behind it. I 
think the need to stimulate and protect cultural goods within national boundaries is important, the need to 
look after rich and varied new experiences is all worth while. Basically... The broadband levy as such I think 
could do something if it was used properly, whatever that is. However that is. If it was used in a positive way 
with a positive mission. If all it is is a way of getting money, it's not really very interesting, but if it's a way of 
enriching, if it could be used to enrich, the social and cultural experience of the people, and perhaps a 
political experience and all those other positive things, then, absolutely, I think it is a good idea. I think it's a 
question of how it is set up. If it's set up in such a way that all it means is that the money goes through 
multinational corporations, then let's not bother. At the moment, if it meant that there's a better chance of 
people getting their music and their works, their creative work, out to the public and being seen and being 
made, and there's a way for it to be promoted and new things can happen, then yes, it's great. Is it necessary? 
No. Is it desirable? If it's done in a way, you know... If you could say what is desirable and you can then 
structure a system which is likely to generate that, then that's a good thing. I think that one should also be 
very careful of, and very mindful of the reality, and the law of unintended consequences. So whatever you do, 
it should be constantly under review. I think it's very interesting to see how much the lottery fund in the UK 
has done to help museums and the cultural life in the UK and various things like that. I think these things can 
help. I think you just have to be very mindful of it, and keep it very open and under constant review, you 
know... Ehm... To have... I think, in a way, my view is that the digital world is going to be fundamentally 
different, and that we have to think about how we make it work. And... Ehm... That... You know... Has the 
government subsidized electricity? I'm sure they have. Have they subsidized developing water. I mean... 
Might the broadband levy sort of seize to exist after a bit? Quite likely. Enough money would be coming 
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through, then you could as it were, you know, just tax the beneficiaries of the broadband levy, so that it 
doesn't hit the consumer. Ehm...What was the question again? (laughs) 
Lars Reiten: Is there a need? And a base for that matter, for a broadband levy? 
Peter Jenner: I don't think there's a need, I think it's a good idea.  
Lars Reiten: Is it a base for it, though? 
Peter Jenner: I think it's a good idea, and, as it were, it changes the game, and makes us to think about what 
we should be doing with the internet. I think the internet has got so much possibilities, and is being so under-
utilized, you know, in a positive way, a creative way. I think a broadband levy as a way of stimulating things 
should be used. Is it the answer to everything? No. But, I think it's something that's worth thinking about. I 
think it's something we have to think about. I mean, that's why I'm trying to get (?putining?) about copyright. 
What is copyright in the digital age? I don't think that the idea of having to get everybody's permission and all 
that stuff, that's obviously nonsense. That's one of the things copyright does, that you have to get everybodys 
permission, is that in fact once people die it becomes impossible to clear their stuff. It becomes increasingly 
impossible in regards to, sort of, big whatevers. They may have an estate that can clear it, but then you have a 
situation where you get these complete block head people controlling estates. I think it's the, probably from 
Roger (Wallis) was it? I think it was (?Berlioso?) or someone, or someone else, who was gay and had his 
boyfriend, and married his boyfriend, and then he died and everything was left to the boyfriend, and then the 
boyfriend got another boyfriend, and he had, you know... So you ended with someone who had nothing to do 
with the music, controlling the content... 
Lars Reiten: Yeah, ehm, the plumber nephew of... yeah... 
Peter Jenner: Yeah, the plumber nephew of the great uncle... Is controlling an estate and deciding whether 
Berlioso's music can be played or not. To me that is ridiculous, and the idea of working what to with the 
money that you distribute from having such a long life of copyright is that you great grand children getting 
money to the estates, which I mean, it's ridiculous. What advance is that?' The guy who's music is being used 
has been dead for fifty years, and yet money are still flowing through to him, which would be much better of 
going to the money of current artists. I wish I had the answers... 
Lars Reiten: Well that's what I'm gonna try to figure out, I guess.  
Peter Jenner: Well, I think you shouldn't try to figure out the answer, I mean what you can help do it to point 
of some of the possibilities and some of the possible dangers. But I think we are coming from a position that 
isn't great. That's the positive, is that we are not in a position where it's an ideal world. A lot of money is not 
getting through to the creators. Too much money is going through to the middle men, and it's far too hard to 
open a new digital service using music because of this. That is something that we should definitely think 
about.  
Lars Reiten: Any other things that we haven't touched upon that you have been burning to bring into this 
conversation? 
Peter Jenner: No, I just think that things should be available. Stuff should be available. Free, and, you know, 
and... If we use a lot we should pay for it. Who knows... I think the BBC is a fantastic model... And I suspect 
that even the NRK is, although smaller. Most of the best music in Norway is off of the NRK, isn't it?  
Lars Reiten: They do OK I think. I mean, there's always going to be different opinions.  
Peter Jenner: Yeah. They have to respond to social unrest in some senses, in other words, if they're just 
playing classical music and there's no pop music, like there was in England, then the pirate ships came on, 
and they though that "we better have radio One!", you know. I think we have to respond with the mood of the 
time and the feelings of the people. At the end of the day there is some sort of political obligation... 
Lars Reiten: To summarize the findings, there are a lot of findings... I have to go through the recording... We 
clocked in on 90 minutes, more or less. I am going to stop the recording now... 
Lars Reiten GOES THROUGH THE REST OF THE INTERVIEW GUIDE WITH Peter Jenner. (SEE 
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR DETAILS) 
 
Total interview time: app. 1hr 29min
	 	 	 	 108	
Cathrine	Ruud	
Intervju med Cathrine Ruud, Musikkforleggerne. 29 februar 2016, via Skype.  
(Tilsendt hovedspørsmål på forhånd etter forespørsel.) 
 
INTERVJUET STARTER MED AT Lars Reiten GÅR GJENNOM INTERVJUGUIDEN MED Cathrine 
Ruud. OPPTAKET STARTER I DET SAMTYKKE FOR OPPTAK HAR BLITT INNHENTET. 
Lars Reiten: Jeg tar det første først, jeg. Hva tenker du når du hører uttrykket bredbåndsavgift? 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja... Jeg er jo litt sånn... Jeg kommer sikkert til å spørre mange spørsmål tilbake også. Det 
jeg lurte på da er hva man tenker sånn utfra ordets betydning, eller om det er uttrykket... Ja... Jeg kan jo si 
litt da... Sånn i ordets betydning er det at det setter fokus på en avgift på bredbånd, at det skal koste noe å 
ha tilgang til bredbånd. Jeg vet jo hva det er, men det er jo ikke bare tilgang til et bredbånd, men en ekstra 
avgift på bredbånd, i tillegg til det man allerede betaler for et internettabonnement. Samtidig så gir det 
assosiasjoner til skatt, avgift, altså, det er et negativt ladet ord. Også forbinder jeg det også litt med 
kassettavgift, og litt de gamle begrepene der. Det er vel det jeg tenker, altså, at det er et litt negativt rettet 
ord.  
Lars Reiten: Hvis du går litt vekk fra ordet i seg selv, men den underliggende betydningen av ordet, har du 
noen tanker om det? Du var jo litt inne på det.  
Cathrine Ruud: Ja, det at det skal koste noe ekstra å ha tilgang til bredbånd? Det var litt det jeg hadde tenkt 
å høre med deg om. Jeg har lest litt om dette, men jeg synes det er litt vanskelig å, altså, å forstå... Jeg 
skjønner veldig godt hvorfor man legger på en avgift, men, litt, hva får man tilbake for det. Hva slags 
fildeling er det snakk om? Er det da fri tilgang til ulovlig nedlasting, ulovlig fildeling, eller er det fildeling, 
for det er bare snakk om en avgift for at man får tilgang til, eller at bredbåndleverandørene har tilgang til 
innhold som produseres? Jeg synes det er litt vanskelig å forstå hva det er man... Hvordan dette innholdet 
utnyttes, da. Skjønner du hva jeg mener? 
Lars Reiten: Ja, jeg kan jo ta litt om det jeg vet så langt. Fra tidligere så har dette vært tenkt som en avgift 
for å kompensere for ulovlig nedlasting, men så viser jo statistikken i dag at ulovlig nedlasting i form av 
torrents og P2P innenfor musikkbransjen, er iallefall i Norge ikke et spesielt stort problem lenger.  
Cathrine Ruud: Ikke sant. 
Lars Reiten: Det er på en måte litt den gamle modellen, også har jeg tenkt på om det er mulig å finne en ny 
modell, er det mulig å hente inn penger fra noen, for ikke å nødvendigvis kompensere, men være med på å 
finansiere... 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja, skjønner hva du mener, men da tenker jeg litt på, hvorfor det? Skjønner du hva jeg 
mener? Hva er det man får igjen? Jeg skjønner veldig godt det at hvis man kan laste ned ulovlig, så gir det 
mening å betale en avgift for det, men... Det er jo så mye innhold som er lisensiert og regulert på nettet 
allerede, så jeg får ikke helt tak i hva slags innhold man da skal betale for, da. 
Lars Reiten: Nei, og det er jo, uten å svare på det spørsmålet, så er det på en måte det jeg tenker at jeg at er 
den inputen jeg vil ha. Det rundt hva en skal betale for. Jeg har jo ikke noen ambisjoner om å si at dette er... 
Altså, i ytterste konsekvens så hadde jo ambisjonen min vært å si at dette er alle meningene, dette er 
hvordan man løser det, slik skal modellen være, kjør på. 
Cathrine Ruud: Ikke sant. 
Lars Reiten: Så tenker jo jeg at jeg ikke tror jeg kommer frem til det. Det kan jo tenkes at, som jeg også sa 
til Knut Bøhn i Phonofile, at jeg skriver 70 sider om dette, også lander jeg på at svaret er nei. Bruke 70 
sider for å beskrive hvorfor svaret er nei. Men det er en tanke rundt det at det er en tidligere forsøkt ting 
som man har snakket om, og som man har tatt inn i noe politikk, gjennom De Grønne i Tyskland som har 
tatt dette inn i EU-programmet sitt i 2011 eller 2009, jeg husker ikke helt. Men så har hverdagen for 
innholdsindustrien endret seg fra CD-alderen via en sånn «lete med lys og lykte»-periode i 10 år fra starten 
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av 2000-tallet, også har man funnet et svar som alle er sånn tålelig greit tilfreds med i dag. Det er 
betraktningene rundt om det er noe vits i, hva man skal kompensere, jeg ønsker, og jeg håper jo det er det vi 
kan se litt på, da... 
Cathrine Ruud: Jammen, den er grei. 
Lars Reiten: Så skal ikke jeg svare altfor mye på det, for da går jeg litt utover den forskergreia rundt at jeg 
skal lytte... 
Cathrine Ruud: Det skjønner jeg.  
Lars Reiten: Hvis man sier at dette forslaget er introdusert i ca 2005 og at man har diskutert det de siste 10-
15 årene, pluss/minus, hva tror du er årsaken til at vi ikke har en slik type avgift på bredbånd i dag? 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja... Det er jo litt vanskelig å spekulere i det... Men utifra hva jeg har lest om det så synes 
jeg det virker som om konseptet er altfor vagt til nå, og det er jo litt de spørsmålene jeg hadde i sted et bevis 
på. Jeg synes i teorien at det er en veldig god idé, og det er jo veldig mange som har slengt ut forslag om 
det, og alle virker som om enes om at det er løsning på noe, men at det virker litt for vagt, sånn 
gjennomføringsmessig. Det virker ikke som om det har vært så veldig mange forslag på hvordan det skal 
gjennomføres i praksis, det har vært mer spørsmål rundt det, og mer konkrete forslag, og ikke så mange 
løsninger, synes jeg. Også er det det at det er et veldig betent område, den klassiske diskusjonen mellom 
hensynet til forbrukerne og de som skaper musikk. Hvor går grensen for hva som er en rimelig balanse 
mellom disse to, og det er jo det man i de 10 årene har prøvd å finne ut av, og som man fortsatt strever med. 
Det er fortsatt for mange uløste spørsmål rundt det. Det er bra du skriver om det, for jeg synes ikke det 
virker som om det er så mange konkrete forslag til hvordan det kan gjennomføres. 
Lars Reiten: Og det er jo fint, for mye av det som har kommet opp rundt dette her, og det har du sikkert lest 
litt om... Litt av feedbacken jeg får når jeg snakker om dette er at jeg blir litt sånn fildelingshippie, og at all 
informasjon på nettet skal være fri og sånne ting, og det er jo ikke mitt beliggende i det hele tatt. 
Tankegangen er jo, som du sier, at man har diskutert det så mye og aldri funnet en løsning på det som er 
god nok for alle.  
Cathrine Ruud: Ja, ikke sant, det er vanskelige hensyn å diskutere rett og slett, så jeg tror ikke det er noen 
som kanskje har... Det virker ikke som om det har kokt ned til noe, egentlig. Man har slengt ut et forslag, 
som er godt i og for seg... Ja... Det er vel egentlig det jeg tenker rundt det.  
Lars Reiten: Hvordan tror du en bredbåndsavgift kan fungere som et supplement til en allerede eksisterende 
struktur i musikkbransjen? Jeg tenker at det på en måte er der en må starte, for mange av de forslagene som 
har vært har gått på å rive opp en struktur og bygge det hele opp på nytt igjen, og det å gjøre store 
strukturendringer er jo ofte en krevende prosess... 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja... Jeg var litt sånn usikker på hva man mente med spørsmålet... Jeg tror jo det kan 
fungere som et supplement, dersom det gjennomføres på en god praktisk måte. Jeg ser vel ikke at det 
nødvendigvis må erstatte noe annet, eller at det ikke passer inn i den strukturen som allerede er der. Jeg får 
litt assosiasjoner til privatkopieringsvederlaget, at det er litt i samme bane som det.  
Lars Reiten: Tror du at en sånn bredbåndsavgift kunne erstatte privatkopieringsvederlaget? 
Cathrine Ruud: Nei, det tror jeg ikke, for det er jo to helt forskjellige... Eller, det er jo på en måte ikke det, 
men...Ja, nei, det har jeg faktisk ikke tenkt helt på, men... For privatkopiering... Ja, det er litt sant, hvordan 
de går litt inn i hverandre, men nei, jeg ser vel ikke at det kan erstatte det, nei, det gjør jeg ikke. Jeg tror det 
må være strukturert på en litt annen måte enn det det er. 
Lars Reiten: Hvordan da, tenker du? 
Cathrine Ruud: Nei, jeg er litt usikker på det. Jeg ser vel egentlig at det kan kompenseres på samme måte. 
Jeg tenker litt på Norwaco som allerede utbetaler vederlag for privatkopiering, at de er en naturlig instans 
for å kunne fordele disse pengene, men om det erstatter det, det er litt vanskelig å svare på. Det har jeg vel 
ikke tenkt sånn umiddelbart, nei.  
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Lars Reiten: Jammen, det... Det er fint... Hva tror du fordelene ved å kunne introdusere en sånn avgift 
kunne vært? 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja... Fordelene er jo fra vår side at det kunne løst en del problemer. Det er igjen hva er 
fildeling, hva er innhold på nettet? I vår forening så jobber vi veldig mye med... I disse dager har vi det vi 
kaller en internettkampanje, hvor vi har kartlagt... Altså det er også ulovlig å legge ut grafisk, altså noter 
eller tekster på nettet, og tilgjengeliggjøre det åpent på internett, så vi har hatt en del runder hvor vi har 
sendt ut brev til diverse aktører, alt fra bedrifter, foreninger, barnehager, blogger og lignende, som har lagt 
ut dette ulovlig, hvor vi prøver å fjerne det. Det er lang prosess, og man vil aldri få bukt med det problemet, 
eller ryddet opp i alle de nettsidene, så jeg vet ikke om det også er noe som kunne vært inni dette her da... 
En slags kompensasjon for opphavsmennene bak dette, og ikke bare film og lydfiler. Sånn sett hadde det 
løst et stort problem for oss, på den måten. Det bør være en rimelig kompensasjon for opphavsmenn, 
ihvertfall hvis det er snakk om ulovlig nedlasting, en kompensasjon som ikke har vært tilstede tidligere, at 
det hadde løst et veldig... Problem... Forbrukerne, hvis det er snakk om ulovlig nedlasting, men også ellers, 
at de kan laste ned på en rettferdiggjort måte, uten dårlig samvittighet, uten straffeforfølgelse eller straff. 
Og hvis det er individuelt fordelt så vil det gi en veldig god kompensasjon for den direkte ulovlige 
nedlastingen som foregår. Også... Altså, som du sier, så er ikke ulovlig nedlasting et så stort problem i 
Norge som det var, men den kampen mot det er uansett vanskelig, selv om strømming nå har begynt å ta 
over. Det er en veldig enkel løsning på det problemet, hvis det er snakk om ulovlig nedlasting. Det vil 
kunne sikre at det som skaper musikk får mer penger å rutte med, mulighet til å skape mer musikk, kunne 
leve av det de gjør, sikre norsk kultur, altså norsk-språklig produksjon, og at de vil da få rimelig betalt for 
det de gjør. Det er en slags rettferdighetssans over det, vil jeg si. Prinsipielt så er det en god idé for 
rettighetshaverne. For forbrukerne... For det jeg tenker er jo at selv om det er bredbåndsleverandørene som 
skal betale for dette, så vil jo den prisen ultimat gå tilbake til forbrukerne. 
Lars Reiten: Erfaringen viser vel ofte det, ja... 
Cathrine Ruud: Tradisjonelt så... Men, selv om det kan virke som en straff, så er det kanskje et mer 
imøtekommende forslag enn det å straffe og bøtelegge... Det er et forslag på en løsning, et kompromiss. Et 
forslag som kan gavne begge sider. Det er veldig enkelt og forståelig, og det er litt det forbrukerne trenger, 
noe lett å forholde seg til, men da må det også være velargumentert og godt begrunnet hvorfor man skal 
gjøre det. En fordel... Men det kommer litt an på det spørsmålet rundt hva de får igjen... Hvis de får igjen... 
Altså, enten det er å benytte seg av ulovlig nedlasting, så får de noe igjen på den måten, og at det er da uten 
dårlig samvittighet, som jeg sier, men hvis ikke blir det litt vanskeligere fra forbrukernes side.  
Lars Reiten: Jeg skal foregå... Det er egentlig et bispørsmål på det neste spørsmålet som har litt med 
ulemper å gjøre, men du var så inne på det, at jeg bare skal foregå det bispørsmålet. Det er den tematikken, 
som mange nevner er litt av problemet med dette, at det å gi en sånn kompensasjon i ytterste konsekvens 
kan føre til at folk tenker at sånn teknisk sett, så kan vi bare, som du nevner rundt noter, at da kan vi bare 
legge ut noter, for vi betaler for dette her.  
Cathrine Ruud: Ikke sant. 
Lars Reiten: Tror du det finnes en måte å unngå den problemstillingen på? 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja, at de... Ja at det ikke skal bli sånn fritt bruk av alt mulig rart?  
Lars Reiten: Mhm 
Cathrine Ruud: Det er et veldig godt spørsmål. Det må jo være veldig tydelig når man betaler den ekstra 
avgiften hva den går ut på, hvordan det skal skje, men det vet jeg jo ikke helt. Det må jo være visse kriterier 
eller retningslinjer for denne avgiften. Hva skal den inneholde, rett og slett, men mer detaljer enn det, vet 
jeg jo ikke, tror jeg.  
Lars Reiten: Nei, litt av grunnen til det spørsmålet er jo at når dette har vært foreslått tidligere, så har blant 
annet IFPI vært ute å sagt at dette i ytterste konsekvens legaliserer det å bruke opphavsrettsbeskyttet 
materiale enten ulovlig eller ulisensiert. Det sier på en måte at «eg betaler en avgift, så da kan jeg, enten det 
er en krone, fem kroner, femti kroner eller hva det nå er, så kan jeg per definisjon finne noter til et helt 
musikalsk Arne Nordheim-verk, for eksempel, og spille med kvartetten min... 
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Cathrine Ruud: Det er en ulempe ved det. hvis det ikke er det som er meningen. Så jeg er helt enig i at det 
er en ulempe. Men måter å omgå det på, det skjer jo uansett, også har vi jo lover. Åndsverksloven 
forhindrer jo det fremdeles hvis ikke man gjør om de lovene til å kunne passe en sånn avgift, så det er jo en 
måte å unngå det... Altså, det vil jo ikke fortsatt være noe mer lov, hvis ikke det presiseres eller endres sånn 
sett, da. Så vil jeg også... Det har jeg satt som ulempe... Det vil være en legalisering av brudd på 
opphavsretten. Det er litt det... Du sa jo det at tidligere så var det det som var involvert i forslaget, men det 
er det jeg også lurer litt på da, de sidene der, hvor langt en går der.  
Lars Reiten: Tidligere så har for eksempel EU foreslått, rundt det jeg kaller kulturflatrate, for det er det det 
har hett i politisk øyemed i sin tid,  så har de foreslått at man betaler en fast, men frivillig avgift hvor en kan 
laste ned via ikke-kommersielle fildelingsaktører, også kan man dele dette med sine femti nærmeste venner, 
for eksempel. Så kan man alltids diskutere om det er veien å gå, det er nok ikke det nå lenger, uansett, men 
om det var en veldig god idé i sin tid kan man jo alltids diskutere. For å være litt uhildet et øyeblikk, så har 
vel jeg landet på at det er en veldig tungvint og ikke spesielt formålstjenlig måte å gjøre det på.  
Cathrine Ruud: Nei, Tyskland er jo i en litt annen situasjon enn oss, også, så kanskje det... 
Lars Reiten: Ja... Men så er det jo som du sier... Det er dette jeg er litt ute etter, om man skal innføre en 
bredbåndsavgift, kan man gjøre det uten å gå på akkord med de tingene som allerede er i åndsverksloven? 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja, ikke sant. Nei...  
Lars Reiten: Det er som du nevner her, at det kan man jo, såvidt jeg forstår. 
Cathrine Ruud: Kan du ta det en gang til? 
Lars Reiten: Hvis man innfører en bredbåndsavgift, kan man gjøre det uten å gå på akkord med 
opphavsrettslovgivning? 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja... Men da må det jo være veldig tydelig hva den skal innebære. Da går det jo ikke å 
ulovlige nedlaste, da må jo lovene endres.  
Lars Reiten: Har du noen flere, du var litt inne på det, men om du har noen flere ulemper? 
Cathrine Ruud: (ler) Jada, jeg har mange ulemper... Det er litt det jeg sa isted, at det er masse ubesvarte 
spørsmål rett og slett. Du skriver jo ulempene ved å introdusere det, så det er jo litt i forkant av en 
introduksjon, men... Også skal det være frivillig? Hvem skal betale? Hvordan det praktisk gjennomføres og 
sånne ting. Hvis det skulle vært frivillig, hvor mange ville gått med på det? Hvis alle skal betale kan det bli 
sett på som en slags kollektiv straff, at ikke alle benytter seg av internett på samme måte, og i like stor grad. 
Ja... Det er litt sånn at det kan hindre litt innovasjonen på gode løsninger, det kan fremstå som en litt lettvint 
løsning kanskje. Man ser jo at ved å innføre andre gode løsninger så hindrer man ulovlig nedlasting, for 
eksempel, hvis det er tilfellet, mens her gjør man på en måte det motsatte, man går litt i feil retning, kan 
man si. Også er det jo spørsmålet rundt hvem som skal kompenseres, hvordan skal fordelingen foregå, og 
det at det er forbrukerne som må betale prisen i ytterste konsekvens, mest sannsynlig. Så er det dette med 
åndsverksloven, at det kan være litt vanskelig, utifra det vi snakket om, eneretten kan man jo ikke gjøre noe 
med, altså det vil være en litt sånn sell-out av rettighetshaverne, kanskje, og noe man har kjempet for i 
veldig, veldig lang tid. Også kan... Det kommer litt an på hvordan dette skal måles, altså hvordan man skal 
innhente informasjon, og hvordan... Hvordan kan man innhente informasjon for å vite best hvordan dette 
skal fordeles videre. Da kan jo personvernhensyn komme inn. Sånt er ikke jeg så veldig god på, hvordan 
man skal registrere dette, men det kan være et problem. At det kan være sånn overvåkningsfølelse over det. 
Også... Så er det dette med at, litt sånn sell-out av rettighetshaverne på en måte... 
Lars Reiten: Hvordan da? 
Cathrine Ruud: Nei, da går det jo på dette med ulovlig nedlasting da, at hvis de går med på... Ja... Det går i 
motsatt retning av hva man kanskje har prøvd å forhindre de siste 10-15 årene da. Også... Hvis det 
legaliseres, så kan det gå på bekostning av gode løsninger, som sagt, at man går litt tilbake. Så vet jeg ikke 
om det er så veldig, den balansen mellom forbrukerne og rettighetshaverne, om det er en god nok 
årsakssammenheng, er jeg litt sånn usikker på. Om dette er en logisk måte å gi tilbake penger til 
rettighetshaverne på. Om den er lett å forklare, og godt nok argumentert, er jeg litt sånn usikker på. Og det 
	 	 	 	 112	
forholdet mellom forbrukerne og rettighetshaverne er allerede ganske konfliktfylt, hvis du skjønner. Jeg 
tror kanskje... Så er det litt problematisk at internett er noe man... Det er på en måte en slags rettighet det 
også, det er kanskje ikke en menneskerettighet, men det å ha tilgang til internett og det å blandet inn det her 
der, kan sees på som en liten ulempe da. Ja... Også hva slags innhold er det som skal kompenseres for? 
Hvor skal det stoppe? Det er jo så mye innhold. det er jo så mye mer enn musikk og film. Det er jo så my 
grafisk, som jeg sa, journalistisk innhold, alt mulig rart, og hvordan skal man fordele dette, hvordan skal 
man sette en pris på hva som er mer verdt? Også kan det skade den normale utnyttelsen av verket, og det er 
vi veldig opptatt av. Det er derfor vi saumfarer litt internett og sånt. Vi har jo også noteforlag som gir ut 
bøker og lignende, og det er ekstra skadelig for dem når det havner på internett for det er så utrolig lett å 
kopiere opp,  bare en sang, for eksempel, som man kan finne i en notebok. Noteforlagene har ikke vært så 
raske på banen som Spotify og de andre, til å lage et system for noter, tekster og lignende. Man har ikke 
det, så det vil kunne skade... Selv om man vil få en økonomisk gevinst av det ett sted, så kan man tape på 
en annen måte, hvis du skjønner. Så er det litt med dette som jeg sa at det oppleves ikke så veldig 
innovativt, eller, det kan virke som litt rask løsning og en litt defensiv løsning, holdning, at man kan... At 
forbrukerne og musikkbransjen generelt nå er ute etter mer originale, velargumenterte, innovative 
løsninger. Også... Ja... Ja? 
Lars Reiten: Nei, jeg tenker at det er masse ulemper, så det er godt å få det på bånd også. Det er masse 
ulemper ved dette, og det er jo det jeg skal prøve å finne ut av, om man kan få noen svar på de... 
Cathrine Ruud: Det er fordeler også, men de er kanskje... Det er jo sikkert det som er litt av greia med at 
det har tatt ti år også da, at det er lettere å finne ulempene... Men det gjelder generelt med mange ting. Folk 
er veldig kritiske, og det er veldig mye lettere å finne ulemper ved ting enn å se løsningene.  
Lars Reiten: Ikke sant, og fordelene sett opp mot alle ulempene, så er jo fordelen i hovedsak en økonomisk 
vinning... 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja... Og som... Som leder av en organisasjon som beskytter rettighetshaverne, så er jo det en 
veldig stor fordel, absolutt, det er det. Hvis det er for ulovlig nedlasting, men også annet, så er jo det noe 
man ikke har fått kompensasjon for tidligere, så det er jo absolutt en stor fordel, og noe som ville ha løst 
veldig mye for rettighetshavere og opphavsmenn.  
Lars Reiten: Utfra det jeg har funnet ut, så kan det nok tenkes at det har noe for seg. Jeg så litt på tallene fra 
Fond for Lyd og Bilde med den gamle kassettavgiften, og fra de fikk inn penger fra kassetter til dagens 
statlige overføringer, så er faktisk summene de har å dele ut bortimot halvert. Det er jo derfor jeg lurer litt 
på om det kan ha noe for seg. 
Cathrine Ruud: Det tror jeg absolutt, men det er viktig at noen tar tak i det på en ordentlig måte, og nettopp 
ser på litt mer av detaljene i det. Nå virker det jo så diffust og vagt.  
Lars Reiten: Det er masse bra input her, og du nevner masse jeg skal spørre om senere, så jeg går litt videre 
(ler..) 
Cathrine Ruud: (ler...) Ja, men det er bare å... 
Lars Reiten: Hvis man skulle begynt å snakke om eller introdusere en bredbåndsavgift i dag, hvordan ser du 
for deg at den kunne fungert? Da tenker jeg litt... Du har jo vært innom noe av det, men hvordan kan man 
for eksempel finne en struktur for hvem som betaler hva? 
Cathrine Ruud: Da er jeg litt usikker på hva du mente... Hvem som betaler hva? Tenker du da på 
valgfriheten rundt det, eller om det er bredbåndsbrukerne, eller hva... 
Lars Reiten: Ja, det er to ting, og hvis det da eventuelt er forbrukerne, gjør man det da utifra en fast avgift, 
gjør man det utifra tilkoblingshastighet, kan man måle antall nedlastinger, eller finnes det en annen type 
løsning, kanskje? 
Cathrine Ruud: Jeg tenker kanskje at en sånn flat rate er det enkleste å forholde seg til, men samtidig så er 
den mest rettferdige måten vel at man ser på hvilke opphavsmenn, eller... Hvem som er berørt, hvilke 
innholdsleverandører som er berørt, og at man i så stor grad som mulig individualiserer vederlaget. Det vil 
jo si at man registrerer hva som... Men hvordan, det vet jeg virkelig ikke... Om da forbrukeren skal betale 
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mer for at man bruker mer, benytter seg av mer? Det er jo det mest rettferdige, absolutt, men om det er 
gjennomførbart, det vet jeg ikke.  
Lars Reiten: Jeg har på en måte skissert tre modeller rundt dette. Sånn som jeg ser det, bare for å gjøre det 
litt enklere å se sammenhenger, så finnes det på en måte tre forskjellige modeller her. En flat rate, en flat 
avgift på 1 kroner, 5 kroner, 50 kroner, hva det nå enn måtte være, også kan du gjøre det utifra 
tilkoblingshastighet, for erfaring tilsier at jo bedre bredbånd du har desto mer interessert er du i å laste ned. 
Eller så kan du gjøre det utifra antall nedlastinger, og noen mener at det kan måles veldig greit og godt. 
Bruk. Og at bruk og hastighet ikke nødvendigvis har noe med hverandre å gjøre, at du kan ha en hundre 
megabit-linje selv om du bare streamer fra Spotify og sjekker nettbanken. 
Cathrine Ruud: Jeg synes ikke det med hastighet er en spesielt god idé, det blir altfor mye basert på 
antakelser og lignende. Flat rate er kanskje den enkleste, men også kanskje den mest urettferdige, for den 
tar i hvert fall ikke hensyn til hvem som gjør mest, og hvem som ikke gjør noe i det hele tatt. Det blir litt 
sånn kollektiv straff igjen, over det hele. Da tror jeg den tredje modellen kanskje er det som virker mest 
fornuftig, hvis det er lett å gjennomføre, og personvernhensyn og anonymitet og alt sånt ivaretas.  
Lars Reiten: Hvordan kan rettferdiggjøre en sånn type avgift til de som er involvert? Du har jo vært inne på 
det tidligere, men da  tenker jeg på forbrukere, rettighetshavere, politikere - for det må jo noen vedtak 
gjennom her, for å få det til på et eller annet vis - og for eksempel internettleverandører. 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja... Altså... Rettighetshaverne er det vel kanskje enklest å selge det inn til. De får et 
vederlag som de ikke har fått tidligere. De vil få mer penger å bruke til å skape ny musikk, men så har man 
jo også det som jeg sa litt isted, at hvis det blir sånn at ulovlig nedlasting i prinsippet legaliseres, så er det 
kanskje litt vanskelig å selge inn til rettighetshavere. Og hvertfall... Det kommer også litt an på fordelingen, 
hvordan man skal selge det inn og argumentere for det, for hvis det er snakk om at man oppretter et fond, 
individuell fordeling, så kan det føles veldig urettferdig at man går med på en sånn løsning om man ikke får 
tilstrekkelig igjen for det. Men sånn i utgangspunktet, så er det vel ganske lett å selge det inn til 
rettighetshaverne, at det skal være en kompensasjon for deres skapende innsats, rett og slett. Forbrukerne... 
Ja... Det kommer helt an på hvilke forbrukere du snakker med, tenker jeg. Bruker de innhold mye? Hvis de 
ikke gjør blir det jo helt... Ja... Hvis man har den registreringsmodellen, og man registrerer ingenting så er 
det kanskje fint, men hvis det er sånn at de kan laste ned så mye de vil, ulovlig og lovlig, så er det også 
kanskje lett å argumentere for. De trenger ikke bekymre seg for straffeforfølgelse. Det er en veldig enkel 
løsning for alle parter, så vil det jo være lett å... Det kommer jo litt an på hvordan man argumenterer for det, 
men de vil jo måtte skjønne at dette er for det beste for rettighetshaverne også. Det er et slags kompromiss 
da, vil jeg si. Det kommer helt an på hvordan løsningen blir, for alt dette her, egentlig. Og for 
internettleverandørene... De får penger for at... De tilbyr noe til kundene, men det er på en måte kun 
tilgangen til innholdet, det er jo innholdet som er interessant for forbrukerne. Noe er jo også hvor raskt det 
er, og alt det der, men uten innhold så er på en måte bredbåndsleverandører ikke verdt så veldig mye. Da er 
det kanskje naturlig at de er med å bidrar, tenker jeg, selv om jeg synes det er litt... Jeg har litt problemer 
med årsakssammenhengen der, egentlig. Og politikere... Det er jo bare å se på... Altså, strømmetilbud og 
sånt i dag, det er jo en god løsning, men de fleste er jo ikke fornøyde med det, det gir jo ikke en god nok 
kompensasjon til alle norske musikere. Man ser jo at norskandelen på strømming er nede på 12 prosent 
eller noe sånt... Det er veldig lite som går igjen til norskprodusert innhold da, og det ser man jo også på film 
og lignende, så for å bevare at produksjonsnivået kan holde seg høyt og at flere folk kan leve av det, så 
trenger man nye ordninger for å beskytte dette. Det er jo noe de bør være interessert i å ivareta.  
Lars Reiten: Bare et litt oppfølgingsspørsmål. Du nevnte litt med forbrukere og det at de på en måte får en 
mulighet til å ikke være forfulgt hvis de laster ned ulisensiert innhold. Tror du det er veien å gå, eller tror 
du, sånn vi snakket litt om tidligere, at en på en måte kan... For å stille spørsmålet på en litt annen måte, 
med bakgrunn i det. Må man ha en bare en tanke i hodet, eller går det an å ha to tanker i hodet samtidig, i 
den forstand at man også ivaretar opphavsfolkene, i den forstand? Det var litt upresist stilt... 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja, jeg vet ikke helt om jeg skjønte det, men jeg synes ikke det er noen god løsning at de 
betaler en avgift, også legaliseres... Det synes jeg ikke er en god løsning.  
Lars Reiten: Da misforstod jeg deg, kanskje... 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja, jeg prøvde bare å sette meg inn i forbrukernes hode, at de kan laste ned så mye de vil 
uten å tenke på straffeforfølgelse, eller lignende. Men jeg synes ikke det er noen god løsning, jeg er jurist 
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også, så jeg synes ikke det er veien å gå i det hele tatt. Ulovlig nedlasting. Så når jeg svarer på det så er det 
at jeg forsøker å sette meg inn i... 
Lars Reiten: Ikke sant. Da skjønte jeg hvor du kom fra. Jeg skulle bare klargjøre at jeg ikke hadde noen i 
Musikkforleggerne, som sa at «ja, de kan bare laste ned» (ler...) 
Cathrine Ruud: Ikke sant. Nei overhodet ikke, jeg prøvde bare å sette meg inn i... Jeg er litt sånn usikker på 
denne modellen, for jeg har lest litt, og i mange står det at man skal kunne, eller man er for en sånn 
fildelingsløsning og en kompensasjon, men så står det at det ikke må skje i strid med åndsverkslovens 
bestemmelser. Så det var litt mitt originale spørsmål, om hva slags innhold er det da som er igjen. Hva får 
man igjen får det, da? For å betale en sånn avgift.  
Lars Reiten: Det er et godt spørsmål. Jeg skal ikke legge noen føringer, men jeg skal være så direkte å si at 
jeg tror ikke det er mulig... 
Cathrine Ruud: Nei, det er det jeg også ikke helt skjønner, så da er jo det eneste alternative ulovlig 
nedlasting, at det legaliseres... Altså, det legaliseres jo ikke, for endringer må jo til, men det er jo en tenker 
ved en slik avgift sånn umiddelbart, enten det er nedfelt i retningslinjene at det skal være sånn, eller at en 
endre lovene på det, eller at det er psykologisk, at folk vil tenke sånn ved å betale en avgift.  
Lars Reiten: Hvordan kan en avgift være økonomisk gunstig for de forskjellige aktørene i musikkbransjen? 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja... Det kan jo være, hvis man får inn et stort vederlag, så vil jo det naturlig... Det kommer 
helt an på hvordan det vederlaget innhentes, hvor stor potten er, hvordan det skal fordeles. Om det er 
gjennom stipender, fond, individuell fordeling. Hvordan er det man merker det? Så er det jo selvfølgelig litt 
de forskjellige modellene du nevnte i stad, hva skal avgiften være på, hvordan skal man... Det kommer an 
på dette om det er ulovlig nedlasting man snakker om eller ikke. Det har man jo ikke akkurat fått noe 
penger for tidligere, men kanskje vil det øke ulovlig nedlasting, og slik gå utover normal utnyttelse av 
innholdet. At man betaler for det på en annen måte. Så... Jeg vil si at strukturen for hvordan dette fordeles 
vil ha mye å si for hvor økonomisk gunstig dette vil være. Men at enn avgift... Den vil jo være et vederlag 
man ikke har sett tidligere, og således vil det jo være gunstig uansett, men det er bare et spørsmål om hvor 
mye.  
Lars Reiten: Ikke sant. Du ledet meg så elegant over på det, så da går jeg over på neste spørsmål om 
distribusjon, og hvordan disse pengene kunne blitt distribuert. For å bare ta litt bakgrunnstall for det, så det 
kan være litt lettere å se hvor mye vi kan snakke om. Jeg gjorde et regnestykke for å se om det hadde noe 
inntjeningspotensiale, og hvis du tar inn en krone per abonnement i Norge, på bredbånd og mobilt 
bredbånd, det er da alle som kan koble seg til 4G, så har du ca åtte millioner bredbåndsabonnement i Norge, 
fordelt på to millioner kablet og cirka seks millioner mobilt. Om du da bare setter en krone og det er tolv 
måneder i året, så har du nesten hundre millioner kroner i året.  
Cathrine Ruud: Ja, og det er jo betydelig, og veldig, veldig bra. Men da er det en flat... 
Lars Reiten: Da er det en flat rate, og sånn at i sin enkleste form, hvor mye kan du tjene inn.  
Cathrine Ruud: Det er jo betydelig mye som ville ha gjort en forskjell. Privatkopieringsvederlaget er vel på 
45-46 millioner, tror jeg.... Så det er klart at det ville kommet godt med. Absolutt. Distribusjonen av det... 
Man har jo mange måter, det kan jo... Det kan jo være i form av fond, stipender, eller individuell fordeling 
gjennom Norwaco. Tenker at det kanskje er... De fordeler allerede privatkopieringspengene, som er en 
individuell fordeling, og det er naturlig at det kanskje hadde ligget innunder de. Men de har jo også 35 
medlemsorganisasjoner som skal være enige i at dette er en god idé, og veien dit er jo ikke så veldig lett. 
Lars Reiten: Innenfor musikkbransjen så har man jo allerede litt strukturer på plass gjennom Gramo og 
Tono, og så videre. Tror du de kunne hatt noe med dette å gjøre? Rettighetshaverorganisasjonene... 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja... Gramo kjenner jeg ikke så godt... Jeg vet jo hva de er... Tono... Vi er jo en 
underorganisasjon av Tono, og jeg tror ikke det faller naturlig innunder Tono å gjøre dette her.  
Lars Reiten: Da må jeg nesten spørre hvorfor, for det er mange som mener at Tono kan ha noe med det å 
gjøre. Det er bare interessant å høre hvorfor ikke.  
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Cathrine Ruud: Nå har ikke jeg tenkt så veldig mye på hvorfor ikke, men... Det er jo bare basert på hva de 
gjør i dag, men...  De innhenter jo allerede avspillinger, eller fremføringer, på en veldig nøyaktig måte i dag 
på andre områder, men... De er jo et fremføringsforvaltnings... De forvalter fremføringsrettigheter, og... Jeg 
synes det er mer naturlig at det ligger under Norwaco, men jeg kan tenke litt på det, altså. 
Lars Reiten: Neida, det er litt sånn initial reaction-greie, dette her... 
Cathrine Ruud: (ler...) Ja, ikke sant... 
Lars Reiten: Men det er veldig interessant å høre at du tenker på den måten, for veldig mange svarer at 
Tono er naturlig og det er strukturer, og det er interessant som et nyanserende argument, hvorfor... 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja... 
Lars Reiten: Men... Jeg lurer litt på her da om... Hvis hele eller deler av pengene, la oss si at hvis man 
fordeler 100 millioner, så kunne kanskje 75% prosent gått tilbake til artister, forfattere, rettighetshavere, så 
må sikkert distributører og plateselskaper ha en liten del av... Si at man da har 25% igjen som man kan 
putte i et fond, som Fond for Lyd og Bilde, for eksempel. Hvordan kunne du sett for deg at det fondet 
kunne fungert, da? 
Cathrine Ruud: Hvem som kunne søke på det, og sånt? 
Lars Reiten: Ja, for eksempel... 
Cathrine Ruud: Jeg er litt... Hva er det som gjøres i Fond for Lyd og... Hvem er det som kan søke der i dag 
da? 
Lars Reiten: Det husker jeg ikke helt på stående fot, men utifra... Det er vel mange enkeltkunstnere og 
mange enkeltindivider som trenger finansiering til... 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja, det måtte jo vært noen som kanskje... Hvor det er vanskelig å fordele individuelt... 
Fange opp grupper som det er vanskelig å fordele individuelt til... Utsatte grupper. Noe sånt. Men samtidig 
noen som det også brukes innhold av på nettet. Jeg vet ikke... For det felles beste, fellesløsninger, noe sånt. 
Er det ikke det fond ofte gjør da? 
Lars Reiten: Jo, det er jo det. Litt av bakgrunnen for det spørsmålene er at plateselskapene tidligere har sagt 
at de på lik linje med filmprodusenter, at de ønsker å ha mulighet til å få tilskudd for å finansiere eksport og 
markedsføring av musikk i utlandet, også sier de at kommersielle krefter på filmsiden har anledning til å 
gjøre dette, kommersielle krefter på musikksiden har ikke det. Det har man sagt før. Det jeg egentlig lurer 
på, i forlengelsen av spørsmålet, er om du kunne sett for deg at det kunne vært mulig for kommersielle 
aktører å søke penger for å for eksempel få inn nye norsk-språklige artister i porteføljen, ta mer risiko, 
markedsføre bedre i utlandet... 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja, absolutt. Det ser jeg for meg. Det synes jeg er en god idé. Og så... Ja... Alt som er med 
på å føre til mer skapelse av nye verk og ny musikk som så går igjen og brukes på internett, som så går 
igjen... Det blir jo en slags sirkel... Det ser jeg for meg kan være en løsning.  
Lars Reiten: Det er jo mange som mener at det at for å kommersielle krefter å tjene penger på søking i 
offentlige fond, er jo ikke akkurat, det er ikke alltid det man vil, så det er bare interessant å høre om rent 
kommersielle krefter kan ha mulighet for å gjøre det.  
Cathrine Ruud: Ja, i denne sammenhengen så synes jeg det.  
Lars Reiten: Nå har vi holdt på syv minutter lenger enn jeg lovte deg, ser jeg her, så jeg tar siste spørsmål. 
Er det behov og grunnlag for en bredbåndsavgift? 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja. Det er jo kjempevanskelig å svare på, egentlig. Jeg har vel ikke... Er det meningen at 
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Lars Reiten: Nei...  Du kan si det sånn at om jeg får utifra fire intervjuer at alle sier «nei, det er det ikke», så 
skjønner jeg at det er det ikke, men så er det så mange nyanser.... 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja, det er veldig mange nyanser, og det er veldig vanskelig å svare på uten at de detaljene er 
mer på plass. Behovet er nok der. For rettighetshaverne så synes jo vi at det hadde vært en fin ting. 
Spørsmålet er jo bare om det er gjennomførbart, hvordan de juridiske, om det går på bekostning av det... 
Det er så utrolig mange faktorer inne idet. Jeg synes absolutt det er behov, og kanskje grunnlag, for å 
utforske det videre.  At det er en såpass god idé at man kan, såfremt disse detaljene gjøres... Da skal på en 
måte alt komme sammen, alle hensyn skal ivaretas. Klarer man det så tror jeg nok det er grunnlag og behov 
for det. Om det er den beste løsningen, det er jeg litt mer usikker på. Det har litt å gjøre med det jeg nevnte 
istad, dette med innovativheten, at det kan hindre det litt, at en lener seg litt på dette, hvor man ser at det er 
nye løsninger som kanskje favoriseres litt mer. Kanskje bedre å se litt mer på strømmemodellen og de 
løsningene man allerede har, og prøve å rydde opp litt mer der. Men jeg synes absolutt at det er nok 
materiale til å utforske det videre, men da er det så mye som må på plass før man kan svare ja eller nei.  
Lars Reiten: Det er godt du svarer det da, så har jeg ikke mistet temaet helt... (ler...) 
Cathrine Ruud: (ler...) Ja, jeg synes det er interessant, altså. Og det er tydelig at det er et behov for... Når 
det har blitt pratet om såpass lenge, og det var vel et par år siden Filmprodusentene tok det opp på nytt, 
igjen... Da virker det jo som om det kanskje er behov for å utforske problematikken og tematikken litt 
videre. Det er interessant, kan man vel si, men man må ha litt mer klare svar før man kan svare på om det 
virkelig er en god løsning.  
Lars Reiten: Bare for å ta et lite oppfølgingsspørsmål. Tror du det kan oppfattes som en quick fix på et mye 
større problem, en mye større strukturutfordring? 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja, det tror jeg. Det er kanskje litt sånn det oppfattes, men det har også sammenheng med at 
det er så mange løse tråder, at... At det er... Ja, jeg tror absolutt at det er grunnlag for å utforske andre 
løsninger først. Når jeg leste det med Filmprodusentforeningen, så virket det veldig... Det har med 
årsakssammenhengen å gjøre, jeg synes de argumentene de kom med- nå er jo dette filmbransjen da - var 
litt lettvinne og ikke så godt argumenterte. Det var litt sånn at «dere bruker innholdet så derfor bør dere 
betale». Det virket litt sånn manglende... Inspirasjon og innovasjon til å gjøre noe annet, ihvertfall i den 
bransjen. I musikkbransjen har vi kanskje kommet litt lengre.  
Lars Reiten: Er det behov for en sånn type avgift etter at streaming kom inn i bildet? 
Cathrine Ruud: Det er et godt spørsmål. Igjen, det kommer litt an på dette med ulovlig nedlasting. 
Strømming har vel tatt mer eller mindre over der, så sånnsett er det kanskje ikke behov, men samtidig så er 
det mange som er misfornøyd med hvordan fordelingen av streaminginntekter er idag, så den er ikke helt 
ferdigløst den heller. Så, jeg vil ikke si at det ikke er behov for det på grunn av strømmingen.  
Lars Reiten: Ikke sant. Har du noe du føler vi ikke har kommet inn på, sånn før jeg avslutter opptaket? 
Cathrine Ruud: Nei, jeg tror vel ikke det. Jeg synes det er litt vanskelig, for det er så lite kjøtt på beinet. De 
argumentene jeg har lest er veldig endimensjonale. Det virker ikke helt godt tenkt gjennom, synes jeg. Også 
er det litt det, innledningsvis, hva får man igjen for en sånn avgift? Er det sånn at man skal ulovlig laste 
ned, eller da blir det jo ikke ulovlig lenger, men da må man igjen gjøre om på lover og alt. Er det det man 
får igjen? Hva med tilgjengeligheten til innhold? Det er det jeg sliter litt med å skjønne, da. 
Lars Reiten: Yes. Jammen, supert Cathrine, da tar jeg å stopper opptaket der... 
Cathrine Ruud: Ja.  
Lars Reiten GÅR IGJENNOM RESTEN AV INTERVJUGUIDEN MED Cathrine Ruud. (SE 
INTERVJUGUIDE FOR NÆRMERE BESKRIVELSE) -  
Total intervjutid: ca 59 minutter 	
